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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis examines the implications of ownership and institutions for corporate 
financing in Central and Eastern Europe. There are three empirical chapters (chapters 2, 3 and 
4). Chapter two examines the role of business networks for firm external financing. Our central 
hypothesis here is that firms’ affiliation to business association is likely to be beneficial in 
securing external finance (especially bank finance) in countries with weak legal and judicial 
institutions, as it helps banks and financial institutions to minimize the underlying agency costs of 
lending. Using recent EBRD-World Bank BEEPS data, we find some support to this central 
hypothesis in our sample.   
Importance of foreign banks for economic development of CEE countries has been 
emphasized in the literature though there is wide dispersion in foreign investment in the region. 
In this context, chapter three (i.e., the second empirical chapter) focuses on the implications of 
corruption for foreign bank entry and ownership structure in Central and Eastern European 
countries. The chapter argues that the presence and persistence of corruption (both absolute and 
relative) may adversely affect costs of setting up as well as running day-to-day operations of 
foreign banks in host emerging economies. Using primarily Bankscope bank-level data we find 
that greater absolute and relative corruption may lower foreign bank entry, greater relative 
corruption may encourage foreign greenfield entry in our sample; while relative corruption is not 
significant for foreign takeover. The latter highlights the importance of encouraging foreign 
investors from countries with similar institutions. 
Finally, considering the implications of ownership for bank capital and performance in 
chapter four (the final empirical chapter) in light of the focus on bank capital and capital 
regulation in discussions after the recent banking crisis, we argue that the relationship between 
bank capital and bank performance crucially depends on bank ownership structure. Using 
Osiris data we examine foreign greenfield and other joint venture (JV) differential effect of high 
bank capital on bank performance. A significant positive effect of foreign Greenfield (as opposed 
to JV) bank capital on bank performance, after controlling for all other factors is found. We 
attribute this to better governance compared to varied ownership arrangement in other joint 
venture banks.  
Thus wide dispersion in the quality of institutions and ownership explains a great deal of 
variation in the economic performance of countries in the region. We hope findings of this thesis 
would inform policies and will also influence future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.0. Background 
Just over two decades ago, transition countries which were till then socialist economies, 
began a process of radical transformation of their political and economic systems. Failure 
of the socialist system was evident in their economic performance and slow economic 
growth (see Gomulka, 1990). State-owned enterprises were inefficient as they failed to 
invest or produce rationally and wasted scarce resources in the process (See Bergson, 
1991,; Estrin, 1993). Privatization thus appeared the natural way forward to addressing 
the ills of the socialist system and also to ensure a successful transition to a market 
economy. However, privatization in transition countries, especially Eastern Europe 
contrasts to those in other countries and as such cannot be compared to the privatization 
experiences of other countries. Privatization in the transitional economies goes far 
beyond a simple transfer of ownership from the state to private individuals. It entails a 
process by which the institution of property is re-introduced to Eastern European 
societies, as efficient use of socially available resources is promoted (Frydman et al, 
1994). This will enable the removal of the erstwhile systematic incentive to under 
produce and over consume scarce social resources. This meant that structural reform of 
the economies needed to proceed on a microeconomic level. 
The process of privatisation provided the opportunity for the emergence of private 
banks and non-financial enterprises, including foreign multinational companies. An 
important feature of the privatization process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has 
been the break-up of large state-owned enterprises, which in turn had led to the growth of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the region. A challenge facing these SMEs has 
been to ensure sufficient finance required for their expansion activities and future growth. 
However despite extensive bank reforms there has been a feeling that these reforms have 
failed to spur the external financing opportunities for the newly privatised domestic 
firms, especially the SMEs. In this context, the first paper examines the possible role of 
firm’s affiliation of various business associations in securing external financing 
opportunities.  
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There has been some consensus that privatization has contributed to improved 
efficiency, which can primarily be attributable to the sale of erstwhile state banks to 
foreign individuals (Megginson (2005), Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2003), Bonin, Hassan 
and Wachtel (2004), Berger et al (2003).
1
 However there is a pronounced inter-country 
variation in the share of foreign banks in the CEE region; the latter can perhaps be 
explained by differential institutional development. Recent literature (e.g., La porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997) has highlighted the importance of legal and 
judicial institutions in enforcing contracts and safeguarding shareholders’ and creditors’ 
rights, thus promoting financial and economic development even in market oriented 
economies. Shleifer (1997) argues that there has to be a transition of government for a 
transition to a market economy to take place. This was described as de-politicization of 
the economy, whereby control over resource use and ownership is transferred exclusively 
to the private sector. Government role will then be to provide the necessary institutions to 
support the market economy. This will necessitate the creation of laws and legal 
institutions that protect private property, enforce contracts between private parties, but 
also limit the ability of officials to prey on private property. Clearly, CEE countries are at 
different levels of institutional development, which in turn influences the pace and the 
success of their market reforms. In this context we examine the role of corruption on 
mode of entry and ownership of foreign banks.  Spectacular growth of foreign banks has 
been a major feature of post-privatisation period in the CEE region. 
While financial liberalization and privatization have dominated the financial 
policy debate over the past few decades, the current financial crisis (since late 2007) has 
highlighted the risks of unregulated privatization. During the sustained period of high 
growth over the past decade or so, unfettered risk-taking by banks had contributed to the 
outbreak of the financial crisis of 2007 around the globe (e.g., see Coricelli et al, 2009; 
De Haas and Van Horen, 2009), necessitating huge government bail-out of banks. 
Accordingly, capital management of banks has come under increasing scrutiny in recent 
time, hence necessitating a re-evaluation of bank regulations. In this context, we highlight 
                                                 
1 Performance of private banks may vary depending on whether they are de novo (newly created) or privatised. De 
novo private banks perform better than privatized banks in general and this may be attributed to the difficulty 
experienced in transforming the pre-privatization fortunes of the privatized banks (Clarke et al, 2003). 
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the impact of ownership structure on the relationship between bank capital and bank 
performance.  
Despite their importance, the aforementioned issues remain unexplored. We hope 
results of this study would provide further understanding of the issues and would also 
yield some implications for policy.  
 
 
 
1.1. Aims and objectives  
The structure of the thesis is as follows:  
 The second chapter examines the role of business networking on firms’ external 
financing choices. We particularly focus on firms’ access to bank finance and  
examine the role of networking on firm’s access to loans from various bank 
ownership types - state, domestic private commercial, and foreign banks in light 
of the potential for firm-bank ownership matching post-reform. The analysis is 
based on 2002 and 2005 rounds of European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) - World Bank BEEPS data available from EBRD. 
 The third chapter explores the role of corruption in general and relative 
corruption, i.e., the corruption in host countries relative to that in home countries, 
on foreign bank entry and foreign ownership in the CEE region. The analysis is 
based on Bankscope and data from De Haas et al (2011).  
 The fourth chapter examines the role of ownership on the relationship between 
bank capital and bank performance, given that bank capital is an essential 
component of bank regulation. The analysis is primarily based on Bureau van 
Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Osiris database. 
 The final chapter summarises the main findings of the paper and also derives 
policy implications, where possible; in the process, we also highlight the 
limitations of our study and scope for further research. 
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1.2.  An Overview 
The present study consists of three main empirical chapters. Chapter 2 examines the role 
of firms’ business association membership on access to external financing including bank 
and equity finance, and also non-bank credit in the Central and Eastern European country 
region. The paper argues that networked firms are likely to have an advantage in securing 
external finance in countries with weak legal and judicial institutions since it helps 
financial institutions to minimize the underlying agency costs of lending. An analysis of 
recent European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) –World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise performance Survey (BEEPS) data from fifteen 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries lends some support to this hypothesis. 
Even after controlling for other factors, firms affiliated to business associations are more 
likely to secure bank finance. Importance of being associated with business networks is 
particularly evident among firms who borrow from domestic private commercial and 
foreign banks, as these new banks attempt to hedge risk in uncertain environment during 
the process of transition. Networking however discriminates against the small and 
medium sized firms’ access to bank loans in the CEE regions. Results are robust in both 
single cross-section and panel data analyzes.  
While growth of foreign banks has been pronounced in some of the transition 
countries, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the growth of foreign banks across the 
CEE region, which remains little understood. In this context, Chapter 3 examines the role 
of corruption on foreign bank entry and share of foreign ownership in fourteen CEE 
countries. The paper not only considers the role of host country corruption, but also the 
distance in the corruption between home and host countries. It is argued that the latter 
measures the degree of (un) familiarity in running a business in the foreign country and 
has been labelled relative corruption. The paper uses Bankscope and some related data on 
mode of foreign entry employed by De Haas et al (2011). There are three sets of results 
that confirm the significance of both corruption measures on foreign bank entry and 
ownership pattern. (i) Greater host corruption and relative corruption are found to both 
discourage foreign bank entry in our sample; (ii) Next we distinguish between foreign 
greenfield and foreign takeover and find that while greater absolute corruption reduces 
the likelihood of foreign greenfield, greater relative corruption may increase the 
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likelihood of foreign greenfield (as opposed to takeover) so as to reduce the direct and 
indirect costs of joint venture especially in an unfamiliar environment. (iii) Finally 
controlling for foreign bank entry, we consider the share of foreign ownership in our 
sample. These estimates strengthen estimates (ii) cited above in that foreign ownership 
responds to host country absolute corruption. Greater host corruption reduces the 
controlling stake of foreign banks in countries with weak institutions. In other words, 
holding a controlling stake emerges to be attractive in an environment where the costs of 
operation of foreign banks are rising as a result of weak institutions in CEE countries. 
The final paper highlights the role of ownership on the relationship between bank 
capital and bank performance in the Central and Eastern European region. Much of the 
discussion in Europe after the recent banking crisis has focused on bank capital and 
capital regulation. We however argue that the relationship between bank capital and 
return on assets crucially depends on bank ownership. Results using cross-country panel 
data from emerging Europe for the period 2000-2007 confirm this. Ceteris paribus there 
is suggestion that foreign greenfield banks operate more efficiently than other banks in 
our sample. We find that foreign greenfield banks tend to have significantly lower 
liabilities and also that they enjoy about 7% higher differential return despite having 
higher liability on average. We argue that the later highlights the potential conflict of 
interests between domestic and foreign owners in joint venture bank subsidiaries.  
 
 
 
1.3.  Significance of the Study 
Despite more than two decades of the reforms in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, wide cross-country variation in economic performance cannot be ignored. This 
disparity has generally been attributed to the dissimilar initial conditions at the start of 
reforms (Earle et al, 1993). In addition, some countries experienced more hurdles than 
others in implementing newly formulated reform-oriented policies, thus having 
differential progress with the reform.  
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This research integrates the literature on social capital, institutions (in particular, 
corruption) as well as ownership for an understanding of the barriers to the corporate 
financial development in the CEE transition region. In doing so, we not only consider the 
issue from the point of view of non-financial firms, but also from those of the banks and 
financial institutions. The questions that we raise are rather unexplored in the literature 
and as such there is important value added of our analysis (see each chapter for further 
discussion).   
In particular, our study attempts to shed light on three unanswered questions 
regarding corporate financing in the CEE region. (i) Why are some firms less able to 
access credit to finance their activities compared to others? The first paper argues that 
networked firms are likely to have an advantage in securing external finance in countries 
with weak legal and judicial institutions since it helps financial institutions to minimize 
the underlying agency costs of lending. (ii) How do foreign banks choose their 
destination countries? The second paper argues that in addition to corruption in the host 
country, corruption in the host country relative to that in the home country, which 
measures the degree of (un)familiarity in running a business in the foreign country 
labelled as relative corruption, could influence a foreign bank’s decision to enter a host 
country in the transition region. (iii) Why are some foreign banks more efficient than 
others? We argue that one hundred percent foreign owned bank subsidiaries –which are 
equivalent to foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries could perform better than joint venture 
banks –which are equivalent to foreign takeover banks,  because the latter suffers from 
the potential conflict of interests between domestic and foreign partners in joint venture 
banks.  
We hope findings of this research will help formulate policies to encourage 
growth of corporate financing opportunities in the region. First, forming networks to 
secure bank loans and other business facilities may not necessarily be an efficient 
arrangement for the broader economy, as it may promote the interests of those networked 
firms who are successful to belong to good networks through family/political connections 
or otherwise, but are not necessarily more efficient firms. Second, our results highlight 
that greater absolute and relative corruption may discourage foreign bank entry in a host 
CEE country, and that while absolute host corruption is important for foreign bank entry, 
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relative corruption must also be taken into account. As such there is scope for attracting 
foreign investment from countries with similar institutional framework so that the degree 
of unfamiliarity of running a business in a host country is minimized. The latter may give 
rise to investment from various emerging countries. The quality of host country 
institutions however needs to be improved to attract foreign investment from home 
countries of significantly higher institutional quality. Finally, following the recent 
financial crisis of 2007, and its focus on capital regulation and its effects on the size of 
the bank capital, results from our study suggests that the relationship between bank 
capital and bank performance crucially depends on bank ownership. Efforts therefore 
need to be directed towards encouraging bank ownership that results in a significant 
boost to bank performance, even as it also affects bank capital. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Value of Business Networks In Emerging Economies:  An Analysis 
of Firms’ External Financing Opportunities 
2.0. Introduction 
Problems of contract enforcement are common in countries with weak institutions 
because there is no guarantee that contractual obligations will be upheld by the local 
institutions. Networks and informal relationships may thus emerge to facilitate 
functioning of many organisations in transition and emerging economies with weak legal 
and judicial institutions (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Boisot and Child, 1996; Guiso et al. 2004; 
Grief 2006; Ayyagari et al. 2008). In this context the present paper examines the role of 
firms’ affiliation to business networks on external corporate financing opportunities. 
Recent empirical studies in the organizational behaviour literature (e.g., Boisot 
and Child, 1996) suggest that informal networks are often a response to inadequate 
institutional support. In particular, lack of legal/judicial structure that guarantees written 
contracts and private property may render credit enforcement difficult. One can argue 
that a firm’s membership of a business network or association may help in minimising 
the underlying costs of lending arising from the uncertainty of credit enforcement (see 
further discussion in section 2.1). The latter may be particularly important for subsidiaries 
of foreign banks operating in emerging economies where the problem of contract 
enforcement is worse.  
Our analysis focuses on a group of Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, who are an important case in point. Even after a decade of reform, there is a 
growing feeling that the reforms have failed to spur adequately the development of 
banking in the CEE countries. Despite widespread reforms, use of external finance 
remains rather limited (only 26% of our sample firms had access to some bank finance), 
even by the standard of other developing and emerging economies. Further, among those 
firms with outstanding bank loans, many tend to have very high, potentially excessive, 
leverage (see Coricelli et al. 2011). This necessitates a further investigation of firms’ 
external financing opportunities in the region. In this respect, the present paper highlights 
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the role of firms’ affiliations to business networks. 
The analysis is developed in two steps. First, we examine the effect of business 
networking on firms’ financing choices distinguishing between internal finance, bank 
finance, non-bank finance and equity finance. Second, we focus on firms’ access to bank 
finance and, in this respect, examine the role of networking on firm’s access to loans 
from state, domestic (local) private and foreign banks. The latter also allows us to explore 
evidence of firm-bank ownership matching, if any. Note however that a firm’s affiliation 
to a business network is unlikely to be exogenous as networked firms are unlikely to be a 
random sample of all sample firms. Hence one needs to correct for the underlying 
endogeneity bias arising out of this selection issue. We adopt two possible approaches: 
first, we obtain the predicted value of business association membership using a first stage 
regression (with some exclusion restrictions; see further discussion in section 2.2.3) and 
use this as a potentially exogenous instrument for firm’s access to any external financing 
as well as access to bank loans (by bank ownership). Second, BEEPS data has a small 
panel element where a small fraction of sample firms were interviewed in both 2002 and 
2005 (see further discussion in section 2.2). This allows us to use 2002 and 2005 BEEPS 
panel data
2
 to obtain OLS fixed effects estimates. In other words, we use variation in 
access to external finance over time (2002-2005) for a given firm to identify the effect of 
networking on firm financing opportunities.  
There is evidence from our analysis that, ceteris paribus, business networking 
plays a significant role on the probability of securing external corporate financing from 
both domestic private and foreign banks. The latter can be attributed to these new banks’ 
attempts to trade cautiously in an uncertain business environment in countries with weak 
institutions. Further, younger small and medium sized enterprises are less likely to be 
networked and are also less likely to have access to various external finances in our 
sample. In other words, lack of business networking may force SMEs to rely more on 
internal finance, thus hindering the process of corporate growth in the region.  
The paper contributes to a limited but growing literature on corporate financing in 
emerging economies. There is generally a consensus in the literature that business 
                                                 
2 Our attempt to include recently released 2009 BEEPS data in the panel analysis failed as 2009 round does not provide 
information on firm’s affiliation to business associations. 
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networks are a feature of the organizational landscape of many countries though their 
nature and effects may vary across the world. Kali (1999) argued that these networks 
absorb honest individuals and raise the density of dishonest individuals engaged in 
anonymous market exchange, which in turn may harm public interest. Consequently, the 
payoff from market exchange may diminish. Along similar lines Khawaja and Mian 
(2005) examining the link between political connection of firms and bank lending in 
Pakistan from 1996-2002, found that political firms borrow 45% more and also have 50% 
higher default rates and this preferential treatment of political firms largely occur in states 
banks in the country. In contrast, cross-country studies on social capital and economic 
growth (e.g., see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley 2000) have generally highlighted the 
positive impact of active membership in social organization to economic growth, thus 
motivating our analysis for the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
While there is a growing literature on corporate financing in CEE region (for example, 
see Fries and Taci (2002); Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Sulla (2002); De Haas et al. 
(2007)) and also some literature highlighting the effect of lack of social capital in 
transition region (e.g., see Raiser (1999), Paldam and Svedsen (2000, 2001)) on 
economic development and growth in the region, we are not aware of any study that 
analyzes the role of business networks on firm external financing opportunities in the 
transition region. We thus integrate two strands of the literature, one on corporate finance 
and, the second one on social capital and economic development, to examine the effect of 
business networks on corporate financing opportunities in the CEE region.  
It is an important exercise because it would allow us to identify a possible micro-
economic mechanism through which business networking can influence corporate 
financial opportunities in the region. Further results from our analysis highlight the 
inefficiency business networking may cause, distinguishing it from the advantages of 
social networking highlighted in the literature. Given that these countries are undergoing 
radical institutional restructuring, it is important that the informal institutions (e.g., some 
business networks) remain compatible with the formal institutions so as to minimize the 
possible costs of corruption and tax evasion and boost economic growth in the region. 
We thus hope that this research will inform policy makers to take steps to ease SME’s 
25 
 
access to external corporate financing opportunities from newly privatised banks 
(domestic or foreign). 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 2.1 explains the data and hypotheses 
while section 2.2 develops the empirical methodology. Sections 2.3 analyzes the results 
and the final section concludes. 
 
 
 
2.1.  Data & Hypotheses 
Our analysis is primarily based on the EBRD – World Bank Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005 data.
3
 BEEPS is a joint initiative of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank 
Group. The survey, was administered to a random sample of 11814 enterprises in 28 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) including Turkey and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), to examine the quality of the business environment (as 
determined by a wide range of interactions between firms and the state), to assess the 
environment for private enterprise and business development. For further details of the 
data, see EBRD (2005). For one particular section of our analysis we also make use of the 
panel element of 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data (see footnote 2 and also section 2.2.3) 
 
 
2.1.1. Data Description 
For the purpose of our study we create a sub-sample comprising only of firms in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This gave rise to a sample 
of 5040 firms, representing about 43% of all firms that participated in the 2005 BEEPS 
                                                 
3 Later we shall make use of 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data to check the robustness of our cross-section estimates using 
2005 BEEPS data. 
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survey. The country distribution of our sample of firms is shown in Table 2.1, which 
suggests that Polish firms represent the largest share, 19.35% of the total sample, 
followed by Hungary, Romania and Czech Republic. 
 BEEPS data provides information on whether a firm is affiliated to any business 
association, which plays a significant role in our analysis. Table 2.1 shows the proportion 
of firms affiliated to business association in the sample countries, which clearly 
highlights the pronounced inter-country variation. While Czech Republic has only 21% 
affiliated firms in our sample, the proportion rises to as high as 91% in Slovenia closely 
followed by 88% in Albania. Note that the nature of most business associations in the 
Balkan countries like Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are likely to be 
different from those in most other countries in the CEE region.
4
 The model of business 
representation in the Balkan countries was adapted from the "continental" chamber 
systems in the sense of being based on compulsory membership. Note however that 
business association membership is compulsory only for certain sectors and these sectors 
may vary from one Balkan country to another. Membership is usually automatic upon the 
official incorporation of an enterprise or the licensing of entrepreneurial activity 
(Duvanova, 2008). This would explain why business association membership would in 
general be much higher in the Balkan region in our sample.
5
 In an attempt to capture this 
regional variation in the business association membership, we create a Balkan dummy 
that takes a value 1 for the subsample Balkan countries, namely, Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovenia and is zero 
otherwise. In other words, inclusion of the Balkan dummy allows us to distinguish the 
effect of compulsory membership from voluntary membership.   
Networked firms may benefit in a number of ways from their affiliation to the 
business association including lobbying the government (82.5% of networked firms), 
resolving disputes (83.5% of networked firms), information on domestic/international 
product and input markets (about 90% firms), accrediting quality standards of the product 
(89% of networked firms) and getting information on government regulation (about 91% 
                                                 
4 Our empirical analysis attempts to control for this. 
5 This explains why despite compulsory business association membership in the Balkan countries, our sample does not 
show 100%  membership of business association in the region. 
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of networked firms). The latter in turn suggests that the business association membership 
variable is likely to be endogenous to firm financing, especially when the firms whose 
associations provide networking-type services (e.g., "information or contacts on domestic 
…markets") tend to be the ones having access to external finance. 
Using the identity of the largest owner, we can also classify firms by ownership 
structure: (a) state, when the largest shareholder is government or government agency; 
(b) domestic private, when the largest shareholder is individual/family, general public, 
and domestic company; (c) foreign, when the largest shareholder is a foreign company. In 
a similar fashion, we classify the banks’ lending to the sample firms as state, domestic 
private commercial and foreign. Table 2.2 cross-tabulates ownership structure of firms 
and banks providing loans to the sample firms. Of the firms that borrow from banks, 
borrowing from domestic private commercial banks is most common, irrespective of firm 
ownership type (state-owned, foreign-owned or private domestically owned). There also 
seems to be some firm-bank ownership matching, as private domestic firms are more 
likely to use domestic private commercial banks. Note that the borrowing from state-
banks is not so common in 2005; but again, relatively higher proportion of state-owned 
firms borrows from state banks. It can be argued that one possible way to reduce costs 
related to adverse selection in bank lending would be to adhere to ownership matching 
between firms and banks (e.g., see Berger et al. 2006), especially in the presence of 
market imperfections in countries with weak institutions. EBRD report (2006) suggests a 
form of bank-firm matching between large firms and foreign banks in a selected number 
of transition countries. Later we would explore if firm-bank ownership matching holds, 
after controlling for all other factors.  
Our analysis solely considers firm finance for new investment, which funds future 
growth opportunities. In the BEEPS survey, firm managers were requested to provide 
information on sources of finance including internal funds/retained earnings, equity, 
domestic private commercial bank borrowing, foreign bank borrowing, state-owned bank 
borrowing (including state development banks), loans from family/friends, money 
lenders or other informal sources, trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from 
customers, credit cards, leasing arrangement, the Government (other than state-owned 
banks) and other, for their establishment’s new fixed investments (i.e., new land, 
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buildings, machinery, equipment, etc). We aggregate the available information to create 
four categories of financing sources: internal finance, bank finance (when firm obtains 
loans from any bank, domestic private commercial, state or foreign), equity finance and 
any non-bank finance; the latter refers to trade credit from suppliers or customers, credit 
cards, and leasing arrangement. Thus, non-bank finance in our study is simply finance 
that are not formal bank loans, and which firms can access as an additional source of 
finance for business activity. Such finance tends to be generally short term in nature, but 
may be long term (in the case of lease arrangements)
6
. Thus external sources of financing 
in our sample refer to bank loans, equity financing or any type of non-bank financing. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the sources of firm financing for new investment in the 
selected countries in 2005. Note however that some firms tend to obtain financing from 
more than one source (internal, external or both). Accordingly, Table 2.4 shows the 
proportion of firms relying solely on any type of internal or external financing. Clearly 
reliance on external financing is rather limited in our sample as a significant proportion of 
firms rely solely on internal finance.  In fact about 39% sample firms relied only on 
internal finance for new investment in 2005 in all countries taken together, though there 
is some inter-country variation as highlighted in Table 2.3. Reliance on equity funding is 
rather limited as equity markets continue to be rather under-developed in these countries. 
A small proportion (1% - 12%) of firms relied solely on bank or equity financing or trade 
credit.  
Following the introduction of the transition process in the early 1990s, there has 
been a significant increase in the share of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in CEE 
countries; the latter could be attributed to the break-up of large state-owned enterprises 
during the transition. Using the labour force size information contained in the BEEPS 
data, we classify firms into three categories, namely, ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’.7 We 
merge small and medium sized firms together and label them as small and medium 
enterprises or SME in short. About 91% of sample firms are small and medium sized 
                                                 
6 Nonbank finance has grown in popularity as a result of financial liberalization reforms in developed as well as 
developing countries. 
7 Other studies notably, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) have used log of sales to proxy for this and Gonzalez et al (2007) 
used natural log of firm total assets.  
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enterprises (see Table 2.1); in other words only about 9% sample firms could be 
classified as ‘large’ according to their employment size.  
It is also important to identify the newly established firms from the rest. 
Following Klapper et al (2002), firms with an age of 10 years or less, i.e, those that came 
into existence after the year 1995, were defined as ‘young’. 49% of small firms in our 
sample fall into the category of young firms. It also means that large firms are not 
necessarily old firms. The average proportion of SMEs and young firms for each of the 
sample countries are also shown in Table 2.1.  
Using firms’ business association membership, we could classify firms into 
networked and other non-networked firms. Table 2.5 compares selected characteristics of 
networked firms with other firms and highlights some important characteristics of 
networked firms.
8
 In general, older state firms and also foreign firms are significantly 
more likely to be networked, while young SMEs in the domestic private sector are 
significantly less likely to be networked. In addition, compared to non-networked firms, 
networked firms are more likely to be involved in the export sector. Thus, networked 
firms appear to be in a more advantageous position than other non-networked firms.  
 
 
2.1.2 The Choice Between Internal Finance And External Finance 
Firms choose between internal and external finance sources to finance firm activity; in 
doing so, firms need to consider a number of factors including the cost of capital. In 
general, specific considerations of firms depend on the particular theory of firm financing 
under consideration. Starting with the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
leverage irrelevance framework, there are a number of extensions including the pecking 
order, asymmetric information signaling framework, agency theory, asymmetric 
information signaling framework, static trade-off, and legal environment framework (e.g.. 
see  Harris and Raviv (1991) and Kumar (2008)). 
                                                 
8 Note that it is not possible to calculate firm-level profits using EBRD data 
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The Modligliani and Miller (1958) leverage irrelevance framework argues firm 
value to be independent of the mix of debt and equity financing and as such firm value 
can not be increased by using debt. Thus, the firm may opt against increasing its leverage 
in financing firm activity as it does not add to the value of the firm.  What matters 
however is the shareholders hold a well-diversified portfolio of financial assets. The 
static trade-off framework argues that firms balance debt and equity positions by making 
trade-offs between the value of tax shields on interest, and the cost of bankruptcy or 
financial distress. Therefore the firm despite the benefits of favourable tax treatment of 
interest payment on debt, must weigh this benefit against the potential costs it faces in the 
event that it goes bankrupt as a result of incurring the debt. Thus, the firm uses less debt 
where the costs of bankruptcy are high and vice versa. This contrasts with the arguments 
of the agency cost theory as developed based on the argument of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) that debt serves as a monitoring mechanism for shareholders who desire to 
monitor managers to discipline the manager from engaging in self servicing objectives at 
the expense of shareholders interests (e.g, see Grossman and Hart (1982). This will result 
in increased firm value, and as such a firm may trade-off the agency cost of different 
types of capital, to influence firm value. Debt therefore becomes valuable as a source of 
financing for firms to the extent that management monitoring and firm value are 
important. The determinants of leverage under the agency cost theory include firm 
ownership concentration, free cash flow, growth opportunities, e.t.c. 
The pecking order theory of firm financing on the other hand, argues that, the firm 
based on a hierarchy of financing choices ranks internal financing highest when 
available, and where external financing is required, debt is preferred to equity. This 
theory is based on the notion that financing by internal funds is least costly as the firm 
does not need to pay interest on internal funds, while equity financing is the most costly 
due to the cost of issuing equity.  
According to the asymmetric information signaling framework, the existence of 
information asymmetry between the firm and the likely finance providers causes the 
relative cost of finance to vary between the different sources of finance. The cost of 
financing is highest where low levels of information regarding the firms activity is 
revealed to potential lenders, as compared to other sources of finance where more 
31 
 
information is provided to potential lenders. Therefore according to the theory there 
exists a hierarchy of firm preference with respect to the financing of investments (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984) and the firm will reveal information based on its preferred source of 
financing.  The role of the legal environment in determining a firm’s source of financing 
remains important. La Porta et al (1997) argues that the legal system is the primary 
determinant of the availability of external financing in a country. Better quality legal 
systems will give rise to larger and more developed markets thus reducing the cost of 
external financing and possibly resulting in firms’ choice of external financing. Lower 
quality legal systems on the other hand give rise to smaller capital markets and higher 
costs of external financing. In the presence of smaller capital markets therefore, firms 
may rely on internal financing as a result of increased costs of external financing. Thus, 
protection of minority shareholders, and protection by antitakeover laws substantially 
reduce the costs of firm external financing.  
The determinants of firms source of financing in the literature and based on the 
aforementioned theories include: ownership concentration (See, Suto, 2003), free cash 
flow (Fama and French, 2002), growth opportunities (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and 
Fama and French, 2002)), growth (Hall et al, 2004), asset structure (Hall et al, 2004), no 
growth opportunity (Jung et al, 1996),  collateral value of assets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995), Percentage of shares held by management (Short et al, 2002), profitability (See, 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995), and Fama and French, 2002), level of intangible assets (See, 
Frank and Goyal, 2003), firm age (Hall et al, 2004; & Bhaduri, 2002), potential good 
news (Ooi, 1999), firm size (Frank and Goyal, 2003), interest rate and firm’s valuation in 
the equity market (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004 ), probability of bankruptcy (Marsh, 1982), 
top management experience (Noe et al, 2003), exchange rate risk (Allayamis et al, 2003), 
political risk (Burgman, 2006),  knowledge intensity (Thornhill et al, 2004), Volatility 
(Kester,1986; & Kim and Sorensen, 1986)), non-debt tax shields (Bradley, et al. 1984; & 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1990), advertising (Bradley, et al. 1984; & Long and Malitz, 
1985), research and development expenditure (Bradley, et al., 1984; & Long and Malitz, 
1985), and various measures of corporate governance as board size, board composition, 
etc (See, Williamson, 1988),  
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We contribute to the literature by highlighting the important role of business 
networks, which remains rather unexplored in the literature. Our central hypotheses in 
this regard are explained below. 
 
 
2.1.3.  Central Hypotheses 
There are often problems of information and incentives, especially in the emerging CEE 
region with weak legal and judicial framework. The borrowers approach financial 
institutions with a view to borrowing funds to invest, but the financial institutions 
(lenders) cannot be sure as to who the best borrower is. Furthermore, even after loans are 
issued, there are risks of strategic default. The financial institutions (lenders) thus have 
the three-fold task of selecting the best borrower, ensuring efficient use of the loan, and 
also ensuring re-payment of the loan. The task is particularly difficult when legal and 
judicial institutions are weak, giving rise to contract enforcement problems. Thus 
alternative non-market mechanism(s) may surface in an attempt to minimize the possible 
agency costs.  
Presence/predominance of informal networks is observed in different kinds of 
exchanges in countries with weak institutions. These networks usually involve an 
exchange of favors, making businesses easier for the members. While exchange within 
the networks does not rely on explicit written contracts, relationships between the 
members are guided by norms/conventions. Norms are nothing but the desirable 
behaviour subject to sanctions in a community (Kandori, 1992). It is now well-
established that the rationale for pervasive family businesses in east Asia is closely linked 
to the role of trust and family ties in an environment of weak (legal) enforceability of 
contracts and social norms concerning altruism and bequest (Yoshikawa & McGuire, 
2008). Granovetter (1994) among others recognizes the role of social mechanism in the 
form of the common family bond in family owned businesses that helps to reduce the 
likelihood of reneging on contracts. Guiso et al (2004) demonstrate the effect of social 
capital on financial development in Italy, while Ayyagari et al (2008) suggest the value of 
the informal sector in a society lacking in quality institutional infrastructure.  
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In this context, our analysis focuses on the effect of business association 
membership on firm’s access to external financing. Affiliation to a business association 
may influence economic activities in different ways (see Pyle, 2006). Doner and 
Schneider (2000) highlight the market complementary role of business associations in 
attempting to overcome various types of market imperfections.
9
 Membership of a 
business association with some repute may provide a platform for networking and thus 
building social capital by linking to member banks and other financial institutions. There 
is also a parallel need to enforce commitments among members to business association. 
Thus, with a strong business association enforcement, banking agreements are more 
enforceable as the business network may ensure that loans of its members with banks are 
re-paid; otherwise the network may suffer from lack of access to loans in future because 
of bad reputation. Business association with weaker enforcement may also exist side by 
side, involving exchange of favours, which make doing businesses easier for those within 
the network. Kali (1999) and Ghatak and Kali (2000, 2001) however argued that while 
affiliation to business networks may facilitate business activities of networked firms, it 
could be inefficient from a general equilibrium perspective. This could be as a result of 
the rent seeking characteristic of networks as highlighted by Olson (1982) when networks 
seek to promote unproductive rents rather than common or public interest.  
Thus our first hypothesis is that a firm’s affiliation to a business association could 
enhance its external financing opportunities. Possible causes of this link would include, 
among others, the following: first, the adverse selection problems of screening potential 
borrowers are alleviated if a firm belongs to a business association (BA) as it may allow a 
lender to obtain information regarding a firm’s creditworthiness at lower costs than 
otherwise. In other words, networking may lower the information asymmetry between 
lender and borrower. A further possibility would be that business associations explicitly 
                                                 
9 Business groups are common form of business association in many emerging economies, especially in Asia. They are 
a collection of legally distinct firms tied together and coordinating on their actions. Member firms are linked in a 
complex manner, e.g, through pyramidal holding, cross ownership or common directorates (Samphantharak, 2002; 
Claessens et al, 2000). Fisman and Khanna (2004) suggested that business groups play a role in aiding the economy 
where social provision of services falls short of the required level and are observed to provide an organizational 
structure that is better suited to dealing with the poor availability of basic inputs and services9 (at the cost of non-
business group firms in a resource constrained economy).  Furthermore, group affiliates usually share a common brand 
identity (e.g, Salim group in Indonesia, the Tata group in India, and Samsung in Korea), and may draw on a common 
labour pool. Members also have access to an internal capital market, which in turn ensures an easier access to external 
capital. 
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monitor their members and ensure better repayment for banks, thus alleviating the moral 
hazard problems of contract enforcement. From the BEEPS questionnaire it however 
seems that business associations in our sample countries do not explicitly perform this 
monitoring/supervisory role. It could still be the case that a firm’s affiliation to business 
association could minimize the potential moral hazard problems of strategic default 
because of reputation factor within a close-knit network.  
While Bonin and Leven (1996) argued that foreign banks may choose those 
domestic firms who have previously established some international links by virtue of 
their import/export activities, others have focused on banks’ preference to serve large 
firms with more transparent accounting standards. It follows from Table 2.5 that 
networked firms in our sample are on average more likely to be operating in the export 
sector, and 68% of networked firms tend to use international accounting standards. 
Accounting for business association membership thus allows us to clarify the mechanism 
through which some domestic firms may overcome the domestic barriers of weak 
institutions and local practices.  
Clearly the quality of institutions could play an important role in the analysis of 
business networking in this paper, as the need for networking is greater in countries with 
weak institutions.
10
 A second and a related hypothesis is therefore to examine whether the 
business networks loses its significance when institutional quality improves over time (to 
this end we include an interaction term between business association membership and 
institutional quality). Since there is limited time variation in our data for 2002-2005 
BEEPS firm-level panel data, we could only exploit cross-country variation in 
institutional quality in our sample.  
In Central and Eastern European as well as the Baltic countries, privatisation and 
institutional reform in the banking sector have advanced in step with the state’s 
withdrawal from the direct provision of banking services and with progress in enterprise 
                                                 
10 Recent literature highlights the importance of legal and institutional structures for enforcing contracts and 
safeguarding shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, thus promoting financial and economic development. In particular, La 
porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1997) suggest that the legal environment matters for the size and the 
extent of a country's capital market. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) argued that developed financial system 
and stronger rule of law help relaxing firms' external financing constraints, which in turn facilitates their growth. Beck 
et al (2002) showed that firms that operate in countries with underdeveloped financial and legal systems and higher 
levels of corruption tend to be more constrained than others.  
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reform. Shleifer (1997) argues that there has to be a transition of government for a 
transition to a market economy to take place. This was described as de-politicization of 
the economy, whereby control over resource use and ownership is transferred exclusively 
to the private sector. Government role will then be to provide the necessary institutions to 
support the market economy. This will necessitate the creation of laws and legal 
institutions that protect private property, enforce contracts between private parties, but 
also limit the ability of officials to prey on private property.  
Considering the sample countries, there is evidence of a wide dispersion in the 
institutional quality, bank reform and competition policy indices among the 15 countries 
in our sample. The institutional quality index (see Bacchetta and Drabek, 2002) is a 
composite index capturing the strength of a country’s government to provide the 
infrastructure to promote a conducive environment for business growth and development 
and comprises of five component indicators – government effectiveness, regulatory 
burden, rule of law, graft, and the extent of democracy (voice and accountability). Bank 
reform index constructed by EBRD  captures the level of advancement of banking sector 
restructuring activities in CEE countries, while the competition policy index measures 
how fair the business environment is in CEE countries in promoting healthy competition 
between enterprises. 
 It follows from Table 2.6 that our sample CEE countries are at different levels of 
reform and we observe a bimodal distribution. Many CEE countries still have a 
considerable way to go to reach the international levels of institution quality. This is 
particularly true for Balkan countries like FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Montenegro, and Albania, many of whom have a negative institutional quality 
index. In contrast, the country with the best institutions was Hungary at 8.7 closely 
followed by Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic and Estonia respectively. Only one-
quarter of the countries actually attained the highest value 4 of the EBRD Bank reform 
index including Croatia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Estonia. In terms of competition 
policy only five countries, namely, Poland, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and 
Estonia actually attained the highest level of competition policy reform.  
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2.2.  Methodology 
This section develops the empirical model to test the two hypotheses of interest:  
H1. Business association membership has an effect on firm’s access to external finance in 
general and bank finance in particular. 
H2: The effect of business association membership on firm’s financing opportunity may 
disappear in countries with stronger institutions  
We test the validity of these hypotheses with respect to two sets of corporate decisions:   
(i) Firm’s choice of financing mode distinguishing between internal finance, bank 
finance, equity finance and non-bank credit. 
(ii) For firms choosing bank finance, we further consider their choice of banks, 
distinguishing between state, domestic private and foreign banks. 
 
 
2.2.1. An Empirical Model Of Firm Financing Choices 
Our first objective is to analyze firm’s financing choices for new investment. As 
indicated in section 2.1.1, firms may use different sources of finance including internal 
finance, bank or equity finance or non-bank credit. While a significant proportion of 
firms rely on internal finance only, many firms tend to combine internal and various 
sources of external financing (bank loans, equity and other non-bank sources). 
Accordingly, we first define a variable IFic, which takes a value 1 if the i-th firm in 
country c relies 100% on internal finance and zero otherwise. Suppose the underlying 
unobserved variable IFic
*
 is given by:  
  IFic
* = α0 + αBA BAic+ αIQ IQc+ αBAIQ BAic * IQc +αx Xic + εi  (2.1) 
Where  is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. While BA refers to the i-th 
firm’s affiliation to a Business Association in a given country, IQ refers to the 
institutional quality index in the c-th country. X refers to all firm-specific control 
variables (please see below for the exact model specification). Ceteris paribus, we do not 
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expect BA to have a significant effect on the likelihood of using internal finance, but in 
the absence of a prior we examine the validity of this null hypothesis as well:   
What we observe is IFic, which is related to IFic
* 
as follows:  
IFic
 
 = 1 if  IFic
*
 >0 
      = 0 if IFic
*
 ≤ 0 
 Given the normal distribution of the error term, we use a probit model to determine the 
likelihood of 100% internal financing for new investment in our sample. Since the probit 
coefficient estimates do not reflect the marginal effects of each explanatory variable, we 
determine it separately as the partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent 
variable with respect to the particular explanatory variable in the estimation of equation 
(2.1). 
It is also important to analyze the factors determining various sources of external 
financing, namely, bank finance, equity finance and non-bank finance, where networking 
could play an important role. Accordingly, we create three more variables, which take the 
value of 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any of the three sources of external finance, 
and zero otherwise, as follows:  
BFic = 1, if the i-th firm in country c uses any bank finance. 
EFic = 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any equity finance.  
NBFic =1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any non-bank finance (as defined in 
section 2.1); 
Accordingly, for a given choice of external finance (BF, EF or NBF), generally denoted 
by XF for any source of external finance, we estimate a binary probit model for each of 
the sources of external finance, namely, BF, EF and NBF. As before, we assume that the 
underlying unobservable variable XFi
*
 for the i-th firm is determined as follows: 
XFic
* 
= β0 + βBA BAic+ βIQ IQc+ βBAIQ BAic * IQc + βx Xic + ui   (2.2) 
The observable variable XFic = 1 if XFic
 *
 > 0 and  
   XFic = 0 otherwise. 
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As before we assume that the random error term u is normally distributed with mean 0 
and variance 1 and accordingly use a probit model to determine XFi  for each type of 
external financing choice namely bank finance (BF), equity finance  (EF) and non-bank 
finance (NBF)
11
.  
Since the probit coefficient estimates do not reflect the marginal effects of each 
explanatory variable, we determine the partial derivative of the expected value of the 
dependent variable (BF, EF or NBF) with respect to the particular explanatory variable in 
each case. 
After controlling for all other factors, an empirical test of our central hypothesis 
pertains to the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates of BA separately for 
bank finance (BF), equity finance (EF) and non-bank finance (NBF). A number of studies 
on banking relationships (e.g., Kali (1999), Ghatak and Kali, (2001)) have recognized the 
importance of business association membership. We thus hypothesize that firms affiliated 
to business associations are more likely to access bank finance. We are however not 
aware of any prior study that highlights the role of networking for equity finance or other 
kinds of non-bank finance. Thus we empirically explore the role of business association 
membership for accessing different kinds of external finance in our sample. 
 Note however that a firm’s affiliation to a business association is likely to be 
simultaneous to firms’ financing choices. So we need to explore possible instruments in 
this respect to obtain an unbiased estimate of BA in our model. This is discussed in 
section 2.2.3. 
Further we include an index of institutional quality IQ
12
 (see discussion in section 
2.2.2) and also an interaction term between institution quality and business association 
membership. The interaction term enables us to identify a differential effect of networks 
in countries with weak institution quality and thus forms the basis of testing our second 
hypothesis. 
We follow the existing literature to choose other firm-specific control variables X 
                                                 
11 As a robustness test of our main regression results, we divide our sample into sub-samples based on the countries 
constituting our main sample and run firm finance choice regressions individually for each country. 
12 The use of a composite variable such as institutional quality in our regression enables us to solve the problem of 
multicollinearity that would have resulted had we used individual country level indices. 
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in each case for estimating equations (2.1) and (2.2). Ownership structure of firms (i.e., 
domestic, foreign) could play an important role especially in the context of networking in 
an imperfect world. Berger et al (2006) argue that foreign banks, especially in developing 
countries such as that of India, tend to serve transparent firms – firms with hard 
information which they are advantageous at processing, and based on this association 
with a foreign bank may develop multiple banking relationships. Foreign ownership is 
further highlighted by Beck et al (2006) as an important determinant of financing 
obstacles for firms – with foreign owned firms reporting less financing obstacles, as does 
Detragiache et al (2008) who find evidence linking foreign banks presence in poor 
countries with less credit supply to the private sector in such countries. It is therefore to 
this end that we include controls for state-owned firms, private domestic firms and 
foreign firms in the present study. 
Both firm size and age are observed to determine a firm’s choice of finance. 
Klapper et al (2002), Kumar (2008), Berger and Udell (1995), Beck et al (2002) and Beck 
et al (2006) confirm this. Thus we expect young SMEs to have less bank finance. While 
other studies have used log of sales e.g., Bevan and Danbolt (2004), and natural 
logarithm of the book value of the total property assets (e.g. Ooi, 2000), we use labour 
force size to proxy for firm size as explained in section 2.1.1. Other control variables 
include growth of fixed assets, prior year research and development spending. 
13
 
 Finally, given that firm’s membership of a business association is likely to be 
significantly higher in most Balkan countries in our sample, we also include a binary 
variable Balkan indicating if the firm is located in a Balkan country. The variable takes a 
value zero otherwise. We also interact firm’s business association membership with the 
Balkan dummy to explore the differential effect of business association membership in 
Balkan countries (relative to other sample countries). Since Balkan countries on average 
tend to have weaker institutional quality, significance of this interaction term allows us to 
examine the link between business networks and institutional quality. 
 
                                                 
13 Note that we do not include any measure of firm profitability as this is likely to introduce further simultaneity bias; 
also note that BEEPS data do not provide information on earnings before interest and taxes which is the basis of 
calculating profitability; we only observe if a firm is making any profit or not (as a binary variable).  
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2.2.2.  An Empirical Model Of Firms’ Choice Of Banks  
Our second objective is to determine firm’s choices of banks belonging to different 
ownership categories, namely, state bank, domestic private commercial bank, and foreign 
bank. Suppose Bijc denotes i-th firm’s choice of j’th bank in country c (where j refers to 
state, domestic private commercial, or foreign banks). For a given choice of j, suppose 
the underlying unobservable variable Bic
 *
 is determined by:   
Bic
 *= γ0 + γ BA BAic + γIQ IQc+ γBAIQ BAic * IQc + γ x X2ic  + εi  (2.3)
 
where the observable variable Bijc is related to Bic
 *
 as follows: 
Bic = 1 if Bic
 *
 >0  
Bic = 0 if otherwise 
We determine equation (2.3) for each type of bank choice (state, domestic private or 
foreign) separately in our sample. Following on from Table 2.3, we can classify Bic  by 
bank ownership type as follows: borrowing from domestic private commercial bank 
(bank_private), state bank (bank_state) or foreign bank (bank_foreign). These three 
binary variables are defined as follows:  
Bank_private = 1 if a firm borrows from a domestic private commercial bank and 
zero otherwise. 
Bank_state = 1 if a firm borrows from a domestic state bank and zero otherwise  
Bank_foreign = 1 if a firm borrows from a foreign bank and zero otherwise  
Given the binary nature of these variables, we use probit models to determine these three 
bank choice variables using equation (2.3)
14
. 
As with equations (2.1) and (2.2), our central hypothesis here is to check if a 
firm’s affiliation to business association is particularly important for loans from a 
particular type of bank classified by its ownership (i.e., state, domestic private 
commercial, foreign). This is closely related to the literature on foreign banks’ entry in 
developing and transition economies (e.g., see Bonin and Leven 1996; Bonin et al. 1998). 
                                                 
14 As a robustness test of our main regression results, we divide our sample into sub-samples based on the countries 
constituting our main sample and estimate bank choice regressions individually for each country.. 
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In particular, there is suggestion that foreign banks tend to lend to borrowers with better 
accounting and reporting standards (and thus may prefer foreign firms) or with those 
firms who have established international links by virtue of their import/export activities. 
In an uncertain foreign environment foreign banks may choose networked firms with a 
view to lower their agency costs. This is related the concept of firm-bank ownership 
matching as observed by Berger et al. (2006) for India. Following on this, we examine 
whether foreign firms are more likely to borrow from foreign banks while state-owned 
firms are more likely to borrow from state banks in our sample of CEE countries.  
We however do not have a prior as to how business association membership could 
influence firm’s choice of banks for domestic private or state banks and therefore we 
empirically explore it in our analysis. Given the potential endogeneity problem of a 
firm’s affiliation to a business association we instrument this variable (see discussion in 
section 2.2.3). As before, we also interact firm’s business association membership with 
the Balkan dummy to explore the differential effect of business association membership 
in Balkan countries (relative to other sample countries), if any.  
The set of firm-specific control variables X2 has some common variables as in X 
in section 2.2.1 above; for example, we continue to include control variables for SMEs, 
young firms, interaction between SME and young and firm ownership type.  As we focus 
on banking relationship only, we now replace competition policy index by EBRD bank 
reform index with a view to explore the effect of bank reform on firms’ access to state, 
domestic private and private foreign banks.
15
 Table 2.7 provides an overview of 
explanatory variables employed in both our firm financing choice and bank choice 
regressions.  
 
 
2.2.3. Addressing possible endogeneity of firm’s affiliation to business networks 
A potential problem with the estimation of equations (2.1) - (2.3) using business 
association membership variable BA as one of the explanatory variables is that firms’ 
                                                 
15 We included all institutional variables in an alternative specification; but the competition index was never significant. 
Thus the final specification does not include competition index. 
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affiliation to a business network is likely to be endogenous. This is because firms may 
choose to belong to a network with a view to facilitate its financing access (see 
discussion in section 2.1); thus networked firms are unlikely to be random among all 
sample firms. Accordingly, there remains an important selection problem that we need to 
address here. One possibility would be to generate an instrument for firm’s affiliation to a 
business network. To this end, we first use a probit model to determine sample firm’s 
affiliation to a business network; we choose potentially time invariant explanatory 
variables like SME, young and firm ownership categories and generate the predicted 
value of the variable as a possible instrument for a firm’s affiliation to a business 
association.  In doing so, we need to ensure some exclusion restriction for the estimation 
of the selection equation with a view to minimize the possibility of endogeneity bias in 
estimating equations (2.1) - (2.3). In particular, we argue that unlike firm financing 
opportunities, growth of fixed assets and research and development spending are not 
pertinent in the determination of first stage BA membership equation so that they are 
excluded from the first stage regression. Further we include a sector control, namely, if a 
firm is involved in export sector in determining firm’s membership of business 
association, which is not included in equations (2.1) - (2.3). Finally, we include a Balkan 
dummy to examine the differential effect of Balkan countries in business networking. 
Probit marginal effects estimates of business association membership as shown in Table 
2.8 highlights that the likelihood of business networking is significantly higher among 
foreign firms, exporting firms and also those from the Balkan countries while it is lower 
for small and medium sized enterprises. We generate the fitted value of this regression as 
an instrument for firms’ business association membership to be used in estimating firms’ 
financing opportunities equations (2.1) - (2.3). 
It is however difficult to address this selection issue convincingly in a single 
cross-section data-set that we have used so far. One possible alternative is to make use of 
the available panel information of sample firms for 2002 and 2005, although the latter 
considerably reduces the sample size (note that the two year BEEPS panel data 
corresponds to only about 14.19% of our total observations in BEEPS 2005).
16
 These are 
the firms initially surveyed in the BEEPS 2002 round and then were re-surveyed in 
                                                 
16 Also see footnotes to Tables 11 and 12. 
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BEEPS 2005, having expressed a desire to be involved in the 2005 BEEPS round.
17
 The 
firms were identified through a firm identity number allocated to such firms in the 
BEEPS 2005 survey round. In particular about 715 firms in fourteen selected countries 
are included in this panel, giving rise to 1430 observations in total for the two rounds 
considered. The underlying idea is that ceteris paribus variation of firm characteristics 
over these two years 2002 and 2005, would allow us to identify the causal effect of 
business association membership on firms’ financing opportunities equations (2.1) - 
(2.3). We construct very similar regression variables used in the cross-section analysis of 
equations (2.1) - (2.3). Means and standard deviations of these variables are shown in 
Appendix Table A2.4, which highlights their comparability with 2005 data used in the 
cross-section analysis.  
One could use this panel data to estimate fixed effects logit model to determine 
the i-th firm’s financing choice (wholly (100%) internal finance, bank finance, equity 
finance and Non-bank finance) for new investment in year t, t=2002, 2005, in country c,  
in terms of lagged value of business affiliation as one of the possible covariates X. We 
assume that the underlying unobserved variable Yict
*
 is determined by:   
Yict
 *
= Ψ0 + Ψ BA BAit + Ψ z IQct + Ψ BAIQ BAit *IQct + Ψ x Xit + Ωi+  еit (4) 
such that  
 Yict=1 if Yict
*
>0 
Yict=1 if Yict
*
>0 
In this respect, we choose four Ys pertaining to firm’s financing choice of wholly internal 
finance, bank finance, equity finance, and non-bank finance (each of them being a binary 
variable) and run four separate fixed effects logit models (see discussion in section 2.3.3). 
There are two error terms in the model – one firm-specific (time invariant) Ωi and the 
other еit that varies not only across firms but also over time. The firm-specific fixed 
effects Ωis allow us to control for firm-specific unobserved variables, which in turn 
minimizes the estimation bias arising out of firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, thus 
justifying the use of the fixed effects logit model. 
                                                 
17  Firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although surveyed in 2005, were either not surveyed in 2002 or refused to be 
involved in the BEEPS round of 2005 having participated in BEEPS 2002. 
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In similar fashion, we use our panel data to estimate fixed effects logit models to 
determine i-th firm’s choice of banks Bict in year t (t=2002, 2005) in country c.  
Suppose the underlying unobserved variable Bict
*
 is determined by:   
Bict
 *
= δ0 + δ BA BAit + δ IQ IQit + δ BAIQ BAit *IQit + δ x X2it + Fi+ vit (2.5) 
Such that the observable variable Bict is related to the unobservable Bict
*
 as follows: 
Bict = 1 if Bict
 *
 >0   
Bict = 0 if otherwise 
As before, we choose three Bs pertaining to firm’s choice of state banks, domestic private 
commercial banks and foreign banks (each of them being a binary variable) and run three 
fixed effects logit models (see discussion in section 2.3.3) for each case. There are two 
error terms in the model – one firm-specific (time invariant) Fi and the other it that 
varies not only across firms but also over time. The model not only determines the 
parameter estimates δ and also their marginal effects. Firm-specific fixed effects Fis 
would allow us to control for firm-specific unobserved variables. In other words, we use 
fixed effects logit models to determine equations (2.4) and (2.5), which in turn minimize 
the potential endogeneity bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity in the data. We can 
thus consider the fixed effects panel (2002-2005) data estimates to be superior to the 
single cross section estimates for 2005 BEEPS sample. 
As before, we include similar firm and country-specific explanatory variables in 
both fixed effects models captured by equations (2.4) and (2.5) above. Naturally the time 
invariant factors are dropped from the estimation of fixed effects logit models. We 
include firm’s association to business association and growth of fixed assets. Since it has 
been argued that business association membership has been a response to institutional 
weakness, we also include an interaction between business association membership and 
institutional quality index, and check for the significance of t-statistic of the interaction 
term. Infact, statistical insignificance of the interaction term in both fixed effects models, 
would highlight the fact that business association membership is not crucial for firm 
financing and bank choice, in countries with high quality institutions.    
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2.3. Results And Analysis 
First we determine the likelihood of a firm’s affiliation to business enterprise; these 
estimates are summarized in Table 2.8 (see discussion in section 2.2.3). We generate the 
predicted value of business association from these estimates and use this predicted value 
as an instrument in the cross-section probit estimates of firm’s financing choices (see 
section 2.3.1) and also probit estimates of firm’s choice of banks (see section 2.3.2). 
These estimates are summarized in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 respectively (corresponding 
uninstrumented estimates are shown in Appendix Tables A2.1 and A2.2). Table 2.11 
shows the panel logit fixed effects estimates for firms’ four financing choices for new 
fixed investment, while Table 2.12 provides the panel logit fixed effects estimates for 
firms’ access to loans from private domestic and foreign banks (see section 2.3.3).18 
 
 
2.3.1.  Determinants of Firm Financing Choices for New Investment 
 Table 2.9 summarizes the probit estimates of firm financing choices. Columns 1 shows 
probit marginal effects of the probability of firms having 100% internal finance while 
columns 2-4 show the probit marginal effects of firm’s access to bank finance, non-bank 
finance and equity finance, if any. Significance of the likelihood ratio chi-squared 
statistic in each case confirms the goodness of fit of these estimated models. 
Given that the estimated coefficients do not reflect the marginal effects of our 
explanatory variables, we compute the marginal effects and report them in the table. This 
enables us to examine the magnitude of the marginal effect of each of the explanatory 
variables on the particular dependent variable in question.  
As dummy variables taking the values of 1 and 0 dominate our selection of 
exogenous explanatory variables of interest, such as small and medium enterprises or 
foreign ownership of firms, their reported marginal effect is the difference in predicted 
                                                 
18 We use STATA to run the regression models, which automatically drops the firms with missing observations, thus 
resulting in a lesser number of observations than we initially began with. 
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value for the dependent variable (e.g., probability of firm financing by internal finance) 
for a dummy variable of 1 versus 0, with all other exogenous variables at their means. On 
the other hand, the marginal effects for the continuous exogenous variables are the 
derivatives of the predicted dependent variable for small changes in the exogenous 
variables. 
Since a significant proportion of sample firms relied on internal finance, we 
estimated the determinants of the likelihood of securing 100% internal finance. Clearly 
firms affiliated to business association are significantly less likely to rely fully on internal 
finance; the same result holds even when institutional quality improves (note that the 
interaction between institutional quality and business association is negative and 
significant). While firms in Balkan countries are significantly more likely to rely on 
100% internal finance, networked firms in Balkan countries are significantly less likely to 
do so as the interaction term between Balkan and business association is negative and 
significant. Finally, firms from countries with more stringent competition policy are less 
likely to rely solely on 100% internal finance, thus highlighting the importance of market 
reform on corporate financing opportunities. 
It is however more interesting to consider the probit estimates of the likelihood of 
access to bank/non-bank finance as well as equity finance (see columns 2 - 4).  These 
estimates (except those for equity finance) are generally consistent with our central 
hypothesis that affiliation to business networks significantly improves firms’ access to all 
types of external finance in our sample of emerging economies with weaker institutions. 
Firms from countries with better institutions tend to have less bank or non-bank finance. 
However, institutional quality appears not to be important for firm financing for new 
fixed investment, by equity. Even for countries with better institutional quality, business 
association membership significantly enhances firms’ access to bank and non-bank 
finance in our sample.   
Other results: Firms with growing fixed assets tend to have more bank credit 
while R&D spending remains insignificant. Firm size is important too. SMEs are more 
likely to secure bank loans and hence rely less on internal finance. This may be the result 
of SMEs having increased access to bank finance following the advent of bank reforms in 
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CEE countries, which saw private banks respond to firms demand for credit. Note 
however that the marginal effect of bank finance for SME’s is only about 9% (compared 
to about 20% for networked firms) though the effect is significant only at 10% level. The 
firm age does not however appear to be important here. 
A comparison of our instrumented marginal effects estimates with un-
instrumented ones (see Appendix Table A2.1.) suggests that our un-instrumented 
estimates are biased upwards. In particular, access to bank-finance is higher by about 35 
percentage points for networked firms, when we consider the un-instrumented estimates; 
however, this marginal effect comes down to 20 percentage points when we consider the 
instrumented estimates shown in Table 2.9. Further, the two coefficients involving 
institutional quality remain insignificant in the un-instrumented estimates though they 
turn out to be significant in the instrumented estimates (see Table 2.9).  
 
 
2.3.2. Determinants of Firm’s Choice of Banks 
As in the previous sub-section, we outline the marginal effects of our probit model 
determining firm’s choice of banks between state bank, domestic private commercial 
banks and foreign banks; these estimates are shown in Table 2.10. Our diagnostic tests 
confirm the goodness of fit of the estimated probit model in this respect. 
 While business association membership is insignificant for firms’ access to loans 
from state bank, the coefficient of the variable is positive and significant for firms 
borrowing not only from domestic private commercial bank, but also from foreign banks. 
In other words, affiliation to business association is conducive to securing loans 
particularly from new domestic and foreign private banks, who face uncertain business 
conditions, especially in countries with weaker institutional environment in our sample. 
With the improvement in institutional quality, business association affiliation continues 
to be significant and positive for firms’ access to loans from domestic state and private 
banks, though not for loans from foreign banks. Compared to other sample countries, 
access to state banks is limited in Balkan countries; while access to domestic private 
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commercial banks is significant more pronounced. Membership of business association is 
however particularly not of relevance for firms’ finance from various banks operating in 
Balkan countries. 
 It is evident that state banks’ role has been curtailed by the recent reform and as 
such state firms are less likely to borrow from all three categories (state, domestic private 
commercial and foreign) of banks. However foreign firms are less likely to borrow from 
domestic private commercial banks, while the estimated coefficient is insignificant for 
loans from state and foreign banks. In contrast, we find no evidence of domestic private 
commercial banks being more or less likely to borrow from any type of bank. In other 
words, evidence of firm-bank ownership matching turns out to be weak when we control 
for all other factors in our sample.  
While the coefficient of growth of fixed assets is positive for all bank categories, 
it is significant only for loans from the private domestic and foreign banks; the latter 
reflects the importance of satisfying some efficiency requirement in the allocation of 
private commercial bank loans.  
After controlling for all other factors, it appears that SMEs are significantly more 
likely to borrow from domestic private commercial banks, while the coefficient of small 
and medium enterprises remains insignificant for loans from state and foreign banks. As 
in Table 2.9, the marginal effect of bank finance from domestic private banks for SMEs 
is only about 6% while that for business association membership is about 17%. In other 
words, despite some progress, business networking tends to raise barriers to access bank 
financing for small and medium enterprises in our sample.  
A comparison of instrumented estimates of business association affiliation with 
those for the un-instrumented estimates (see Appendix Table A2.2) highlights differences 
in marginal effects as well as their significance. First, marginal effects of business 
affiliation are under-estimated in the un-instrumented estimates for loans from domestic 
(0.06 as opposed to 0.17) and foreign (0.03 as opposed to 0.06) banks.  Accordingly, 
there is suggestion that the premium for business affiliation is lower for foreign (as 
opposed to domestic private banks).  Second, the interaction term between institutional 
quality and business association affiliation turned out to be significant in the instrumented 
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estimates for access to loans from private domestic and foreign banks (thus highlighting 
the extent of bias in the un-instrumented estimates.  
 
 
2.3.3. Fixed effects panel data estimates of firm financing and firms’ choice of banks 
Finally, in an attempt to test the robustness of our estimates, we use panel data to estimate 
firm’s financing choices and also firms’ access to loans from state, private and foreign 
banks respectively. In this respect, we are particularly interested in fixed effects estimates 
that minimizes the endogeneity bias arising from inclusion of unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity into the model. Since only logit (and not probit) models are amenable to 
fixed effects estimates,  Table 2.11 shows the logit fixed effects estimates (marginal 
effects) of firm’s access to 100% internal finance, and also any access to bank finance, 
non-bank finance and equity finance. Table 2.12 summarizes the corresponding marginal 
effects estimates of the firms’ choice of state, domestic private and foreign banks. 
Naturally the time invariant factors are dropped from these fixed effects models. Also 
note that we lose a significant number of observations if there is no variation in the access 
to finance from the particular source over the two years in our sample. This loss of 
observations is a feature of fixed effects models given that they only use variation within 
groups of observations whilst estimating coefficients, and therefore their success at 
predicting outcomes, relies on the existence of sufficient variation between variable 
observations within groups of observations. The ability to obtain this required variation 
though is limited to the extent that the group sizes are small, and therefore in our case as 
we have only two year observations for our firms, our results are affected by such lack of 
variation in observations for firm characteristics
19
. Hence, we also show the pooled logit 
estimates with year dummies which is identical to the panel fixed effects estimates for 
two-years panel data in Appendix Tables A2.5 and A2.6.  
 Clearly, fixed effects estimates (marginal effects) of firms’ internal and external 
financing choices shown in Table 2.11 support the significance of business association 
                                                 
19 Increasing group sizes by obtaining more observations on the firms may however serve to resolve this Fixed effects 
logit regression challenge, which we are unable to address due to our limited data availability 
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membership for obtaining bank finance and non-bank finance only. As with the single 
cross-section estimates the networking variable turns out to be insignificant for equity 
financing. An improvement in institutional quality is associated with lower likelihood of 
firms accessing non-bank finance though the effect is insignificant for access to bank 
finance. Thus, networking is associated with greater non-bank finance, while it paves into 
insignificance for bank financing as and when institutional quality improves.  
Next we move on to Table 2.12, summarizing the marginal effects estimates of 
firms’ access to loans from state, private or foreign banks.  As with single cross-section 
analysis, business association membership significantly enhances the likelihood of firms 
borrowing from private and foreign banks, but not from state banks. In particular, among 
firms with access to bank loans, a networked firm (relative to a non-networked firm) is 
0.75 percentage points more likely to borrow from a private commercial banks; by the 
same token, a networked firm is 1.34 percentage points more likely to borrow from 
foreign banks, even after controlling for all other possible covariates. The networking 
effect is less pronounced for loans from domestic private commercial banks (relative to 
foreign banks), which contrasts the cross-section estimates. Note also that compared to 
the cross-section estimates (Table 2.10), marginal effects of networking are smaller in 
panel data estimates (0.75% as opposed to 17% for private domestic banks and 1.34% as 
opposed to 6% for foreign banks). In other words, cross-section estimates tend to over-
estimate the true effect of business association membership and can thus be regarded as 
the upper bound of the true effect. 
Further, considering the subsample of firms with access to bank loans, differential 
effect of networking vanishes (Table 2.12) for access to loans from private banks as 
institutional quality improves. The latter can be contrasted with the single cross-section 
estimates shown in Table 2.10, which could reflect the potential role of time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity accounted for in the panel data analysis. However the fact 
remains that the size of our panel sample is rather small and therefore, it would be 
interesting to see if these results hold in larger samples.  
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2.4. Concluding Comments 
Financial intermediation may not always guarantee efficient utilization of credit, 
especially if there are market imperfections and institutional weaknesses. In this respect, 
the present paper explores a possible mechanism through which networking as measured 
by firm’s affiliation to business association could affect financing of investment and 
thereby encouraging growth of business enterprises in selected CEE countries.  
Following the recent institutional economics as well as organizational behavior 
literature, we argue that firms’ association with informal business networks may help 
them secure external finances, especially in countries with weaker institutions. We 
further examine if the importance of affiliation to business networks disappears in 
countries with better institutional quality. Results from a sample of CEE transition 
countries do confirm the positive role of business networks on firm’s access to bank 
finance. In particular there is evidence that affiliation to business association significantly 
boosts networked firms’ access to bank loans, even after controlling for all possible 
factors. Positive role of networks for network participants is particularly evident for firms 
borrowing from domestic private commercial banks and also foreign banks. The effect is 
robust in both single cross-section and panel data analysis, though there is some evidence 
that single cross-section estimates tend to over-estimate the effect of business networks. 
In the process non-networked small and medium enterprises are discriminated against, 
despite various on-going reforms.  
With respect to our second hypothesis, there is evidence from the single cross-
section estimates that importance of business association persists even when institutional 
quality improves, especially for firms’ access to bank and non-bank finance and also for 
firm’s borrowing from state and private domestic banks. Note however that the 
differential effect of business association for countries with higher institutional quality is 
no longer significant when we consider panel fixed effects estimates. 
Forming networks to secure bank loans and other business facilities may not 
necessarily be an efficient arrangement for the broader economy, as it may promote the 
interests of those networked firms who are successful to belong to good networks through 
family/political connections or otherwise, but are not necessarily more efficient firms. 
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Thus contrary to the common wisdom, social capital may not necessarily be a welfare 
improving arrangement. This is most especially as it would be interesting to examine 
whether networking as a screening device for banks assessment of firms creditworthiness 
works, as will be indicated by increasing loan default rates of such networked firms. 
Differences between networking and membership of business associations may also be 
explored with a view to understanding the structure of both business networks as 
informal business linkages, and those of memberships of business associations as formal 
business linkages and differences across the region, countries and industry.  
Including firm data on earnings before interest or taxes
20
 would further enhance 
our results of this paper in enabling us to convincingly pursue the effect of firm’s 
affiliation of business networks on profitability. However BEEPS data does not provide 
such information. We however hope future research will address this as well as the 
aforementioned shortcomings of this paper. 
 
                                                 
20 BEEPS questionnaire only asked firms whether a profit was made in the last year.  
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CHAPTER 2 TABLES  
Table 2.1: Distribution Of Firms Across Sample Countries 
Country Number 
of 
Firms 
Percentage 
of Total 
Observations 
Percentage of 
young firms in 
each country 
Percentage of firms 
with Business 
Association 
Membership in each 
Country 
SMEs as a 
proportion of total 
firms in each 
country 
FYR of Macedonia 200 4.0% 47.00% 41.00% 90.00% 
Serbia and Montenegro 300 6.0% 42.67% 58.00% 86.33% 
Albania 204 4.0% 61.76% 88.00% 92.65% 
Croatia 236 4.7% 27.97% 82.00% 86.02% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 200 4.0% 57.50% 52.00% 90.00% 
Slovenia 223 4.4% 21.97% 91.00% 87.44% 
Poland 975 19.3% 37.47% 30.00% 92.92% 
Hungary 610 12.1% 41.64% 54.00% 91.97% 
Czech rep 343 6.8% 49.11% 21.00% 92.13% 
Slovak rep 220 4.4% 43.64% 34.00% 90.00% 
Romania 600 11.9% 38.00% 54.00% 90.17% 
Bulgaria 300 6.0% 44.00% 43.00% 90.00% 
Latvia 205 4.1% 54.15% 26.00% 89.76% 
Lithuania 205 4.1% 46.83% 32.00% 90.24% 
Estonia 219 4.3% 45.21% 48.00% 90.41% 
Total 5040 100.0% n/a n/a 90.58% 
The distribution of firms across sample countries. Data is obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005 Data survey. Patterns also observable are the various cross-country dissimilarities in 
young firms, Networked firms, and firms of Small and Medium Enterprise size, where firm size is defined by the number of employees. Our sample comprises 
5040 firms in total of which 90.58% comprise SMEs. This suggests the growth in SMEs in Central and Eastern European countries owing to the transition 
country reforms. Furthermore, our sample represents some of the countries at an advanced stage in their reform process, notably, Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, and Romania. 
 54 
 
Table 2.2: Firms’ choice of banks (by ownership type) 
Loans from 
Firm Ownership 
State-owned Domestic Private Foreign 
State bank (1) 12 
(23.53%) 
 
133 
(15.93%) 
7 
(9.33%) 
Domestic  Private commercial 
bank (2) 
34 
(66.67%) 
 
598 
(71.62%) 
48 
(64.00%) 
Foreign bank (3) 5 
(9.80%) 
104 
(12.46%) 
20 
(26.67%) 
TOTAL 51 835 75 
The choice of bank type patronized for loans, by the three types of firms prevalent in our data set. This represents a smaller sub-sample of 
our original data set as it reflects only those firms that patronize, state banks, domestic private commercial banks, and foreign banks. 
Figures in brackets refer to the proportions of firm ownership by each owner obtaining loans (funding) from each of the three types of 
banks. It is constructed from the BEEPS 2005 questions 45 a17 to 45a19, which asked the respondents what proportion of their firm’s new 
fixed investment has been financed by borrowing from domestic private commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, and borrowing 
from state-owned banks (including state development banks). Total firms borrowing from banks in our sample are 961 Firms and firm 
ownership is mutually exclusive. Note however, that while firm ownership is mutually exclusive, bank borrowing is not, and so the same 
type of firm can borrow from more than one type of bank. We have three types of firms: State-owned, Domestic Private (comprising 
individual-owned firms, family-owned firms, general public-owned and domestic company-owned firms) and Foreign firms. Here 
ownership refers to the firm ownership type with the majority of shareholding of all the shareholders in the firm.   
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Table 2.3: Distribution of Firms By Source of Financing for New Fixed Investment 
Country 
Source of Finance 
Total 
Internal Bank Non-Bank Equity Other 
FYROM (Macedonia) 
85 18 8 4 4 200 
 (42.50%) (9.00%) (4.00%) (2.00%) (2.00%) 
Serbia and Montenegro 
188 50 14 2 2 
300 
(62.67%) (16.67%) (4.67%) (0.67%) (0.67%) 
Albania 
162 57 6 0 0 204 
 (79.41%) (27.94%) (2.94%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Croatia 
130 70 32 15 3 
236 
(55.08%) (29.66%) (13.56%) (6.36%) (1.27%) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
79 35 12 0 0 
200 
(39.50%) (17.50%) (6.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Slovenia 
136 66 20 1 3 
223 
(60.99%) (29.60%) (8.97%) (0.45%) (1.35%) 
Poland  
733 202 112 13 0 
975 
(75.18%) (20.72%) (11.49%) (1.33%) (0.00%) 
Hungary 
304 136 88 106 0 
610 
(49.84%) (22.30%) (14.43%) (17.38%) (0.00%) 
Czech rep 
186 39 71 36 2 
343 
(54.23%) (11.37%) (20.70%) (10.50%) (0.58%) 
Slovak rep 
115 29 38 25 1 
220 
(52.27%) (13.18%) (17.27%) (11.36%) (0.45%) 
Romania 
433 139 93 3 2 
600 
(72.17%) (23.17%) (15.50%) (0.50%) (0.33%) 
Bulgaria 
184 74 32 2 4 
300 
(61.33%) (24.67%) (10.67%) (0.67%) (1.33%) 
Latvia 
74 31 28 33 4 
205 
(36.10%) (15.12%) (13.66%) (16.10%) (1.95%) 
Lithuania 
126 32 65 6 6 
205 
(61.46%) (15.61%) (31.71%) (2.93%) (2.93%) 
Estonia 
138 39 60 3 4 
219 
(63.01%) (17.81%) (27.40%) (1.37%) (1.83%) 
The distribution of firms by source of financing for new fixed investment. Source of data is EBRD – World Bank BEEPS 2005 
data. Figures in tables above refer to the number of firms using the various sources of financing for new investment, and so 
firms may be observed to use more than one source of financing. Therefore, proportions in table above may not add up to 
100% in certain countries. Figures in brackets refer to number of firms in each category as a proportion of total firms in each 
country.  
The above  table is constructed from the 2005 BEEPs data questions Q45a15 to Q45a27 which asked respondents what 
proportion of firms new fixed investment have been financed from internal funds, equity, borrowing from local commercial 
banks, borrowing from foreign banks, borrowing from state-owned banks, including state Development banks, loans from 
family and friends, Money lenders or other informal sources, trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit 
cards, leasing arrangement, The Government (other than state-owned banks), and other. A Firm’s borrowing from internal 
funds constitutes the firm’s financing of new investment by internal financing, Firms borrowing from banks is the summation 
of the proportions of financing obtained from each of the individual types of banks -  domestic private commercial banks, 
foreign banks, and state-owned banks. Firm’s non-bank financing for new investment is obtained by the summation of firms 
financing for new investment from trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit cards, and leasing 
arrangement.  A firm finances new fixed investment by equity if it obtains any proportion of financing by the issue of new 
shares. The column above referred to as “other”, is the summation of firms proportions of sources of finance for new fixed 
investment from loans from family and friends, money lenders or other informal sources, The government (other than state-
owned banks), and other. 
 
 
 56 
 
Table 2.4: Distribution of Firms’ Reliance On A Single Source Of Finance For New 
Fixed Investment Across Sample Countries 
Country 
Source of Finance 
Total 
Internal Bank Non-Bank Equity Other 
FYROM (Macedonia) 
70 9 0 2 15 200 
 (35.00%) (4.50%) (0.00%) (1.00%) (7.50%) 
Serbia and Montenegro 
142 10 3 2 7 
300 
(47.33%) (3.33%) (1.00%) (0.67%) (2.33%) 
Albania 
108 11 0 0 1 
204 
(52.94%) (5.39%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.49%) 
Croatia 
68 20 4 3 2 
236 
(28.81%) (8.47%) (1.69%) (1.27%) (0.85%) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
55 14 0 0 2 
200 
(27.50%) (7.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (1.00%) 
Slovenia 
64 10 2 0 5 
223 
(28.70%) (4.48%) (0.90%) (0.00%) (2.24%) 
Poland  
472 23 12 1 23 
975 
(48.41%) (2.36%) (1.23%) (0.10%) (2.36%) 
Hungary 
190 37 17 46 6 
610 
(31.15%) (6.07%) (2.79%) (7.54%) (0.98%) 
Czech rep 
113 11 17 11 38 
343 
(32.94%) (3.21%) (4.96%) (3.21%) (11.08%) 
Slovak rep 
75 8 8 10 5 
220 
(34.09%) (3.64%) (3.64%) (4.55%) (2.27%) 
Romania 
276 33 11 1 13 
600 
(46.00%) (5.50%) (1.83%) (0.17%) (2.17%) 
Bulgaria 
120 22 8 0 6 
300 
(40.00%) (7.33%) (2.67%) (0.00%) (2.00%) 
Latvia 
46 11 4 18 7 
205 
(22.44%) (5.37%) (1.95%) (8.78%) (3.41%) 
Lithuania 
75 7 24 4 5 
205 
(36.59%) (3.41%) (11.71%) (1.95%) (2.44%) 
Estonia 
68 4 4 2 3 
219 
(31.05%) (1.83%) (1.83%) (0.91%) (1.37%) 
Distribution of firm’s reliance on a single source of financing across sample countries. Source of data is EBRD – World Bank 
BEEPS 2005 data.  All sources of finance are as earlier defined in the preceding Table 1.3. The figures in tables above refer to 
the number of firms financed 100% by either of the sources of finance – Internal finance, bank finance, non-bank finance, 
equity finance, and other. Figures in brackets refer to number of firms in each category as a proportion of total firms in each 
country. Note that proportions will not add up to 100% in all countries as not all firms will use 100% of any type of finance in 
sample countries. Clearly, most firms are 100% internally financed across our sample countries, with a lot fewer firms being 
100% bank financed.  
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Table 2.5: Mean Comparison of Networked and Non-networked firms 
Firm Characteristic Number of 
Firms 
Networked 
Firms 
Non-Networked T-stat 
SME 5040 0.8419 0.9631 -14.569*** 
Young 5034 0.3428 0.4934 -10.954*** 
Private 5040 0.7227 0.8291 -9.069*** 
State 4906 0.1065 0.0666 4.945*** 
Foreign 5040 0.0864 0.0377 7.129*** 
Growth of fixed assets 4883 127.53 31.34 4.837*** 
Research and 
Development spending 
3163 46.5764 10.4931 5.664*** 
Exports 5027 0.4008 0.2167 14.324*** 
International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) 
5040 0.2752 0.1148 14.577*** 
Independent Sample Means Test. T-Test for the Significance of the Difference between the Means of Two independent Samples - 
Networked firms and non-networked firms, based on selected firm characteristics. Our data sample comprises a total of 5040 firms 
drawn from 15 CEE countries. However, on account of observations missing for a number of firms, the number of firms either in 
possession or not in possession of selected firm characteristics varies across countries. A negative significant t-statistic indicates that 
Networked firms are less likely to possess the firm characteristics in question compared to Non-networked firms. The inverse is 
equally true. All t-statistics are significant at the 1% level of significance. T-statistics are computed assuming non-equality of means 
between networked and non-networked firms. 
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Table 2.6: Institutional quality in sample countries 
COUNTRY 
EBRD Bank 
Reform 
Index[1] 
Competition 
Policy Index[1] 
Institutional 
Quality Index[2] 
FYROM (Macedonia) 2.7 2.0 -3.3 
Serbia and Montenegro 2.7 1.0 0.0 
Albania 2.7 2.0 -7.1 
Croatia 4.0 2.3 0.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.7 1.0 -9.9 
Slovenia 3.3 2.7 8.5 
Poland 3.7 3.3 7.0 
Hungary 4.0 3.3 8.7 
Czech rep 4.0 3.0 6.8 
Slovak rep 3.7 3.3 2.8 
Romania 3.0 2.3 -0.8 
Bulgaria 3.7 2.7 0.1 
Latvia 3.7 3.0 2.6 
Lithuania 3.7 3.3 2.6 
Estonia 4.0 3.3 6.1 
The Distribution of institutional quality across sample countries. The EBRD bank reform and EBRD competition 
policy indices are both obtained from the EBRD structural Indicators Database 2009. The values of both indices range 
between 0 (minimum) and 4+ (maximum). Higher values depict countries at higher levels of bank reform and a more 
competitive climate, respectively. Institutional quality index is obtained from Bacchetta and Drabek (2002). The index 
ranges from -25 to 25, with higher values depicting countries at higher levels of institutional quality. 
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 Table 2.7: Model Specifications 
Model specifications for firm financing for new investment, and Firm’s bank choice. The choice of variables employed 
by both models, differ to the extent that one variable is excluded in either model specification. EBRD Competition 
policy index is excluded from firm’s bank choice regression, while EBRD bank reform index is excluded from Firm 
financing for new investment regression. 
Variable Category Explanatory Variables 
Firm Financing for 
New Investment 
Firm's Bank 
choice 
Firm Size 
Small and Medium 
Enterprises   
  Young firms   
  
Small and Medium 
Enterprises* Young 
firms 
  
 Growth of Fixed Assets   
Firm ownership State-owned firms   
  Foreign-owned firms   
  Domestic Private firms   
Business sector 
Manufacturing sector 
firm  
 
 
Business Association 
Firms membership of 
business association   
Research And 
Development 
Prior Year Research and 
Development Spending   
Country-level institutional 
variables 
EBRD competition 
Policy index   
  
Institutional Quality 
Index   
  
EBRD Bank Reform 
index   
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 Table 2.8: Probit marginal effects estimates of a firm’s affiliation to business 
association 
Dependent Variable Business Association 
State Firm -0.0521 
(0.0640) 
Foreign Firm 0.151*** 
(0.0641) 
Domestic Private  Firm -0.0228 
(0.0505) 
Small and Medium Enterprises -0.300*** 
(0.0367) 
Young Firm -0.129*** 
(0.0222) 
Exporting firm 0.142*** 
(0.0239) 
Balkan country 0.355*** 
(0.0224) 
Number of Observations 2365 
Log-likelihood -1426.83 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (7) 422.15*** 
The table reports First stage probit (marginal effects) regression estimates with firm-level data using 2002 BEEPS. The 
dependent variable is a firm’s affiliation to a Business Association, which we interprete as a firms Networking status. 
All variables employed in the regression are dummy variables, and detailed descriptions are as provided in Appendix 
Table A2.3. The number of observations of 2365 is arrived at, after excluding all firms missing observations for at least 
one of the variables included in our model specification.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. *= significant at 
10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.9: Probit Marginal Effects Of Likelihood Of Firm Financing Opportunities  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
100% 
Internal 
Finance 
Bank 
Finance 
Non-bank 
finance 
Equity  
finance 
Predicted Business Association -0.192*** 0.203*** 0.0835* .0000509 
 (0.066) (0.0556) (0.0501) (0.0282) 
State Firm 0.0111 -0.137*** -0.000803 -0.0283* 
 (0.0626) (0.0375) (0.0487) (0.0175) 
Foreign Firm 0.163*** -0.144*** -0.0267 -0.0179 
 (0.0622) (0.0385) (0.0490) (0.0226) 
Domestic Private Firm 0.0157 0.00312 -0.00438 -0.0106 
 (0.0483) (0.0403) (0.0376) (0.0230) 
Growth of fixed assets -0.00112*** 0.00116*** 0.000516** -0.0000248 
 (0.0003) (0.00024) (0.00022) (0.00014) 
Prior Year Research & Development 
spending 
-0.0000192 0.0000672 7.90e-06 0.0000262 
 (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00002) 
Small and Medium Enterprise -0.0850 0.0885* 0.0324 -0.0155 
 (0.0727) (0.0503) (0.0502) (0.0376) 
Young Firm -0.133 -0.0330 0.00682 0.0196 
 (0.107) (0.0928) (0.0786) (0.0434) 
Small and Medium Enterprise X Young 
firm 
0.0422 0.0655 0.0333 0.00234 
 (0.108) (0.0963) (0.0807) (0.0408) 
Competition policy -0.0715** 0.0247 0.0240 0.0253 
 (0.0315) (0.0269) (0.0261) (0.0183) 
Institutional Quality 0.0030886 -0.0080101** -0.00654** 0.00325 
 (0.00418) (0.00365) (0.00338) (0.00201) 
Business Association X Institutional 
quality 
-0.00988*** 0.0100*** 0.00757*** 0.00154 
 (0.00368) (0.00319) (0.0028) (0.00147) 
Balkan country 0.228*** -0.194*** -0.223*** -0.0431 
 (0.0779) (0.0518) (0.0380) (0.0334) 
Business Association X Balkan Country -0.0818* 0.148*** 0.138** 0.0533 
 (0.0520) (0.0540) (0.0662) (0.0635) 
     
Log likelihood -1605.82 -1281.26 -1120.97 -528.81 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (14) 66.92*** 127.11*** 62.66*** 60.03*** 
Number of Observations 2365 2365 2365 2365 
The table reports probit (marginal effects) regression estimates for firm financing for new fixed investment using 2005 BEEPS data. All firms with missing 
observations for any variable are omitted from this analysis. The dependent variables in all regressions are whether the firm finances any proportion of new 
fixed investment using: 1 =100% Internal funds, 2 = Any bank finance,  3 = Any Non-bank finance (i.e., sum of trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from 
customers, Credit cards, and leasing arrangements), 4 = Any equity finance. The variable, predicted Business Association, is the predicted value of business 
association obtained from running the probit regression in Table 2.8 above, and employed as a regressor in the present regression. All other variable definitions 
are as detailed in Appendix Table A2.3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%.  
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Table 2.10: Probit Marginal Effects Estimates of firms’ Access to Banks by Ownership 
Type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable 
State Bank Domestic Private 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign 
Bank 
Predicted Business Association  0.000354 0.170*** 0.0603* 
 (0.0029) (0.0493) (0.0165) 
State Firm -0.0253** -0.0825** -0.0168** 
 (0.0113) (0.0363) (0.00687) 
Foreign Firm -0.0199 -0.111*** -0.00498 
 (0.0145) (0.0322) (0.0135) 
Domestic Private Firm -0.00358 0.0124 0.000829 
 (0.0176) (0.0353) (0.0111) 
Prior year Growth of fixed assets 0.0000296 0.000914*** 0.000141** 
 (0.0001) (0.00021) (0.00006) 
Prior Year Research and Development 
spending 
7.80e-06 0.0000672* 0.0000147* 
 (0.00002) (0.0004) (0.00001) 
Small and Medium Enterprise 0.00211 0.0693* 0.00756 
 (0.0249) (0.0425) (0.0131) 
Young Firm 0.0518 -0.170* 0.0336 
 (0.0382) (0.0908) (0.0271) 
Small and Medium Enterprise X Young 
firm 
-0.0448* .2286439 -0.0217 
 (0.0257) (0.115)** (0.0175) 
EBRD Bank Reform Index -0.0309** 0.0704*** 0.0101 
 (0.0147) (0.0263) (0.00782) 
Institutional Quality 0.00447*** -0.0117*** -0.00169 
 (0.00157) (0.0033) (0.00114) 
Business Association X Institutional 
quality 
0.00276** 0.00949*** -0.00145 
 (0.00121) (0.00288) (0.0011) 
Balkan country -0.0362* 0.00949*** -0.0200 
 (0.0225) (0.0428) (0.0131) 
Business Association X Balkan Country 0.0649 0.0667 0.0264 
 (0.0596) (0.0464) (0.0234) 
    
Number of Observations 2365 2365 2365 
Log likelihood -396.68 -1109.02 -280.66 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (14) 53.65*** 98.09*** 76.36*** 
The table reports probit (marginal effects) regression estimates for firm’s bank choice for new fixed investment using 2005 
BEEPS data. All firms with missing observations for any variable are omitted from this analysis. The dependent variables in all 
regressions are whether the firm finances any proportion of new fixed investment using Bank finance from 1 = State Bank; 2 = 
Domestic private commercial Banks; 3 = Foreign Bank. The variable, predicted Business Association, is the predicted value of 
business association obtained from running the probit regression in Table 2.8 above, and employed as a regressor in the present 
regression. All other variable definitions are as detailed in Appendix Table A2.3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= 
significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.11: Fixed Effects Logit Marginal Effects Of Firms Financing Opportunities  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 100% 
internal 
finance 
Bank 
finance=1 
Nonbank 
finance=1 
Equity 
Finance=1 
Business Association -0.287 0.859*** -2.295*** -0.847 
 (0.238) (0.289) (0.287) (0.855) 
Growth of fixed assets 0.00296 -0.00463 0.00532* -0.00248 
 (0.00283) (0.0.00374) (0.00302) (0.00596) 
Institutional Quality 0.143 -0.172 -0.611*** -0.5032 
 (0.198) (0.249) (0.198) (63.681) 
Business Association X 
Institutional Quality 
0.0591 -0.0584 0.0797* 0.0259 
 (0.0407) (0.0487) (0.0483) (0.150) 
     
Number of Observations 298 234 622 60 
Number of Firms 149 117 311 30 
Log likelihood -100.96 -74.75 -142.85 -18.44 
LR chi2(4) 4.63** 12.69*** 145.43*** 4.71** 
The table reports fixed effects logit (Marginal effects) regression estimates with firm-level fixed effects using the panel component of 
the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS. Our panel is a balanced panel of 715 firms.  Note that we lose a significant number of observations if 
there is no variation in the access to loans from the particular source for firms over the two years in our sample. Hence, we also show 
the pooled logit estimates with year dummies in Appendix Table A2.5 which is identical to the panel fixed effects estimates for two-
years panel data. Firm finance source variables included in the regression are variables from Table 2.9 which have the potential to 
vary over time. All dependent variables are also as defined in Table 2.9 above. Consistent with our probit regression results in Table 
2.9 above, networked firms are more likely to obtain bank finance. In addition, the insignificance of the interaction of Business 
Association and Institutional Quality suggests that, in countries with poor institutional quality, firms’ network membership aids their 
access to bank finance. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 
1%. 
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Table 2.12:  Fixed Effects Logit Marginal Effects Of Firms’ Access To Bank Loans  
 Firms borrowing from 
VARIABLES State Bank Local Private 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign bank  
    
Business Association -0.611 0.754*** 1.336*** 
 (0.713) (0.314) (0.667) 
Growth of fixed assets -0.0126 -0.00562 0.0181* 
 (0.0159) (0.00376) (0.0104) 
Institutional Quality 0.0399 0.0632 Na[1] 
 (0.440) (0.320)  
Business Association X 
Institutional Quality 
0.0945 -0.0608 -0.0766 
 (0.109) (0.0550) (0.110) 
    
Number of Observations 82 196 50 
Number of Firms 41 98 25 
Log likelihood -27.34 -62.73 -12.36 
LRchi2(4) 2.16 10.39** 9.93*** 
[1] Note that the institutional quality variable is dropped for foreign banks. 
The table reports Logit (Marginal effects) regression estimates for firm’s bank choice, with firm-level fixed effects using the panel 
component of the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS. Our panel is a balanced panel of 715 firms.  Note that we lose a significant number of 
observations if there is no variation in the access to loans from the particular source over the two years in our sample. Hence, we also 
show the pooled logit estimates with year dummies in Appendix Table A2.6 which is identical to the panel fixed effects estimates for 
two-years panel data. Variables included in the regression are variables from Table 2.10 which have the potential to vary over time. 
With regards to foreign bank choice, the variable institutional quality was dropped from the regression on account of institutional 
quality having no within group variance. All dependent variables are as defined also in Table 2.10 above. Consistent with our probit 
regression results in Table 1.10 above, networked firms are more likely to obtain bank finance from local private commercial banks. In 
addition, the insignificance of the interaction of Business Association and Institutional Quality suggests that, in countries with poor 
institutional quality, firms’ network membership aids their access to bank finance. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= 
significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
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APPENDIX TABLES A2 
Appendix Table A2.1: Un-Instrumented Probit Marginal Effects Of Likelihood Of 
Firm Financing Opportunities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 100% internal 
finance 
Bank 
Finance 
Non-bank 
finance 
Equity  
finance 
Business Association -0.0827** 0.351*** 0.0382 0.00885 
 (0.0363) (0.102) (0.0280) (0.0187) 
State Firm 0.0474 -0.654*** -0.0160 -0.0285* 
 (0.0613) (0.178) (0.0457) (0.0172) 
Foreign Firm 0.0804 -0.276 0.00934 -0.0184 
 (0.0620) (0.170) (0.0489) (0.0199) 
Domestic Private Firm 0.0291 -0.0401 -0.0102 -0.0108 
 (0.0480) (0.128) (0.0379) (0.0230) 
Growth of fixed assets -0.00114*** 0.00376*** 0.000526** -0.0000231 
 (0.0003) (0.00071) (0.00022) (0.00014) 
Prior Year Research & 
Development spending 
-0.0000374 0.000274 0.0000148 0.0000266 
 (0.00006) (0.000167) (0.0004) (0.00002) 
Small and Medium Enterprise 0.0778* -0.234** -0.0391 -0.0150 
 (0.0445) (0.119) (0.0367) (0.0225) 
Young Firm -0.0610 -0.337 -0.0233 0.0197 
 (0.104) (0.290) (0.0758) (0.0418) 
Small and Medium Enterprise X 
Young firm 
0.0345 0.224 0.0355 0.00250 
 (0.107) (0.297) (0.0808) (0.0408) 
Competition policy -0.0823*** 0.123 0.0302 0.0272 
 (0.0316) (0.0861) (0.0263) (0.0186) 
Institutional Quality -0.00239 0.0000516 -0.0039553 0.00383 
 (0.0485) (0.0138) (0.00392) (0.00236) 
Business Association X 
Institutional Quality 
-0.00170 -0.00412 0.00354 0.000468 
 (0.0537) (0.0150) (0.00424) (0.00269) 
Balkan country -0.015962 0.201 -0.157*** -0.0385 
 (0.0615) (0.179) (0.0389) (0.0311) 
Business Association X Balkan 
Country 
.0052163 0.0447 0.0881 0.0408 
 (0.0674) (0.191) (0.0729) (0.0642) 
     
Number of Observations 2365 2365 2365 2365 
Log likelihood -1607.47 -1281.86 -1121.4174 -528.69 
LR chi2 (14) 24.12** 125.91*** 61.78*** 60.26*** 
The table reports probit (marginal effects) regression estimates for firm financing for new fixed investment using 2005 BEEPS data and with Business 
Association variable not instrumented. All firms with missing observations for any variable are omitted from this analysis. The dependent variables in all 
regressions are whether the firm finances any proportion of new fixed investment using: 1 =100% Internal funds, 2 = Any bank finance,  3 = Any Non-bank 
finance (i.e, sum of trade credit from suppliers, trade credit from customers, Credit cards, and leasing arrangements), 4 = Any equity finance. All variables are 
as defined in Appendix Table A2.3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%.  
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Appendix Table A2.2: Un-Instrumented Probit  Marginal Effects Estimates Of Firms’ Access 
To Banks By Ownership Type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable State bank Domestic private 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign bank 
Business Association  0.0291* 0.0550** 0.0295** 
 (0.0156) (0.0283) (0.013) 
State Firm -0.0259*** -0.105*** -0.0176*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0315) (0.00591) 
Foreign Firm -0.0211* -0.0565 0.00963 
 (0.0119) (0.0394) (0.0192) 
Domestic Private Firm -0.00474 0.000232 0.000321 
 (0.0173) (0.0362) (0.0113) 
Prior year Growth of fixed assets 0.0000218 0.000927*** 0.000138** 
 (0.0001) (0.00021) (0.00006) 
Prior Year Research and Development 
spending 
8.99e-06 0.0000804* .0000161* 
 (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00001) 
Small and Medium Enterprise 0.00346 -0.0751* -0.0222 
 (0.0145) (0.0385) (0.0160) 
Young Firm 0.0517 -0.226*** 0.0188 
 (0.0360) (0.0858) (0.0217) 
Small and Medium Enterprise X Young firm -0.0436* 0.237** -0.0197 
 (0.0251) (0.115) (0.0171) 
EBRD Bank Reform Index -0.0332** 0.0712*** 0.0100 
 (0.0143) (0.0263) (0.00765) 
Institutional Quality 0.00710*** -0.00727* 0.000844 
 (0.0208) (0.00406) (0.00156) 
Institutional quality X Business Association -0.000679 0.00417 -0.00415*** 
 (0.00213) (0.00422) (0.00159) 
Balkan country -0.0248 0.0258 0.0419 
 (0.2263) (0.0484) (0.0340) 
Balkan country *Business Association 0.0261 0.00768 -0.0117 
 (0.0475) (0.0530) (0.0129) 
    
Number of Observations 2365 2365 2365 
Log likelihood -394.76 -1112.98 -279.01 
LR chi2(14) 57.48*** 90.16*** 79.66*** 
The table reports probit (marginal effects) regression estimates for firm’s bank choice for new fixed investment using 2005 BEEPS 
data and with Business Association variable not instrumented. All firms with missing observations for any variable are omitted from 
this analysis. The dependent variables in all regressions are whether the firm finances any proportion of new fixed investment using 
Bank finance from 1 = State Bank; 2 = Domestic private commercial Banks; 3 = Foreign Bank. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix Table A2.3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *= significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 
1%. 
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Appendix Table A2.3: List of variables and summary statistics– Business Networks 
And Firm External Financing 
Variable Names Variable definitions Mean Standard 
Deviation 
100% Internal Finance This refers to firms that finance their new fixed investment 
entirely by internal funds.  It is a dummy variable taking the 
value of “1” if firms finance their new fixed investment 
entirely by internal finance and “0” otherwise. 
0.50 0.50 
Bank finance This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from the bank. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of “1” if any proportion of financing for 
new fixed investment is obtained from the bank and “0” 
otherwise. 
0.26 0.43 
Non-Bank finance This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from non-bank sources – Trade credit 
from Suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit cards, 
leasing arrangements. It is a dummy variable taking the 
value of “1” if any proportion of financing for new fixed 
investment is obtained from non-bank sources and “0” 
otherwise. 
0.19 0.39 
Equity finance This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from equity. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of “1” if any proportion of financing for 
new fixed investment is obtained from equity and “0” 
otherwise.  
0.06 0.24 
State Banks This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from state banks. It is a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” if the firm borrows from a 
state bank and “0” otherwise. 
0.04 0.20 
Domestic Private 
Commercial Banks 
This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from Domestic private commercial 
banks. It is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the 
bank borrows from a domestic private commercial bank 
and “0” otherwise. 
0.19 0.39 
Foreign Banks This refers to the proportion of firm financing for new fixed 
investment obtained from foreign banks. It is a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” if the bank borrows from a 
Foreign bank and “0” otherwise. 
0.03 0.17 
State firm  This refers to a State-owned firm. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of  “1” if the Government is the majority 
owner of the firm and  “0” otherwise 
0.07 0.25 
Foreign firm  This refers to a foreign-owned firm. It is a dummy variable 
taking the value of “1”, if a foreign company is the majority 
owner of the firm, and “0” otherwise. 
 
 
0.06 0.24 
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Domestic Private firm  This refers to a firm owned by a local citizen or company. 
It comprises the sum of the dummy variables of Individual 
firm ownership, Family firm ownership, domestic company 
ownership and general public firm ownership. It is thus a 
dummy variable, with “!” indicating that a local citizen or 
company is the majority owner of the firm and “0” 
otherwise. 
0.82 0.39 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise 
This refers to firms of Small and medium size. A small and 
Medium enterprise is defined according to the BEEPS 
survey data, as a company having a labour force size of 
between zero and 249 workers.  The variable denoting a 
SME is a dummy. This is coded “1” for small or medium 
sized firm (enterprise) and “0” otherwise. 
0.91 0.28 
Young Firm This refers to a firms years of existence or operation. We 
define a young firm as one in existence as at 1995. Our 
definition of a young firm follows that by Klapper et al 
(2002).  A young firm is so coded as a dummy variable, 
taking the value of “1” if a firm is a young firm and “0” 
otherwise.  
0.41 0.49 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise X Young firm 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 
variables, Small and Medium enterprises and Young firm. 
0.39 0.49 
Business Association 
Membership 
Business association membership. A dummy variable 
coded “0” for firms not having business association 
membership and “1” for firms. Possessing business 
association membership. 
0.48 0.50 
Exporting Firm This refers to a firm that exports goods either directly or 
indirectly. It is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if 
a firm exports goods and “0” otherwise. 
0.32 0.47 
Growth of fixed assets. This is the growth of a firm’s investment in fixed assets. It 
is expressed in percentage 
16.96 33.96 
Prior year research and 
development spending 
Research and Development spending in the previous year. 
This is a continuous variable measuring the amount of 
Research and development spending by firms (in thousands 
of US dollars). 
31.91 192.26 
Competition policy index An EBRD Country business competition policy index 
ranging from 0.0 to 4.0 with higher values depicting 
countries with more (stringent) competitive climates, and 
low values depicting countries with less competitive 
climates. 
2.80 0.63 
Institutional Quality A country broad composite index of institutional quality, 
comprising five component indicators – Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory burden, Rule of law, graft, and 
extent of democracy (voice and accountability) .(see 
Bacchetta and Drabek (2002),  . Values range from values 
3.63 4.60 
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of -25.00 to 25.00 with higher values depicting higher 
quality institutions and low values depicting low quality 
institutions. 
Bank Reform Index An EBRD index indicating the extent to which banking 
sector reforms have taken place in transition countries. It 
ranges from 0.0 to 4.0, with higher values depicting that the 
countries are at an advanced stage of banking sector reform. 
3.56 0.45 
Balkan This represents a country from the Balkan region 
comprising: Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR of Macedonia. 
It is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if a firm is 
located in a Balkan country and “0” otherwise.  
0.23 0.42 
Business Association  X 
Balkan country 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 
variables, Business Association and Balkan. 
0.18 0.38 
Business Association X 
institution Quality 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 
variables, Business Association and Institution Quality. 
1.40 3.82 
Source: 2005 BEEPS data, EBRD institutional indices and Bacchetta and Drabek (2002)  
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Table A2.4: Descriptive Statistics For The Panel Data Analysis– Business Networks And Firm 
External Financing 
Variable Names Mean Standard 
Deviation 
100% Internal Finance 0.49 0.50 
Bank finance 0.27 0.44 
Non-Bank finance 0.60 0.49 
Equity finance 0.05 0.22 
State Banks 0.053 0.22 
Domestic  Private Commercial Banks 0.19 0.39 
Foreign Banks 0.037 0.19 
Business Association 0.38 0.48 
Growth of Fixed assets 22.70 44.44 
Institutional Quality 2.13 4.95 
Business Association*Institutional Quality 0.69 3.37 
Source: 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data and Bacchetta and Drabek (2002) 
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Table A2.5: Firm Finance Choice Pooled Logit Estimates For 2002 And 2005 Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 100% internal 
finance 
Bank 
Finance 
Non-bank 
finance 
Equity  
finance 
     
Business Association 0.129 0.399** -0.208 0.175 
 (0.218) (0.175) (0.272) (0.417) 
Growth of fixed assets -0.00121 0.00413*** -0.000904 -0.00198 
 (0.00184) (0.00153) (0.00286) (0.00286) 
Institutional Quality -0.0589*** 0.00655 0.00202 0.0933*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0205) (0.0414) (0.0338) 
Business Association X Institutional 
Quality 
0.00787 0.00991 0.0365 -0.0337 
 (0.0332) (0.0289) (0.0486) (0.0493) 
Constant 1.734*** -1.393*** -1.376*** -2.897*** 
 (0.148) (0.129) (0.227) (0.242) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of Observations 1038 1038 514 1038 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.6: Firm Bank Choice Pooled Logit Estimates For 2002 And 2005 Data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable State bank Domestic private 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign 
bank 
    
Business Association 0.0720 0.165 0.805** 
 (0.431) (0.200) (0.356) 
Growth of fixed assets -0.00354 0.00484*** 0.00192 
 (0.00409) (0.00152) (0.00268) 
Institutional Quality 0.0532 0.00930 -0.0515 
 (0.0395) (0.0223) (0.0520) 
Business Association X Institutional 
Quality 
0.126* -0.0116 -0.0398 
 (0.0683) (0.0326) (0.0671) 
Constant -2.871*** -1.927*** -3.410*** 
 (0.263) (0.147) (0.284) 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes 
    
Number of Observations 1038 1038 1038 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 3 
Corruption, Foreign Bank Entry and Ownership Structure 
3.0 Introduction 
There is a general consensus that foreign banks can play a supporting role in the process 
of financial development and thus in the transition of Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries from socialist to market economies. This has resulted in a pronounced 
growth of foreign banks in the region (Naaborg et al, 2004, Claessens et al 2008). 
Existing evidence also suggests that foreign banks have generally outperformed private 
domestic banks in these CEE countries (e.g., see Bonin et al (2005); Havrylychk et al 
(2006); Claessens et al (2001)).  
 One cannot however ignore the important inter-country variation in foreign bank 
entry in the region. By 2008, Slovakia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and 
Croatia had very high foreign ownership of banks (90% or more of total bank assets were 
foreign owned) while foreign ownership was rather limited in countries like Slovenia, 
Moldova (see Table 3.1). The unanswered question is what explains this pronounced 
inter-country variation in foreign presence in the CEE region? The present paper argues 
that corruption in general and relative corruption, i.e., the corruption in host countries 
relative to that in home countries, in particular, can explain a great deal of variation in 
foreign bank entry, mode of entry (distinguishing between foreign greenfield and 
takeover) and also foreign bank ownership, even after controlling for all other factors. 
The rationale for foreign bank entry in transition countries is not fully understood. 
Most studies on foreign bank entry tend to focus on developed economies, mostly the US 
(e.g., see Goldberg and Saunders (1980), Goldberg and Saunders (1981), Fisher and 
Molyneux (1996), and Hultman and Mcgee (1988)). These countries welcomed foreign 
banks into their economies in the process of embracing capitalist principles in their 
economies.  One can identify three key rationales for foreign bank entry. Williams (2002) 
argues that in order to provide financial services to their existing clientele, foreign banks 
establish a presence abroad where their customers are located (Brealey and Kaplanis 
(1996); Goldberg and Saunders (1981); Buch (2000); Lensink and Hermes (2004); 
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Brimmer and Dahl (1975); Gray and Gray (1981); Ball and Tschoegl (1982); Aliber, 
1984); Nigh et al. (1986); Magri et al. (2005); Damanpour, (1991); Clarke et al (2003)). The 
attractiveness of host markets is another rationale for foreign bank entry.  In particular, 
lower taxes and high GDP per capita are reasons for foreign bank entry in some transition 
countries (Claessens et al, 2000). Large host markets are likely to be attractive 
destinations for foreign banks as a result of the increasing opportunities to innovate and 
provide financial products not previously existing in such countries. Growing markets are 
equally appealing to foreign banks as they enable foreign banks to benefit from future 
opportunities that may become available as markets grow in size. Finally, host country 
institutions including bank regulation is the third rationale for foreign bank entry. 
Favourable host country regulation promotes competition between domestic and foreign 
banks (Clarke et al, 2001) and enables foreign bank expansion. Regulations conducive to 
foreign bank entry include regulation enforcing and establishing safe, transparent and 
enforceable rules for financial markets. Lensink et al (2002) find bank reforms to be 
important for foreign bank entry. Weak host country bank regulation on the other hand 
may protect inefficient domestic banks while increasing the costs of operation of foreign 
banks. Despite this, Cerutti et al (2007) and Focarelli et al. (2005) argue in favour of 
foreign banks to locate in countries with weak regulation.  
The state of institutional infrastructure in transition countries differs significantly 
from that in the developed economies generally studied in the literature. Weak 
institutions in the CEE region encompass the legal, political and economic infrastructure 
as highlighted in the measures for rule of law, judicial efficiency, democratic 
accountability, protection of creditor rights, and protection of property rights. In 
particular, Lensink and Haan (2002) have identified bank reforms and better political 
freedom as important factors for foreign bank entry. While bank reforms have been 
ongoing for some time, the pace and sequencing of bank reforms have varied across the 
CEE region. Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia are among the earliest and 
swiftest economic and banking reformers (Koutosomanoli-Filippaki et al, 2009) and have 
also enjoyed the economic benefits. Strong institutions will thus promote foreign bank 
entry and weaker institutions are likely to discourage it.   
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While different dimensions of institutions may be pertinent, recent FDI literature 
has particularly focussed on the significance of corruption (e.g, see Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2003).
21
 Higher corruption can significantly weaken CEE country institutional 
quality. Hellman et al. (2000) particularly argued that while corruption occurs 
everywhere, it is particularly widespread in transition and less developed economies 
which in turn weakens the process of economic reform. Corruption is generally defined 
and understood in most literature as the abuse of public power for private gain (See 
Rodriguez et al, 2005). Corruption may however have different facets and is 
consequently difficult to measure (Senior, 2006). In this respect, one may distinguish 
between petty corruption
22
and grand corruption
23
. Petty corruption is a low level 
corruption which may involve bribery to get routine procedures followed more quickly or 
not followed at all (Moody-stuart, 1996). In contrast, grand corruption is a high level 
corruption, and will tend to involve senior government officials, and those involved in the 
highest tier of decision making in the country. Thus, the former is of more direct 
consequence to the average citizen in a country, while the latter is a result of the actions 
taken by the national/sub-national authorities.   
There is a general consensus that corruption adversely affects foreign direct 
investment as it acts as a tax on international investments (Wei, 2000). Hines (1995) cites 
the USA as a country from which foreign direct investment goes to less corrupt countries. 
Conversely, Egger and Winner (2005) provide evidence suggesting that corruption may 
encourage foreign direct investment. From that perspective, foreign bank entry might be 
encouraged despite the prevalence of corruption though there is no evidence in this 
respect. Distinguishing between absolute and relative corruption, Driffield et al. (2010) 
find that in addition to absolute corruption, relative corruption may further lower foreign 
ownership in non-financial firms in the transition region; the result is however reversed 
for knowledge intensive firms who are wary of sharing their knowledge with local 
partners in the region characterized by weak institutions. The literature is generally silent 
                                                 
21 We do not survey the FDI literature as a whole, but only focus on the part of the literature where the role of 
corruption on FDI has been examined for obvious relevance to the current study. 
22 This is lower level corruption which may involve bribery to get routine procedures followed more quickly-or not 
followed at all (Moody-stuart, 1996). 
23 This is high level corruption, and will tend to involve senior Government officials, and those involved in the highest 
tier of decision making in the country. 
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about the role of corruption on foreign bank entry and ownership in the emerging world; 
the present paper attempts to bridge these gaps in the literature.  
We argue that corruption may affect foreign bank entry to the extent that it 
increases the cost of operations (setting-up a business as well as running day-to-day 
business) of foreign banks in host economies. Petty corruption such as bribery from low 
level officials may reduce transaction costs of foreign banks to the extent that foreign 
banks are able to afford such costs to locate in such host countries. Grand corruption is 
another form of corruption representing an indirect cost to foreign banks in locating in 
host country economies. This could, for example, take the form of banks from certain 
home countries influencing the enforcement of host country bank regulation policies 
towards their home country. By so doing, foreign banks from competing home countries 
are placed at a disadvantage. In other words, absolute host corruption is likely to have an 
adverse effect on foreign bank entry. 
In addition to absolute corruption, we also highlight the importance of foreign 
banks working in similar institutional host country environment as in the home country. 
The latter, in turn, offers an argument for relative corruption, i.e., the corruption in home 
country relative to that in host country. There is some indirect evidence in Europe that 
foreign owners try to minimize these costs, e.g., foreign owners are often from 
neighbouring countries (e.g., see Naaborg et al, 2004) so as to ensure a similar operating 
environment. For example, Swedish banks are observed to be prevalent in Baltic 
countries and Austrian banks in Slovak republic. Havrylychk et al (2006) suggest that 
foreign banks enter countries whose economic, political and social environment they 
know the best. Furthermore, Galindo et al (2003) emphasizes the increased cost to the 
foreign bank subsidiary of operating in a dissimilar host country environment. In the 
absence of any direct evidence in this respect, we examine if greater relative corruption 
would discourage foreign entry in a corrupt host environment in our sample.  
A further important feature of our analysis is to consider the role of corruption 
and relative corruption on mode of foreign bank entry, which remains little understood. 
In this respect, we distinguish between foreign greenfield and takeover. A greenfield 
investment exists where a foreign bank establishes a new bank subsidiary in the host 
country. The foreign owner therefore fully controls the bank subsidiary and has no local 
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partner to collaborate with; in other words, this is a case of sole foreign subsidiary. A 
takeover bank is one where the foreign bank acquires usually a substantial stake in the 
host country bank, and yet may need to depend on the assistance of local partners to 
pursue business interests in the host country; in other words, a foreign take-over is likely 
to involve some form of joint venture with a local partner in the host country. In this 
respect, we explore the possible role of corruption on the choice between sole foreign 
subsidiary and joint venture which remains rather explored. On the one hand, foreign 
bank ownership through greenfield investment may be less attractive because the local 
partners in an acquired joint venture firm in the host country may provide the valuable 
local knowledge to deal with the corrupt business environment and government red tape 
in a host country. In other words, it is less likely for a wholly owned foreign subsidiary to 
own the know-how of how to avoid red-tape in the unfamiliar corrupt host environment. 
On the other hand, the presence of “knowledgeable" local owners/managers in a joint 
venture could be problematic (even if they had the expertise in dealing with the 
government red tape and corrupt business environment) because these local managers 
may trigger a bigger risk by leaking technology-related information to other firms. Along 
this line, Lehner (2008) found that greenfield foreign bank entry is relatively more 
common in developed markets with stronger institutions, while the cases of cross border 
lending and acquisition entry prevails more in less developed banking markets with 
weaker legal/judicial structures, which creates greater uncertainty in enforcing contracts. 
Unlike Lehner (2008), we particularly focus on CEE transition countries to examine the 
role of corruption and relative corruption on foreign greenfield and takeover. 
Many existing studies tend to combine a number of institutional indicators 
measuring various aspects of institutional quality, into one composite index (e.g., see 
Claessens et al, 2008, and Lensink et al, 2008). This is particularly problematic as many 
of these indicators tend to be correlated with each other in a complex way and as such 
does not allow one to examine the role of a key institutional index independently. We 
focus on the corruption index because the corruption index is a useful measure of 
institutional quality in a country. Corruption can be seen as a key single indicator of 
institutional quality as it reflects the impact of underlying institutional inputs (including 
poor protection of property rights, excessive and arbitrary regulation, and weak informal 
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institutions, i.e., norms and values shaping human behaviour) into one output indicator 
that describes the quality of the interface between businesses and public administration. 
Moreover, unlike most other institutional indicators, corruption indicators are not expert-
assessment based, but result from survey data based on experience of businesses. Since 
corruption is multidimensional and difficult to measure, we also examine the robustness 
of our results with possible alternative measures, e.g., the rule of law index. 
We measure corruption using the Kaufman et al (2009) World Governance 
Indicators, and specifically Corruption control index. This is one of six important 
indicators of institutional quality, and is chosen as it measures the impact of corruption 
directly. There are other comparable corruption indices, e.g., those provided by the 
International country risk guide (ICRG), and the Transparency international index. We 
were however unable to use the ICRG corruption index as it was unavailable for a 
number of our sample countries such as Serbia, and FYR Macedonia. Hence, we use the 
corruption control index from Kaufman et al (2009) World governance indicators (see 
further discussion in section 3.2).  
Second, unlike most existing studies (with the exception of Driffield et al., 2010 
for manufacturing firms), we argue that in addition to corruption in the host country, one 
also needs to take account of the corruption in the host country relative to that in the 
home country. Absolute corruption is defined as the corruption existing in a host country 
while relative corruption is the absolute distance in the corruption between home and host 
countries.  
Finally, in addition to the effect of absolute and relative corruption on foreign 
entry and foreign ownership, we empirically explore the role of absolute and relative 
corruption, ceteris paribus, on mode of foreign bank entry, which thus far remains rather 
unexplored and as such constitutes an important value added of our study.  
Our analysis is primarily based on the bank-level data from Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Bankscope database from a number of CEE host 
countries for the period 2000 - 2008. This bank-level data have then been matched with 
Kaufman institutional data not only for host countries, but also for the home countries 
from where the respective foreign banks originate. Note however that the ownership 
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information obtained from Bankscope is largely time-invariant, as the ownership 
information primarily pertains to the latest year of the survey. Hence, we make use of a 
second sample with time-varying information on mode of entry from De Haas et al. 
(2011), which are then merged with the Bankscope data. Note however that the second 
sample does not have any information on continuous foreign ownership variable, which 
we obtain from Bankscope. While we adopt fixed effects logit to determine foreign bank 
entry using the De Haas et al. sample, we use pooled cross-section multinomial logit 
models to determine the mode of foreign bank entry using the Bankscope data; however, 
given the inertia in the ownership information we lose a lot of observations, when we use 
the panel model. We also determine a pooled Tobit model of foreign ownership by 
correcting for the mode of entry.
24
 We check the robustness of our corruption estimates 
by employing alternative rule of law measure and also estimate an augmented model with 
additional explanatory variables to minimize the omitted variable bias.  
Our analysis confirms the importance of both absolute and relative corruption on 
foreign bank entry, mode of entry and foreign ownership in the CEE region though there 
are also some differences with respect to each of the outcome variables of interest. First, 
there is evidence that higher levels of both absolute and relative corruption lower the 
likelihood of foreign bank entry. Second, we consider the multinomial logit estimates of 
mode of foreign bank entry, distinguishing  between foreign greenfield and foreign 
takeover; there is evidence that greater relative corruption may increase the likelihood of 
foreign greenfield (as opposed to takeover) so as to reduce the direct and indirect costs of 
joint venture especially in an unfamiliar environment. However absolute rather than 
relative corruption is more important for foreign takeover where a foreign owner 
collaborate with a local partner. This appears convincing as the local owner in foreign 
takeover banks handles the local red tape in setting up and running the business in corrupt 
home environment. (iii) Finally, we consider the selectivity corrected estimates of foreign 
ownership in our sample and find that absolute corruption lowers foreign ownership 
while relative corruption remains insignificant here.  
                                                 
24 Given the inertia in the ownership information, use of panel models means a significant loss of data; hence we also 
consider the pooled estimates which produce comparable estimates. See discussion in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
  
80 
 
 
We contribute to the literature in a variety of ways. While there are a number of 
studies linking corruption and FDI for non-financial firms, as far as we are aware, ours is 
one of the first systematic studies linking corruption to foreign bank entry, mode of entry 
and foreign ownership in the CEE region. We examine the role of both absolute and 
relative corruption in the context of banks physically located in host CEE countries. In 
this respect, our examination of the role of corruption for foreign bank entry in the host 
CEE countries complements that of Galindo et al. (2003) study of relative corruption in 
the context of cross-border banking activity. Cross-border bank activity is uncommon in 
transition countries due to the level of banking sector development. Our study is also 
sufficiently different from Driffield et al. (2010) for manufacturing firms. Focusing on 
the case of banks (as opposed to non-financial firms), we use a different data set 
(Bankscope as opposed to Orbis) and different measures of corruption. Also the sample 
countries are somewhat different. More importantly, we have time-varying information 
on foreign bank entry and also the mode of entry; clearly, our mode of entry variable is 
richer, distinguishing between no entry, foreign greenfield, and foreign takeover. 
Accordingly, we not only obtain the panel data fixed effects estimates, but also a 
multinomial logit selection model (where the first stage equation pertains to model of 
entry) of foreign ownership. As a result, we are able to generate results for a sample of 
banks, which are sufficiently different from Driffield et al. (2010). Unfortunately, 
however, we do not have any information on the characteristics of the parent bank and we 
hope future research will address this.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 provides an 
overview of the literature on foreign bank entry and its relation with corruption. Section 
3.2 discusses our data set and section 3.3 explains the methodology. Section 3.4 provides 
the discussion of our regression results, and section 3.5 concludes the chapter.  
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3.1. Background, Literature And Hypotheses 
3.1.1. Determinants of FDI 
Simonsen (2003) argued that the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
show why FDI is now viewed with such near-universal approbation. Perhaps in no other 
part of the world during the ten years before, had FDI had such profound, beneficial 
effects on prospects for sustainable human development. The sharp growth in per-capita 
GDP and labor productivity seen in such countries as Poland, Hungary, and Estonia since 
the mid-1990s had been driven by the large amounts of FDI that these countries had 
attracted. Without their FDI successes, these countries would not have been front-runners 
for EU accession at the time. Certainly, these cases could have motivated more CEE 
countries in recent time to run for EU accession.  
 There is a large and growing literature on the determinants of FDI though there is 
relatively very little knowledge about the growth of foreign banks and bank ownership in 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe including the community of 
independent states (CIS).  Here we briefly review the FDI literature for non-financial 
firms operating in the transition region because of their obvious resemblance to our 
objective of determining foreign bank entry, mode of entry and foreign ownership in CEE 
transition region. For example, Culem (1988), Mody and Wheeler (1992), Lucas (1993) 
and Cheng and Kwan (2000), Lankes and Venables (1996) find evidence that transition 
progress, political stability, new market opportunities and perceived risk levels were 
important for management decisions regarding investment, while Holland and Pain 
(1998) find that the method of privatization, labour costs, trade linkages and proximity to 
the EU as important arguments for FDI inflows. Resmini (2000), using a unique panel 
data set at the sector level for eleven CEE economies during 1990 to 1995, find that 
market variables such as population and GDP per capita were important for FDI inflow. 
Carstensen and Toubal (2004) find that market size has a positive effect on FDI flows 
and that the level and method of privatization as well as country risk significantly affect 
the volume of FDI inflows. Including CIS countries in a study of 25 transition countries, 
Kinoshita and Campos (2004) find labour costs, natural resource abundance and 
institutions as being additional determinants of FDI inflows in transition countries. 
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Johnson (2006) further compare  CEE and CIS countries and argue that the larger inflows 
of FDI to the CEE economies rather than the CIS economies can primarily be explained 
by better opportunities for market-seeking investment due to stronger host country 
demand, a faster transition process and possibly less problems of corruption. Improved 
quality of institutions which play a significant role in attracting foreign direct investment 
inflow, in countries like Hungary, and Czech republic, which were swifter reformers, 
certainly could have also enabled significant levels of economic growth to have been 
achieved by some CEE countries that they were able to join the membership of 
organization for economic cooperation and Development (OECD), thus further boosting 
their development. Thus our attempt to include corruption is bound to benefit a deeper 
understanding of the variation in the share of foreign bank assets in the CEE countries, 
which in turn may further FDI inflow in banking in the transition region.   
 
3.1.2. Foreign Bank Entry in CEE Countries. 
It has been argued that the growth of foreign banks in emerging/transition countries is 
related to the broader growth of international banking which has been attributed to 
growing trade flows, foreign investment activities and globalization of capital markets. 
Despite various direct and indirect costs, establishing a physical presence in a host 
foreign country provides a string of advantages to the foreign bank. These, according to 
Berger et al (2000), include (a) more effective servicing and monitoring of retail 
customers and (b) an opportunity to compete for retail and wholesale customers in the 
foreign country. Clearly growth of foreign banks in the erstwhile communist states 
promotes competition in the banking sector between state, domestic private and foreign 
banks and introduces market mechanism to enhance savings, to channel available savings 
into value maximising investment and therefore significantly boost the process of 
economic growth.  
Two forms of foreign bank entry exist in the literature. One form is cross-border 
lending in which foreign banks lend to firms in other countries without establishing a 
presence, while the other involves a direct establishment of a presence to support 
enterprises in host countries. Our analysis focuses on the latter, distinguishing between 
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greenfield banks and mergers or acquisitions.
25
 The superior performance of greenfield 
banks compared to acquired or merged banks which often gives rise to joint venture with 
local partners, would inform the policy circle of their growing appeal. Despite this, 
acquired and merged banks have also attracted some interest from foreign individuals 
(e.g., see Megginson (2005) and Clarke et al (2003)). The forms of foreign bank 
operation has also evolved over time with foreign banks choosing to operate as branches, 
subsidiaries, or agencies  This has been attributed to foreign banks attempts to maintain 
their global competitive edge (Heinkel et al,1992). Barriers to entry has also informed 
banks choice of organizational form as argued by Cerutti et al (2007) who find that banks 
are more likely to operate as branches in countries that have higher taxes and lower 
regulatory restrictions on bank entry and on foreign branches. Furthermore, Goldberg and 
Grosse (1994) argued lower regulatory restrictions to encourage growth of international 
banking.  
Foreign banks aim not only to maximize their profits as they expand abroad 
(Williams, 1997), but also to diversify their risks in an uncertain business climate. From 
this perspective, foreign banks may tap into markets beaming with potential, while 
maintaining their existing share in current markets. This will protect the banks in the 
event of market downturns in various markets. It has been suggested that foreign banks in 
Central and Eastern European transition countries are more efficient than domestic banks 
(private or state banks) (Havrylchyk, 2006) and realize enormous profits. Kraft (2004) 
argued that high interest margins were the strongest reason for foreign bank entry in 
Croatia. Regulations have also been argued as a reason for foreign bank entry into the 
transition region. Foreign banks will enter countries with regulations promoting 
competition as a result of co-existence of both foreign and domestic banks. Such 
regulations will expose inefficient domestic banks and force them out of the market 
(Clarke et al 2001). Bank reforms also play a role in affecting foreign bank entry through 
the efficiency of the financial sector, as well as through its effect on domestic investment.  
Bank reforms once advanced will further curb banks excessive risk taking culture and 
banks substantially high interest margins (Williams, 2002). 
                                                 
25 Berger et al (2000) illustrate how mega mergers are becoming the order of the day in the developed world especially 
US and Europe where commercial banking organizations are combining and large banks are merging.   
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3.1.2.1. Benefits of foreign Bank entry 
The benefits of foreign banks to transition countries have been many and varied. In 
addition to boosting competition, foreign banks have brought about the use of advanced 
technology in lending which through spillover effects has benefitted the local markets 
(Claeys and Hainz, 2006). Foreign banks have also enabled increased access to credit to 
firms (Giannetti and Ongenna, 2005). Small firms are also not left out. Foreign banks 
responded to the huge demand for credit by new small and potentially profitable firms 
seeking to provide basic goods, and the emergence of entrepreneurs lacking access to 
start-up capital (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009)
26
. In addition, in competition with domestic 
banks these banks have contributed to the development of host country banking sectors. 
Thus efficiency of banking sectors has been the result (See Yildirim and Philipatos 
(2007); Bonin et al (2005)). Other ways by which foreign banks have contributed to the 
development of host country financial systems include provision of access to foreign 
capital and also mitigating problems of connected lending that afflict domestic bank 
lending in many developing countries (Mian (2006); Giannetti and Ongena (2009); 
Further, growth of foreign banks and therefore increased market competition may also 
help ease the barriers to entry for new entrepreneurial firms (Rajan And Zingales, 2003). 
Foreign banks tend to employ an educated labour force, who are more able to adapt new 
technologies (Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg, 2008) and also help improving the quality, 
pricing and availability of financial services, both directly as providers and indirectly 
through increased competition (Lensink et al, 2002).  
 
 
3.1.3. Mode of Foreign Bank Entry  
Most existing literature on mode of foreign entry pertains to multinational enterprises. 
The choice of mode of entry to penetrate a host country is one critical decision to be 
made by the foreign multinational enterprises and has been carefully studied in the 
international business literature (for recent reviews, see Buckley & Casson, 1998; Chang 
                                                 
26 The emergence of small enterprises was also a product of the reform process which entailed enterprise reform. 
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& Rosenzweig, 2001; Davis et al., 2000; Root, 1994). We make use of this existing 
literature to draw inference about the mode of entry of foreign banks.  
Foreign banks may penetrate host country banking sectors through two primary 
modes of entry
27
, either as greenfield investments or takeover. These modes of entry play 
a crucial role in the transmission of benefits to domestic customers (Claeys and Hainz, 
2007). As a greenfield investment, the foreign bank starts a new foreign bank subsidiary 
in the host country banking sector.  The desire of foreign banks to follow their clients 
abroad, is the primary motivation for foreign greenfield investment of this type (Aliber, 
1984), which in turn may boost competition (Poghosyan and Poghosyan (2009)) and also 
generate more transparent organizational structure.  In addition, foreign greenfield 
investment may possess superior screening technology for choosing the best borrowers 
from the pool of all borrowers, and thereby may reduce the burden of non-performing 
loans, and other structural weaknesses associated with erstwhile state banks (Degyrse et 
al, 2009, and Claeys et al, 2007).  
A second mode of entry through which foreign banks may penetrate host country 
banking sectors is takeover, usually via mergers and acquisition. In such takeovers, 
foreign banks acquire an existing domestic institution, thereby improving the efficiency 
of the domestic institution from its erstwhile inefficient state. The acquisition may be a 
partial acquisition of an existing bank –whether state or local private, or a complete 
acquisition of the bank
28
. The resultant joint venture bank may benefit from the soft 
information from its local managers that the Greenfield foreign bank
29
 is not able to 
obtain. However the local advantage of the joint venture banks created by mergers and 
acquisition may be negated if the local managers may indulge in technology leakage to 
other firms, thus enhancing the relative merit of foreign greenfield banks.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27 These are classed as equity modes of entry in the literature as equity is purchased in the process of bank ownership. 
28 in which case the newly completely acquired bank becomes wholly owned by the foreign individual taking over the 
bank. 
29 That whose ownership foreign individuals have through Greenfield investment. 
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3.1.4. Corruption and Foreign Bank Entry 
Quality of institutions is fundamental to attracting foreign direct investment, especially 
for the banking sector (e.g., see Galindo et al, 2003)
30
. There is also an important positive 
externality here as foreign bank investment has a significant positive impact on local 
banks efficiency (Genci, 2009). 
In the presence of corruption institutions are devoid of quality. This is compatible 
with a general view of corruption to create inefficiencies of government as argued by 
Mauro (1995), Mo (2001), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and Rose-Ackerman (1999). 
Inefficient institutions may be created in developing countries as a result of corrupt 
officials. The state is inefficient in its provision of services as observed from the poor 
quality of institutions in the state. While government, the provider of social institutions, is 
by nature inefficient in many developing and transition countries, corrupt institutions in 
developing countries will further significantly enhance inefficiency. Accordingly, 
corruption may prevent developing countries from attaining the potential levels of 
development.   
The value of quality of institutions to the development of the capitalist economy 
is one that has been extensively studied. Countries where the overall institutional 
environment is conducive to provide competition tend to have lower interest margins 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al, 2004). Quality institutions are ones in which creditor rights, 
shareholder rights and property rights are maintained, and the rule of law is upheld. 
Judicial efficiency is also present in such institutional environments. Political and Social 
institutions are also important for the development of the country. Measures of political 
and social institutional infrastructure include: political stability, voice and accountability, 
democracy, etc. Economic freedom as employed by Demirguc-Kunt et al (2004) is also a 
very important country level indicator of institutional infrastructure. The relegation of the 
role of Government in the emergence of the new market economy to that of provision of 
institutional framework to support the market, requires government to ensure these 
institutions are of utmost quality. It is these institutions that will provide the bed rock for 
effective reforms in transition countries. 
                                                 
30 Galindo et al (2003) argues that a positive and significant correlation has been observed between various proxies of 
the flow of foreign direct investment in banking, and level of bilateral economic integration. 
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Among various institutional indices, we particularly focus on the role of 
corruption, which may act as a drag on foreign bank entry because corruption often 
rewards unproductive behavior by channeling unmerited contracts and rights to firms in 
exchange for bribes, thereby penalizing efficient and innovative initiatives. Corruption is 
often a trait of the government and its associated establishments that creates the level of 
bureaucracy to perpetrate corruption (Aidt, 2009).  While corruption occurs everywhere, 
it is particularly widespread in transition and less developed economies with weak legal 
and judicial structures that make law enforcement more difficult in case of a conflict 
(Hellman et al., 2000). Indeed, corruption varies across countries as much as labor costs 
or corporate tax rates (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000). As such, corruption may adversely 
affect the market seeking and efficiency seeking (See Bevan and Estrin, 2004) 
motivations for foreign owners to the transition region.  
Corruption may however affect foreign bank entry through influencing bank 
regulation. This is because corruption may be beneficial in circumventing regulatory and 
administrative regulations (Leff, 1964), which may induce foreign banks to enter the 
corrupt countries. Taken together, the effect of host corruption on foreign bank entry 
remain ambiguous and thus rationalizing our attempt to test this hypothesis for the 
sample containing Central and Eastern European countries.  
 
3.1.4.1. Banking Regulation and Foreign Bank entry 
Bank regulation has been argued to promote bank efficiency as it promotes bank 
competition. Bank regulation will promote the entry of foreign banks and exit of 
inefficient domestic banks. Foreign banks being the banks to benefit most given their 
superior skills in risk management, and use of efficient technology to the market, may 
therefore demand improvement in bank regulation as a result (Lensink et al, 2002). 
Improved bank regulation is a component of bank reform currently ongoing in many 
transition countries. Prior to the reform period, the banking sector was poorly regulated, 
with many newly established private banks lacking the necessary capital and skills to 
compete effectively with the dominant state-owned and privatised banks (Fries et al, 
2002). Bank reform, especially in the areas of bankruptcy and corporate governance have 
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been associated with lower costs faced by new bank entrants (Fries et al, 2002). Voinea et 
al (2006) found that banking sector reforms positively influence foreign banks' activity in 
a sample of 12 home countries (of which 10 are EU members) and 16 recipient countries 
(consisting SEE and CEE countries). This is interpreted as a proxy for the degree and 
speed to which the EU policies have been adopted in recipient countries.  
Bank reforms may however not be an unmixed blessing. Tighter bank regulation 
may hamper foreign bank entry, and while reducing bank activity promotes banking 
sector fragility (Barth et al, 2001; 2003). This is brought about by the harmful effects of 
competition
31
 as a result of tighter bank regulations (Carletti 2005)
32
. Thus, banking 
sector development and performing banks, are adversely affected (Barth et al, 2003). 
Bank costs of financial intermediation are also affected. Demirguc-kunt et al (2004) find 
that tighter regulation boosts bank interest margins
33
.  
 
3.1.4.2. Corruption and Mode of entry 
Once a foreign bank decides to enter a country, it needs to make a strategic choice about 
the mode of entry between greenfield and takeover. In this respect, Chen (2006), Harzing 
(2002) and Meyer (1998) makes a distinction between greenfield investment, and 
acquisition while others distinguish between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary. 
In fact, there is often a correspondence between these two alternative sets of 
terminologies. In particular, a greenfield investment is a wholly owned subsidiary as no 
local partners are involved so that the foreign owner is in full control of the bank 
subsidiary in the host country. A takeover bank that may arise through merger and 
acquisition may involve local partners and as such bank control would be shared between 
the foreign and the local partners.  
The choice of entry mode among firms has been widely researched on a global 
scale (Barkema & Vermeulen 1998, Chen 2006). There are four main theories of the 
                                                 
31 Competition among banks, as a result of the presence of adverse selection in loan markets, enables banks exercise 
market power. Banks ability to screen borrowers effectively therefore worsens as the number of competing banks 
increase. Higher probability of bank failures result as tougher competition between banks leads to riskier banks. 
32 This contrasts with the traditional effects of bank regulation in promoting competition which leads to efficiency. 
Carletti et al however suggest that, whether greater competition enhances or worsens the stability of the banking system 
remains to be seen.  
33 A finding supported by Levine (2003).  
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choice of entry mode, primarily among multinational enterprises (but arguably equally 
applicable to banks as well): transaction cost theory (Meyer 2001), a learning perspective 
(Barkema & Vermeulen 1998) a strategic view (Harzing 2002) and institutional theory 
(Rodriguez et al, 2005).  
Taken together, there is a tradeoff between these two choices, namely, fully 
owned subsidiary and joint venture banks. Corruption makes local bureaucracy less 
transparent and hence acts as a tax on foreign investors (Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). 
Most forms of foreign bank entry in corrupt environments take place through takeovers/ 
acquisition. Corruption may induce a foreign bank to collaborate with a local partner in 
joint venture banks, who enable the foreign owners to cut through the bureaucratic maze 
present in highly corrupt environments, and as such the value of a local partner may be 
high.
34
 The problem however arises from the fact that the same local owner may be 
responsible for the leakage/diffusion of the foreign technology to others, which may be a 
source of conflict between the local and foreign owners in a joint venture; the fact 
remains that the likelihood of resolving a conflict in a corruption environment remains 
rather low. In the absence of any prior, we thus examine this empirically for our sample. 
 
3.1.4.3. Relative Corruption and foreign bank entry 
In addition to corruption in the host country, we argue that the distance in corruption 
between host and home country, which we label as relative corruption, may influence 
bank entry. While we are not aware of any study assessing the effect of relative 
corruption on bank entry, other measures of dissimilarity between home and host 
countries have been used in the literature. For example, the physical distance between 
host and home countries has traditionally been used in the literature to proxy for 
information costs (Buch 2005). It also affects international asset holdings and 
international capital flows negatively (Portes and Rey, (2001); and Wei and Wu (2002)). 
However, distance has since been redefined to refer to the dissimilarity between countries 
in terms of culture, language, and laws (e.g., see Berger et al, 2000). Institutions are not 
left out and the notion of distance is equally applicable, as argued by Mian (2006), and 
                                                 
34 Further evidence in support is provided by Tekin-Koru (2006) and Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh and Eden (2006). 
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Lensink et al 2008). Berger et al (2000) observe physical distance to adversely affect 
foreign bank performance in countries. Foreign banks cost of providing services rise as a 
result of dissimilar characteristics between home and host countries. Foreign bank 
performance is however improved as the dissimilarity in host-home country 
characteristics reduce. Lensink et al (2008), observe foreign bank inefficiency to decline 
as institutional distance improves. Claessens et al (2008) argue foreign banks to enter 
host countries as a result of host comparative advantage relative to other competing 
foreign banks in the same host country. Learning costs of new institutional environments 
is another dimension brought into the foreign bank literature by Galindo et al (2003).  
Foreign banks face a cost in learning to deal with institutional differences across 
countries. These costs are however reduced, the closer the institution quality of the home 
country of the foreign bank is to that of its host country.  If this is the case, we will expect 
more foreign bank entry in host countries of similar institution quality to their home 
countries.  
Further Galindo et al (2003) focus on cross-border foreign bank entry, which is 
not a popular route of entry for foreign banks into transition countries. This is known as 
direct lending, and is typically offered to large-scale borrowers (Focarelli et al, 2005). 
Transition countries following enterprise reform have seen erstwhile large enterprises 
privatized as small and medium enterprises (Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Sulla, 2002). 
Resulting from that, foreign banks establish themselves within the borders of host 
transition countries. A physical presence is important for development of personal 
relationships with clients as banks seek to expand bank activities (Rajan, 1998).
35
 
Along this line, we not only explore the effect of relative corruption on foreign 
bank entry, but also consider if host countries share borders with home countries, and 
whether both host and home countries are both members of the European Union. 
Prospective membership of the European Union by a number of transition countries may 
have informed the advanced stage of reforms in countries like Hungary, Czech Republic, 
                                                 
35Our study differs from the study of Galindo et al (2003) in that our study is restricted to CEE countries only, where as 
Galindo examine a larger sample of countries in which both CEE countries, other transition countries and non-
transition countries are lumped together. As such cross-border direct lending is not important for our sample as 
transition countries differ fundamentally in structure from other countries including many developing countries.       
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Poland, and Slovakia (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al (2009). This is important and 
relevant as we seek a deeper understanding of the reasons for the physical presence of 
foreign bank entry in transition countries despite the well known costs of corrupt 
operating environments.  
 
 
 
3.2.  Data and Sources 
Data for our study is obtained from Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) 
Bankscope database. This is a database containing balance sheet and income statement 
information pertaining to a large variety of banks. It also provides us with bank activities, 
as well as key ratios. Financial statement data is available for the period 2000 – 2008, 
over which our study is done. Furthermore, it is a popular database for use in study on 
banks, and has been extensively employed in previous studies on banking.  
Bankscope provides us with unconsolidated and consolidated financial statement 
information for a number of banks. However, for the purpose of our study, we focus on 
banks with unconsolidated financial statements as this enables us to focus clearly on the 
characteristics of the foreign banks of interest. We use the 2008 version of Bankscope 
and we identify if a host bank has any foreign interest (investment) or not. This is 
regardless of the actual extent of foreign investment in the bank. These banks we define 
as foreign banks
36
. The complexities involved in identifying full ownership of any bank 
in Bankscope resulted in our decision to take into account direct bank subsidiaries 
ownership only. We thus do not take into account indirect foreign bank subsidiaries 
ownership of banks. Data on institutional characteristics employed in the study are 
obtained from Kaufman et al (2009) World governance indicators index, which are then 
matched with the host bank-level data for the sample countries. We also obtain the 
institutional indices for home countries of the foreign banks and match them carefully 
with the relevant host banks in our sample. This is our primary data-set containing 
                                                 
36 This contravenes the popular definition of a foreign bank in previous studies, in which foreign banks are so defined if 
the foreign interest is at least 51% of total shareholding. 
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information for 138 banks over 2000-2008 and the total number of bank-year observation 
is 1018 (see further discussion in section 3.2.1.1). 
 The continuous foreign ownership information obtained from Bankscope is 
largely time-invariant. Hence we take advantage of some related data used by De Haas et 
al. (2011) to build a sub-sample with time varying ownership information (see further 
discussion in section 3.2.1.2) . This panel data set comprises of 780 observations drawn 
from 106 bank subsidiaries operating in 14 host countries in the CEE region. 
 
 
3.2.1 Data Samples 
Here we analyze the characteristics of both datasets as outlined in sub-sections 3.2.1.1 
and 3.2.1.2.  
 
3.2.1.1 Main Data set 
For the 138 sample banks, we construct a pooled data set where some bank subsidiaries 
have observations for each of the years 2000 to 2008 and other bank subsidiaries are 
missing a few observations for some of the years. We match the foreign banks with their 
respective country of origin (country where their parent bank is located), called their 
home country. The country in which these foreign bank subsidiaries are located is 
referred to as the foreign bank subsidiary’s host country. Some of the bank subsidiaries 
belong to banking groups and so we may find bank subsidiaries of similar names in 
different Central and Eastern European countries such as OTP bank, Banka dd, etc. Most 
foreign bank subsidiaries originated from developed home countries where their parent 
banks are located; there are only a few foreign banks originating from developing home 
countries. There is also significant concentration of foreign bank subsidiaries originating 
from European Union home countries, thereby highlighting the benefits of European 
integration.  
Host countries in our sample include 14 countries, namely, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech republic, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
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Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Incidentally, one 
representative bank in our sample may have foreign investment from more than one 
foreign country; hence, we define the home country as the one with the highest 
ownership holding amongst all other foreign investors in the particular bank in the host 
country. Accordingly, home countries in our sample include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Israel,  Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Turkey, and United States of America. In 2006, Austria was the largest foreign 
investor in terms of control of banking assets in the Czech Republic, Slovak, Hungary, 
Romania and Croatia (Altman 2006). Furthermore it is evident that parent banks from 
many emerging countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania are now investing 
in other neighbouring emerging economies.  
 
3.2.1.2. Data Sub-sample  
The continuous foreign ownership information obtained from Bankscope is largely time-
invariant. Hence we merge the bank-level data set from Bankscope with related 
ownership information used by De Haas et al. (2011) to build a sub-sample with time 
varying ownership information. Note however that this information is not available for all 
the banks in our main sample and hence we create a subsample that contains time-varying 
ownership information. There are 106 banks giving rise to a sample size of 780. Also, 
unlike the main sample, the ownership in this sub-sample is binary in nature 
distinguishing foreign entry between greenfield and takeover. We construct an 
unbalanced panel data set from this sub-sample comprising banks observed for the period 
2000 - 2008. This panel data set enables us to fully examine how foreign bank entry 
decisions and subsequently foreign ownership decisions are determined by the level of 
absolute and relative corruption in host countries. While there are fewer banks in this 
sub-sample, all the 14 host countries represented in the main sample are still present in 
this sub-sample as well.  
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3.2.2. Measure of corruption 
There are various measures of corruption available in the literature. Impact of differences 
in corruption and other institutional characteristics on foreign bank entry
37
 is analyzed 
using three of six country level indices from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).  The 
institutional indices in Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) are an updated version of 
the institutional indices constructed by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). This 
is a database on world governance indictors and has been popularly employed in a 
number of studies such as: Galindo et al (2003), Demirguc-kunt et al (2004), Lensink et 
al (2008). It is worth noting that it is a perception based index, and as such weaknesses 
associated with the use of such data is acknowledged. Other comparable indices widely 
employed in studies on corruption include the Transparency international index (TI 
index) and the International country risk Guide (ICRG) index, which too are both 
perception based indices. The challenge with using such perception based indices is that 
perceptions my well be informed by not only conventional wisdom, but also by existent 
climatic conditions such as current economic performance of the country (Aidt, 2003). 
Given the popularity of the Kaufman et al (2008), we decided to employ the index.  
Rule of Law: This index measures the perception of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. The index ranges between -2.5 to 2.5, higher values indicating countries 
with better rule of law. 
Control of Corruption: This index measures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. This index like others 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values indicate less corrupt countries, while lower values 
will indicate more corrupt countries
38
.   
                                                 
37 Foreign bank entry refers to the ownership of a bank subsidiary in a host country by a parent bank located in a 
foreign country. 
38 Aidt (2009) suggests a manipulation of corruption control indices such as the Transparency international index in 
which higher values correspond to less corrupt countries, while lower values correspond to more corrupt countries, as is 
often done in applied work. This will enable a more direct measure of corruption to be obtained from such indices of 
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We define corruption in the respective home and host countries as absolute corruption. 
We also compute the difference between the home and host corruption control indices 
and label it as relative corruption. Therefore lower values of relative corruption index 
correspond to closer similarity of host country institutions with that of the home. 
Appendix Table A3.1 provides the descriptive statistics of absolute corruption control in 
home and host countries, as well as, relative corruption in host countries. We observe 
Denmark as the home country having the highest mean absolute corruption control (thus 
the lowest corruption). Sweden and The Netherlands, have the next higher mean 
corruption control indices respectively. We argue that the greater the distance in home 
country and host country corruption control, the higher is the transaction costs being 
incurred by a foreign bank in a host country and therefore the lower is the foreign bank 
ownership. We empirically examine the validity of this hypothesis.    
With regards to the host countries, Slovenia is the host country with the highest mean 
absolute corruption control (lowest corruption). Moldova is the host country with the 
lowest mean absolute corruption control (highest corruption). On the basis of relative 
corruption, Moldova has the highest mean relative corruption. This implies that foreign 
banks on average will find it difficult to operate in Moldova, due to the wide dis-
similarity in operating environments. Slovenia on the other hand, has the lowest mean 
relative corruption. Thus on average, they will be more attractive to home countries for 
foreign bank investment.   
Similarly, we construct relative and absolute measures with respect to the rule of 
law, which is used as an alternative corruption measure. Appendix Table A3.2 provides 
further justification for this. The table shows the bivariate correlations between 
corruption, rule of law and regulatory quality. It is however evident that corruption and 
rule of law measures are more closely correlated than corruption and regulatory quality 
measure. Hence, we can test the robustness of our original corruption results by 
employing rule of law as an alternative measure of corruption. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
corruption control. Once manipulated, lower values of the index will indicate less corrupt countries, and higher values 
will indicate more corrupt countries. 
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3.2.3. Data description 
Table 3.1 provides selected financial sector indices in our host countries for the most 
recent year 2008. We observe foreign owned banks owning a significant asset share of 
banking sector assets. Slovakia has the highest asset share of foreign owned banks 
(99.2%), followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina (95.0%), and FYR Macedonia (93.2%). 
Slovenia has the least assets share of foreign owned banks at 31.1%. This trend is 
however not followed when we consider non-performing loans. FYR Macedonia is found 
to have the highest non-performing loans.  
There is also wide variation in the distribution of Domestic credit to GDP ratio in 
our sample.  Montenegro, Slovenia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Croatia have higher level of 
financial development as compared to Moldova, Romania, Serbia and FYR Macedonia. 
The final column of Table 3.1 shows the EBRD bank reform index, a constructed index 
by the EBRD measuring how advanced transition countries have gone in undertaking 
sweeping banking sector reforms, which again highlights same variation across sample 
countries. The highest bank sector reform of 4.0 is attained in Croatia and Hungary, while 
the lowest bank sector reform index of 3.0 is found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine respectively.  
The distribution of banks across the sample host countries are summarised in 
Table 3.2. Heterogeneity exists in the number of host country banks observed in each 
host country. Serbia; Poland, Czech Republic and Bosnia-Herzegovina make up the 
quartet of the host country bank observations most represented in our sample. Bulgaria 
bank observations are the least represented host country observations in our sample 
comprising only 2.2% of total observations. 
Table 3.3 shows means and standard deviations of selected bank indicators for the 
sample host countries and highlights the heterogeneity in our sample in this respect. 
Return on Assets measures the overall profitability of our host banks in host countries. 
While banks in Moldova are the most profitable at 3.0%, other country banks, at 1.0% are 
considerably far behind. Ukraine on the other hand is the least profitable with an average 
at 0.50%. Return on equity, an alternative measure of bank profitability, and a measure of 
greater interest to shareholders of the bank, is quite high in a large number of host 
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countries on average. Moldova is once again the host country on average with the highest 
return on equity. Negative average return on equity is observed in the Serbia and Ukraine.  
There is also significant variation in net interest revenue, bank profitability, 
capital structure and riskiness across our sample host country banks on average. Most of 
the countries on average have quite profitable as well as highly capitalized banks, 
especially those in Moldova, Hungary, Slovenia, and Czech Republic.  
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of five major home countries across the sample 
host countries. These are Austria, Germany, Greece, USA, and Italy. Austria as a major 
home country is compatible with arguments by Altman (2006) that high foreign 
ownership of the banking market in Central and Eastern Europe features a large presence 
and concentration of ownership with Austrian banks. 21.05% of Home country banks 
investments from Austria are made in host country banks in Serbia. 38.89% of German 
home country banks investment are made in host country banks in Poland. 50% of home 
country banks from Greece invest in host country banks in Serbia. 22.22% of home 
country banks from USA are made in home country banks in Poland and Moldova 
respectively. Italy, the last of the major home countries makes 25% of host country 
investment in Croatia and Romania. One of the reasons for major home countries to 
invest mostly in a certain host country may be due to similarity in institutional quality 
and business climate in the country. Corruption in major home countries relative to host 
countries may be very small and thus provide foreign banks from major home countries 
with familiar terrain to operate in at no additional cost in host countries.  
Access to the panel data sub-sample allows us to focus on the mode of foreign 
bank entry, which primarily distinguishes between greenfield and takeover modes of 
entry. This is summarized in Table 3.5. Banks in the sample countries appear to be split 
in the choice between these two modes of entry. Clearly incidence of foreign takeover 
dominates in many sample countries like Romania, Hungary, Bosnia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and Bulgaria. However, foreign greenfield appears to be the dominant mode of entry in 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine. 
 Table 3.6 summarizes the distribution of foreign ownership in the sample host 
countries. There is substantial foreign bank ownership in general in all of our host 
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countries on average. While Romania has the highest mean foreign ownership 
concentration and Poland closely behind, Croatia has the least. Four levels of foreign 
ownership concentration are observed. These are full foreign ownership (100%), fifty-one 
percent but no more than 99% foreign ownership, 26% but no more than 50% foreign 
ownership, and 1% but no more than 25% foreign ownership. The former category of 
foreign ownership is quite substantial in our sample, with Montenegro and Hungary 
having the highest proportion of such bank types. In general though, most of our sample 
host countries are well represented in all categories of foreign ownership.  
 
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
The parent bank’s decision to invest in a host foreign country may be viewed as 
consisting of three simultaneous decisions. (i) The first decision pertains to whether or 
not to locate in the host country. (ii) The second decision taken simultaneously to the 
first, is the mode of entry – foreign greenfield or foreign takeover and (iii) The actual 
amount of investment in the host bank as highlighted in the percentage of foreign 
ownership in the host bank. Models of foreign bank entry employed in previous studies 
have been built on this precept
39
, of which Smarzynska and Wei (2001) and Javorcik and 
Wei (2009) are classic examples. Bank characteristics are viewed and argued as 
important factors for foreign entry in such studies, as are host country characteristics. For 
example, a home bank may decide to locate in a host country due to the host banks 
profitability. The same home bank may further then decide to acquire 100% of the 
shareholding in the host bank due to its expected profitability and the host country’s 
expected market size growth.   
Foreign banks mode of entry into host countries appears to be varied. Foreign 
banks may locate in host countries through mergers and acquisitions (Berger et al, 2000). 
                                                 
39 Note though that such models mostly ignore the mode of entry decision and rather view foreign entry as being 
comprised of the decision to enter the host country and the foreign shareholding to own. 
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They may also locate as various forms: branches, subsidiaries, or agencies, based on host 
country advantages of doing so (Henkel et al, 1992, and Cerutti et al, 2007).  
A simultaneous probit model was employed by Smarzynska and Wei (2001) to 
jointly determine a foreign investor’s decision in choosing between a wholly-owned firm 
or joint venture conditional on foreign direct investment taking place.  We deviate from 
this approach and develop our study in three stages – determining foreign bank entry, 
foreign bank mode of entry (foreign greenfield and foreign takeover), and foreign bank 
ownership. Our analysis has been guided by the distribution of foreign ownership 
concentration in our sample (e.g., see Appendix Figure B3.1). It follows that 60% of our 
total main data sample observations had attracted foreign ownership between 80% and 
100%. In contrast, about 20% banks have less than 20% foreign ownership.  It must be 
noted that whilst a host of existing studies examining foreign entry such as Javorcik and 
Wei (2009), focus mostly on firms, our study pertains to banks and as such offers new 
insight. Banks differ structurally and operationally from firms in the activities they 
engage in, however to the extent that they support firm existence, such a study as this 
may shed interesting light on corruption being an interesting rationale for foreign banks 
to enter host CEE countries and support the firms. 
 
 
3.3.1. A Model of Foreign Bank Entry 
We first focus on determining foreign bank entry decision in a host country. In this 
respect, we make use of the subsample data. Although ownership is largely time invariant 
in nature, for a sub-sample of banks there is some variation of ownership over time. So 
we start with simple logit model using pooled data (with control for years) and then move 
on to the logit fixed effects model which drops the firms for which there is no time 
variation in ownership.  
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Pooled Logit Model 
Suppose Fij= 1 if the i
th
 foreign bank invests in the j
th
 host country 
Suppose Fij= 0 otherwise. 
Then, Fij =1, if Fij* >0 
Fij =0 Otherwise. 
Where  
   
      (3.1) 
Where C is absolute corruption and RC is relative corruption in country j respectively. 
Thus, after controlling for all other factors, we focus on identifying the pure effect of 
corruption and relative corruption. X refers to a set of bank characteristics – bank size, 
profitability, risk, intangible assets, and Herfindahl index.  
Bank size is measured by the log of total assets. The huge asset share of foreign 
banks in many of the eastern European countries suggests that foreign banks will be of 
significantly large sizes. We measure bank risk by the ratio of non-performing loans to 
gross total loans. Existing literature suggests that foreign banks hedge risk in developing 
countries by lending to large firms due to their transparency in activities.  The Herfindahl 
index of deposit market concentration provides us domestic deposit market share of the 
foreign bank subsidiaries in their respective host countries. It is a calculated index (see 
Appendix Table A3.3 for further details). Bank profitability is controlled for by the return 
on assets (otherwise known as ratio of earnings before interest and taxes, divided by total 
assets). Bank profitability accounts for banks operational efficiency (as measured by ratio 
of overheads to total assets), and credit market efficiency (as measured by ratio of net 
interest margin to total assets),  
The index of market concentration is included to control for competition among 
banks in the host country. Descriptive statistics and other variable definitions are as 
provided in Appendix Table A3.3. Appendix Table A3.4 provides the descriptive 
statistics for our time varying bank ownership sub-sample. 
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In alternative specifications, we replace corruption (C) and relative corruption 
(RC) by the corresponding absolute and relative rule of law.  
 
Logit Fixed Effects Model 
Given that a sub-set of firms also experienced time variation in ownership, we also 
attempt logit fixed effects estimates of foreign bank entry.  
We thus determine the decision of the i
th
 bank to invest in the j
th
 host country in 
year t, t=2000,…,2008, in terms of host country absolute (C) and relative corruption 
(RC), among other control variables X.  
 Fijt=1 if Fijt*>0 
Fijt* =0 if otherwise 
where Fijt
*
 is determined by:  
Fijt
 *= Φ0 + Φ C Cjt + ΦRCRCjt+ ΦXXijt +  еijt      (3.2) 
All variables are as defined in the preceding pooled logit model above. 
 
 
3.3.2. A Pooled Model of Foreign Bank Mode of Entry 
Foreign banks may choose different modes of entry to enter the host country. Given the 
data at our access, we distinguish between foreign Greenfield entry and foreign takeover 
entry. We employ a multinomial logit model to determine the mode of entry where the 
reference category implies ‘No entry’.  
We thus define a new mode of entry variable, FBMODE as follows: 
FBMODE = 0 if bank has no foreign investment 
  = 1 if foreign bank is a Greenfield investment 
= 2 if foreign bank is a foreign takeover     
  
102 
 
 
Given the discrete and unordered nature of the variable, we apply a multinomial logit 
model to determine FBMODE using pooled data.  
The multinomial Logit model is used where a choice is to be made by the i
th
 
foreign bank in the j
th
 host country, from a number of alternatives and the data to be 
analyzed are individual specific.  The choice sets, which are analyzed with this model, 
are unordered. The model is as illustrated below: 
e
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  k = 0, 1,2.  (3.3) 
Where, Y is the discrete dependent variable and X’s are the explanatory variables; 
(inclusive of host country absolute corruption and relative corruption). K is the number of 
modes of entry choices available to the foreign bank as specified in (3.3).  
Equation (3.3) is estimated for each choice with respect to the reference category. 
The estimated equations then provide a set of probabilities for the k+1 choices for a 
decision maker with characteristics X. Maximum likelihood method is then used to solve 
the set of equations that arise to obtain the probabilities of each choice.  
 In addition to the measures of absolute and relative corruption the set of control 
variables X employed in our multinomial logit model are similar to those used in the 
pooled logit and fixed effect logit models. In this respect we have been guided by the 
existing literature.  
 
 
 
3.3.3. Determination of Foreign Bank Ownership with Selection for Mode of Entry 
Determination of foreign ownership is contingent upon foreign bank’s mode of entry 
(foreign green field or take over). Hence to determine foreign ownership, we need to 
correct for the selectivity bias arising from the choice of mode of entry. Note, however, 
that foreign bank ownership information is largely time-invariant in our sample. 
Therefore, we use a Heckman type selection to determine foreign ownership after 
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selecting banks with some foreign investment, which allows us to address the selectivity 
bias a la Lee (1983).  This is a 2-step method. First we estimate the multinomial logit of 
bank mode of entry and generate the inverse Mills ratios for k=0, 1, 2 where k denote the 
mode of entry as follows: 0: No foreign entry, 1: foreign greenfield entry and 2: foreign 
takeover entry, respectively. The inverse Mills ratios are plugged into the second stage 
tobit model of foreign ownership FOij by the i-th bank in host country j. 
 ij
T
ijT
G
ijGijijXjRCjcij XRCCFO  
0
00
*     (3.4) 
Where FOij =0 if    and FOij =   when .  λs are the inverse Mills 
ratios respectively for k = 0, 1, 2. 
X is the set of host country bank characteristics, explaining this probability, namely 
Profitability, bank size, Intangible to total assets ratio, ratio of non-performing loans to 
gross total loans, Computed Herfindahl index of deposit market concentration. C refers to 
host country absolute corruption. RC refers to relative corruption. Since we use pooled 
data, we also include the year dummies to control for variation over time. The remaining 
errors remain included in the independently and identically distributed error term, ε. 
In all regressions, we determine the marginal effects of each explanatory variable 
separately as the partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable with 
respect to the particular explanatory variable. This is so, as the coefficient estimates do 
not reflect the marginal effects of each explanatory variable.  
 
 
 
3.4. Empirical Results 
We have access to time-varying bank mode of entry and ownership data though naturally 
there is a lot of inertia in entry information. Hence, in addition to panel models, we also 
experiment with pooled estimates. While Driffield et al. (2010) use Wooldridge (1995) 
model, we refrain from doing so; this is because application of Wooldridge (1995) model 
requires that the ownership variable is truncated from below or above, which is not the 
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case in our context. Further, the selection equation in Wooldridge model involves running 
a binary probit model to determine whether there is foreign entry or not; in contrast, our 
mode of entry variable is richer as it distinguishes no foreign entry from foreign 
greenfield and foreign takeover; as such we cannot apply a binary choice model as the 
first stage selection equation. Hence we take recourse to Lee (1982) where the first stage 
selection equation is a multinomial logit model to determine mode of foreign entry; we 
save the inverse mill’s ratio from the first stage, which are then inserted into the second 
stage ownership equation to control for selectivity bias arising from differential modes of 
foreign entry
40
. In doing so we not only control for absolute and relative corruption, but 
also a whole host of other factors including year dummies; we argue that the year 
dummies would control for variation in ownership over time, if any. The advantage with 
this two stage model is that it makes use of most of the sample (the panel formulation of 
the model drops a large proportion of time-invariant observations).  
The main results for all our regressions are as presented in Tables 3.7 – 3.9. 
Discussions on foreign entry are couched with respect to the fixed effects logit regression 
results (see Table 3.7). These fixed effect regression results may be compared to those 
obtained for the pooled samples in Appendix Table A3.5. Pooled multinomial Logit 
estimates of mode of entry form the second set of results presented in Table 3.8. We 
examine the banks choice between foreign greenfield and foreign takeover (relative to no 
foreign entry). Finally we consider the mode of entry selectivity corrected estimates of 
foreign ownership summarised in Table 3.9. In all estimations, we discuss marginal 
effects of the host bank characteristics and host country absolute corruption and relative 
corruption on the dependent variable of interest.  
 
 
3.4.1. Results 
The effects of host country absolute corruption on foreign bank ownership concentration 
is captured by corruption control indices. Although the Kaufman et al (2009) corruption 
                                                 
40
 Note that we insert only the inverse mills ratios for foreign greenfield and foreign takeover into the second stage 
regression while maintaining that of No foreign entry as the reference inverse mills ratio category which is omitted. 
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control world governance indicator is such that higher values of the indicator indicates 
lower corruption, we convert the variable appropriately so that higher value of the 
indicator refers to higher corruption.
41
  
Fixed effects logit estimates in (Table 3.7) highlights the role of corruption on 
foreign bank entry; there is suggestion that, ceteris paribus, both absolute and relative 
corruption would significantly lower the likelihood of foreign bank entry; in other words, 
an exclusion of relative corruption would under-estimate the role of corruption on foreign 
bank entry. We also check the robustness of this corruption effect by employing the 
alternative measure rule of law, which appears to be compatible with the corruption result 
discussed above. In particular, it suggests a positive but insignificant effect of rule of law 
for foreign entry.  This is because greater corruption or worse rule of law enhances costs 
of setting up and running operations in the host country. 
Among other results for bank entry, evidence suggests the importance of higher 
intangible assets, and higher host country bank concentration for foreign bank entry. 
Greater share of non-performing loans however tends to be associated with foreign entry, 
possibly as a result of the banks potential profitability in host country CEE economies. 
Banks size though remains insignificant.  
Table 3.8 shows the multinomial logit estimates of foreign banks mode of entry, 
where the reference category are those banks with no foreign ownership. These results 
suggest that higher host country corruption lowers the likelihood of foreign greenfield 
entry while higher relative corruption increases it. Relative corruption is however not 
significant for foreign takeover in a host country, but absolute host corruption is. The 
latter suggests the foreign banks may only desire a domestic partner in corrupt 
environments to achieve legitimacy as well as, reduce the risks of operating in such an 
environment. Employing rule of law as an alternative indicator of corruption provides 
evidence in support of corruption effect, as both absolute and relative rule of law 
coefficients are positive and significant for foreign greenfield mode of entry choice. Rule 
of law provides an avenue through which corruption can affect bank entry as lower rule 
                                                 
41 Note that it is not possible to employ the methodology of Aidt (2009) to specify absolute corruption control in 
inverse form so as to enable a direct interpretation of the roles of host country absolute corruption, given that corruption 
control index is a continuous variable. The methodology of Aidt (2009) is only applicable where the measure of 
corruption control is of a discrete nature.  
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of law may be indicative of higher corruption in the host country and vice versa. In 
comparison of coefficients of host country absolute corruption and rule of law, while 
better rule of law results in marginally less foreign greenfield entry than lower corruption, 
relative rule of law results in slightly more foreign greenfield entry than relative 
corruption. 
Selectivity corrected regression estimates for foreign ownership are shown in 
Table 3.9. Note that all our inverse Mill’s ratios are statistically significant, thus 
justifying the use of the selection model used here. Clearly, the relative corruption 
coefficient is not statistically significant here while that for absolute corruption 
coefficient is. The latter suggests that higher host corruption would lower the likelihood 
of foreign bank ownership.  
Greater rule of law also has a positive and significant impact on foreign bank 
ownership providing supportive evidence in that regard. This is given that greater rule of 
law will imply lower absolute corruption as courts ensure that law and order are 
maintained, This once again reflects the increased costs of operation in host country by 
foreign banks on account of host country corruption which discourages foreign bank 
ownership.  
 
 
3.4.2. Further Robustness Tests 
Finally, we estimate extended models for determining foreign entry, mode of entry 
choice, and foreign ownership in an attempt to reduce biases due to omitted factors. In 
particular, we augment Tables 3.7 – 3.9 by including a binary variable, named 
integration, measuring joint EU membership/accession of the home countries and host 
countries of some banks in our sample, whereby host banks located in EU accession 
countries have foreign investment from banks from EU member countries. These results 
are summarized in Appendix Table A3.6. As before, absolute and relative corruption 
lowers entry while these variables have differential effects on foreign Greenfield and 
takeover entry. Surprisingly, integration yields a negative effect on foreign bank entry 
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while its effects on mode of entry remain insignificant; however, greater host GDP 
signifying the size of host market tend to boost foreign entry as well as foreign 
ownership. In other words, these lend support to our earlier results discussed in section 
3.4.1.  
 
 
 
3.5. Concluding Comments 
This chapter examines how a foreign bank’s decision to invest in a host country is 
affected by corruption in the host country as well corruption in the host country relative 
to that in the home country. We examine the roles of both host country absolute and 
relative corruption using bank-level data from CEE countries over the period 2000 – 
2008.  
Given that there is rather limited literature on foreign banks operating host 
countries, we build our analysis on the existing literature on FDI in emerging economies. 
We not only examine the factors determining foreign bank entry, but also mode of entry 
and also foreign ownership corrected for mode of entry. There is suggestion that both 
absolute and relative corruption are important for determining foreign bank entry and 
mode of entry in our sample, but only absolute corruption is important for determining 
foreign ownership ones we correct for the selectivity bias for mode of foreign bank entry. 
There is evidence that ceteris paribus host country absolute and relative 
corruption would both discourage foreign bank entry; while both absolute and relative 
corruption are important for determining foreign Greenfield, only absolute corruption 
matters for foreign takeover. Finally, foreign ownership only responds to absolute 
corruption, once we correct for foreign entry. We examine the robustness of our central 
results by using alternative corruption index and also by estimating an augmented model 
with a view to minimize the omitted variable bias. Results are robust to these alternative 
specifications. 
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In light of findings CEE country governments may seek to improve the quality of 
host country institutions so as to promote continuous increase in host country foreign 
bank subsidiaries. This is most important given the stream of benefits the banks bring to 
CEE banking sectors and their increased costs of operation in CEE countries on account 
of host country absolute corruption. Encouraging foreign greenfield banks will also 
appear to be an ideal for CEE countries so as to enable inflow of foreign skills that 
promote the development of the banking system further. 
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CHAPTER 3 TABLES 
Table 3.1: Selected Financial Sector Performance Indicators For The Sample Host Countries 2008  
Host Country 
Asset Share of 
Foreign Owned 
Banks 
(In percent) 
Domestic credit to 
private sector  
(in per cent of GDP)   
Non-performing 
loans 
(In percent of 
Total Loans) 
EBRD Bank 
Sector  Reform 
Index 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 95.0 53.5 3.1 3.0 
Bulgaria    83.9 74.5 3.2 3.7 
Croatia     90.8 68.1 4.8 4.0 
Czech Republic       81.7 51.0 3.3 Na 
Hungary     84.0 67.6 3.3 4.0 
Macedonia (FYR) 93.1 43.9 10.1 3.0 
Moldova     31.6 36.5 5.9 3.0 
Montenegro  84.6 87.2 6.0 3.0 
Poland      76.5 55.0 4.7 3.7 
Romania     87.7 38.5 4.5 3.3 
Serbia      75.3 39.7 Na 3.0 
Slovakia    99.2 44.7 3.5 3.7 
Slovenia    31.1 85.6 3.6 3.3 
Ukraine     51.1 79.8 2.3 3.0 
Source: EBRD transition country Structural and institutional Change Indicators Database 2009. 
The table summarizes selected indices of financial sector performance for 2008 in the sample host Countries. Clearly foreign banks dominate the banking 
sectors in our sample countries with the exception of Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine. There is more heterogeneity in the distribution of domestic credit in 
our sample.  ‘Na’ in the case of Czech Republic and Serbia implies that the performance indicator of interest is not available for both Czech Republic and 
Serbia Host countries.  
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 Table 3.2: Distribution of Host Country Bank Observations in Sample 
Host Countries 
Number 
of Banks 
Frequency 
Percentage of  
Total Observations 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 11 86 8.4% 
Bulgaria    3 22 2.2% 
Croatia     9 78 7.7% 
Czech Republic       11 88 8.6% 
Hungary     8 52 5.1% 
Macedonia (FYR) 10 73 7.2% 
Moldova     8 59 5.8% 
Montenegro  3 23 2.3% 
Poland      21 146 14.3% 
Romania     14 85 8.3% 
Serbia      22 158 15.5% 
Slovakia    6 50 4.9% 
Slovenia    7 54 5.3% 
Ukraine     5 44 4.3% 
Total 138 1018 100.0% 
Source: Main data sample. 
While our sample data set is quite huge comprising of 1018 bank observations, it is dominated by Serbia, Poland, Czech republic and Romania Bank 
observations 
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Table 3.3: Means Of Selected Host Country Characteristics  
Host Country 
Return 
on 
Assets 
(%) 
Return 
on Equity 
(%) 
Other 
income to 
Total 
Assets  
Net 
Interest 
to Total 
Assets 
Intangibles 
to Total 
Assets 
Deposits 
to Total 
Assets 
Total 
Liabilities 
to Total 
Assets 
Equity to  
Total Assets 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.0 7.0 0.04 0.05 0.0012 0.64 0.77 0.23 
Bulgaria    2.0 15.0 0.04 0.05 0.0002 0.75 0.87 0.13 
Croatia     1.0 5.0 0.02 0.04 0.0013 0.75 0.86 0.14 
Czech Republic       1.0 12.0 0.01 0.02 0.0013 0.68 0.89 0.11 
Hungary     0.0 13.0 0.02 0.05 0.0088 0.80 0.86 0.14 
Macedonia (FYR) 0.0 5.0 0.03 0.05 0.0016 0.68 0.73 0.27 
Moldova     3.0 14.0 0.05 0.06 0.0016 0.68 0.75 0.25 
Montenegro  2.0 10.0 0.05 0.04 0.0021 0.75 0.84 0.16 
Poland      1.0 8.0 0.02 0.04 0.0068 0.77 0.89 0.12 
Romania     0.0 3.0 0.03 0.06 0.0038 0.79 0.81 0.14 
Serbia      0.0 -3.0 0.08 0.05 0.0031 0.68 0.74 0.26 
Slovakia    1.0 5.0 0.02 0.03 0.0014 0.85 0.91 0.09 
Slovenia    1.0 8.0 0.02 0.03 0.0027 0.81 0.91 0.09 
Ukraine     1.0 -7.0 0.03 0.05 0.0004 0.83 0.88 0.12 
Source: Main data sample.  
In all cases, higher values indicate better performance. The profitability ratio of return on equity is quite high in most countries, while that of Return on Assets appears to be on 
the low side. The share of other income to total assets accounts for bank sector quality variation (see Lensink et al., 2008), with higher values indicating higher banking sector 
quality. Intangibles to total assets ratios are quite low in host country banking sectors on average possibly indicating the low level of banking sector development in our host 
countries. These should improve with time as banks growth potential increases. Deposits to total assets, total liabilities to total assets, and equity to total assets are all measures of 
capital structure of host country banks. 
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Table 3.4:  Distribution Of Foreign Banks From 5 Major Home Countries In CEE 
Region 
 Home Countries  
Host country Austria Germany Greece USA Italy 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 
(15.79%) 
1 
(5.55%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Bulgaria    0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(5.55%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Croatia     1 
(5.26%) 
2 
(11.11%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
2 
(25.00%) 
Czech Republic       3 
(15.79%) 
4 
(22.22%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(11.11%) 
1 
(12.50%) 
Hungary     0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(11.11%) 
1 
(12.50% 
Macedonia (FYR) 2 
(10.53%) 
1 
(5.55%) 
2 
(20.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Moldova     0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(5.55%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
2 
(22.22%) 
1 
(12.50% 
Montenegro  0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(12.50% 
Poland      0 
(0.00%) 
7 
(38.89%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
2 
(22.22%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Romania     1 
(5.26%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
3 
(30.00%) 
1 
(11.11%) 
2 
(25.00%) 
Serbia      4 
(21.05%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
5 
(50.00%) 
1 
(11.11%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Slovakia    3 
(15.79%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(11.11%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Slovenia    2 
(10.53%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Ukraine     0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(5.55%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
TOTAL 19 18 10 9 8 
The five major home countries from which foreign bank investment in host country banks originate. The 
distribution refers to our main data sample. Figures refer to the number of banks in respective host countries in 
which foreign investment from each Home country is made. Figures in parenthesis refer to individual host 
country banks in our sample as a proportion of total banks in sample host countries with foreign investment 
from individual home countries. Our distribution is heterogeneous across our sample. 
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Table 3.5: Distribution Of Foreign Ownership In CEE Region 
Countries 
%of Banks in each bank ownership category Number of 
Bank 
Observations 
Foreign 
Greenfield 
Foreign 
Takeover 
Domestic 
private 
State 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina   6.00 60.00 33.00 0.00 63 
Bulgaria    6.00 44.00 50.00 0.00 18 
Croatia     23.00 0.00 77.00 0.00 78 
Czech republic   47.00 21.00 21.00 11.00 81 
Hungary     5.00 62.00 33.00 0.00 42 
Macedonia (FYR)   32.00 8.00 60.00 0.00 60 
Moldova     22.00 12.00 57.00 10.00 51 
Montenegro    50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 14 
Poland      36.00 39.00 21.00 4.00 107 
Romania     26.00 64.00 9.00 0.00 53 
Serbia      36.00 5.00 45.00 14.00 121 
Slovakia    32.00 50.00 18.00 0.00 34 
Slovenia    0.00 47.00 25.00 28.00 32 
Ukraine     25.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 44 
Source: Sub-sample data with time varying bank ownership 
Clearly incidence of foreign takeover dominates in many sample countries like Romania, Hungary, Bosnia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria. However, 
foreign greenfield appears to be the dominant mode of entry in Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine. 
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Table 3.6: Distribution Of Foreign Ownership – Main Bank Ownership Sample 
  Percentage of banks when foreign ownership (FO) is as follows 
Host country Mean of  
Foreign 
Ownership[1] 
Foreign 
Ownership 
=100% 
51%<=Foreign 
Ownership 
<=99% 
26% 
<=Foreign 
Ownership 
<= 50% 
1%<=Foreign 
Ownership 
=<25% 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 72.50% (35.99) 31.00 37.00 19.00 0.00 
Bulgaria    54.00% (33.55) 0.00 59.00 0.00 41.00 
Croatia     34.42% (40.81) 0.00 19.00 12.00 23.00 
Czech       55.63% (46.07) 44.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 
Hungary     75.14% (37.98) 63.00 6.00 13.00 17.00 
Macedonia (FYR) 64.08% (37.14) 12.00 47.00 0.00 29.00 
Moldova     52.37% (41.81) 36.00 10.00 14.00 15.00 
Montenegro  80.94% (29.46) 70.00 0.00 30.00 0.00 
Poland      64.90% (42.24) 45.00 18.00 5.00 5.00 
Romania     69.03% (43.66) 29.00 25.00 0.00 2.00 
Serbia      64.33% (43.05) 42.00 11.00 4.00 24.00 
Slovakia    82.01% (38.34) 48.00 0.00 0.00 18.00 
Slovenia    45.44% (46.83) 13.00 0.00 15.00 0.00 
Ukraine     47.42% (38.27) 0.00 61.00 0.00 18.00 
Source: Main sample; [1] Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
We classify sample banks according to the distribution of foreign ownership: (i) 100% ownership, (ii) at least 51% but at most 99% foreign ownership, (iii) 
at least 26% but at most 50% foreign ownership and (iv) at least 1% but at most 25% foreign ownership. The horizontal summation of proportions of 
foreign banks in all four categories adds up to 100%. A significant concentration of foreign ownership is evident in most of our sample countries, especially 
in counties like Czech republic, Hungary, Romania, and Poland, where bank reforms are much advanced.  A significant proportion of host banks have 100% 
foreign ownership.  
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Table 3.7:  Fixed Effects Logit Estimates of Foreign Bank Entry 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Foreign Entry Foreign Entry 
Return on Assets -1.593 0.953 
 (3.430) (5.068) 
Intangible Assets Ratio 10.68** 9.737** 
 (4.661) (4.211) 
Small Bank -46.53 -49.22 
 (4,025) (4,649) 
Medium Bank -22.97 -25.08 
 (3,202) (4,072) 
Non-performing loans Ratio 14.04* 11.34 
 (7.276) (7.313) 
Herfindahl index of market 
concentration 
21.37** 23.18** 
 (9.513) (10.48) 
Host Country Absolute Corruption  -6.559*  
 (3.497)  
Relative Corruption -5.599**  
 (2.517)  
Host country Rule of Law  6.958 
  (4.446) 
Relative Rule of Law  -9.904** 
  (4.497) 
   
Observations 192 192 
Number of Banks 25 25 
LR chi2(8) 101.73*** 112.14*** 
Log likelihood -30.533934 -25.327471 
Source: Panel data sub-sample.  
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent significance of coefficients respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance.  
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Table 3.8: Multinomial Logit Regression of Foreign Bank Characteristics on Foreign Bank Modes of Entry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Foreign 
Greenfield 
Foreign  
Takeover 
Foreign 
Greenfield 
Foreign  
Takeover 
Return on Assets 0.333 -0.762 -0.0524 -0.808 
 (2.252) (1.807) (2.259) (1.813) 
Intangible Assets ratio -12.27 41.07*** -14.97 36.61*** 
 (14.09) (12.19) (14.18) (12.02) 
Small Bank 0.582* -2.621*** 0.747** -2.368*** 
 (0.340) (0.372) (0.346) (0.368) 
Medium Bank 0.439* -1.160*** 0.605** -1.048*** 
 (0.266) (0.245) (0.272) (0.248) 
Non-performing Loans Ratio -0.495 -0.213 0.0451 -0.213 
 (1.112) (1.177) (1.105) (1.167) 
Herfindahl Index of Market 
Concentration 
-2.318** -1.044* -2.132** -0.950 
 (1.018) (0.634) (1.013) (0.631) 
Host Country Corruption -1.875*** 0.534**   
 (0.248) (0.248)   
Relative Corruption 0.630*** 0.140   
 (0.117) (0.111)   
Host Rule of Law   1.843*** -0.121 
   (0.220) (0.210) 
Relative Rule of Law   0.802*** 0.197 
   (0.143) (0.127) 
Constant -2.078*** -0.0880 -2.497*** -0.209 
 (0.533) (0.519) (0.549) (0.530) 
     
Observations 798 798 798 798 
Log-likelihood -740.24787 -740.24787 -740.56899 -740.56899 
Pseudo R2 0.1289 0.1289 0.1286 0.1286 
Likelihood Ratio chi2(32) 219.14*** 219.14*** 218.50*** 218.50*** 
Source: Panel data sub-sample.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent significance of coefficients respectively at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels of significance. 
Foreign bank entry is defined as a categorical variable which takes a value 0 for no entry, 1 for foreign greenfield entry and 2 for foreign takeover. 
Therefore no foreign bank entry is our reference category in the multinomial logit regression. Our coefficients are jointly significant on account of the 
significant likelihood ratio chi-square. All variables are as defined in Appendix Table A3.3 
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Table 3.9: Joint Estimation of Multinomial Logit and Tobit Regression 
Dependent Variable 
Foreign Entry- 
Greenfield 
Foreign Entry - 
Takeover 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Return on Assets -0.469 -0.788   
 (2.957) (1.616)   
Intangible Assets -4.357*** 5.520 13.54 16.05 
 (1.546) (3.518) (18.08) (17.98) 
Non-performing loans 0.456 -0.406 9.488 11.74 
 (1.142) (1.414) (15.96) (16.00) 
Small Bank 0.631 -2.248*** -1.566 -2.202 
 (1.399) (0.603) (5.012) (4.950) 
Medium Bank 0.282 -0.882** -3.820 -3.729 
 (1.034) (0.374) (3.682) (3.740) 
Herfindahl Index of market 
concentration 
-3.857 1.292 -20.94** -22.10** 
 (2.579) (2.265) (10.43) (10.44) 
Host country Absolute 
corruption 
  -9.829**  
   (3.900)  
Relative corruption   -0.824  
   (1.697)  
Host country Rule of Law    8.475*** 
    (3.248) 
Relative Rule of law    1.650 
    (1.980) 
Inverse mills 1 (Greenfield)   0.698*** 0.631*** 
   (0.112) (0.115) 
Inverse mills 2 (Takeover)   0.460** 0.350* 
   (0.221) (0.206) 
Constant -0.589 -18.49*** 83.42*** 78.50*** 
 (1.077) (1.138) (7.402) (7.632) 
Sigma   37.50*** 37.54*** 
   (0.970) (0.971) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 798 798 798 798 
Log-likelihood -608.78 -608.78 -3900.68 -3901.00 
Likelihood ratio Chi2  482.09*** 482.09*** 79.70*** 79.07*** 
Source: Main sample. Regression variables are defined in Appendix Table A3.3. Sigma is the ancillary statistic and is analogous to the square root of 
the residual variance in OLS regression. The values can be compared to the standard deviation of foreign bank ownership concentration in all 
regressions which suggests a substantial reduction. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent significance of coefficients respectively at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.  
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APPENDIX TABLES A3 
Appendix Table A3.1: Absolute Corruption control and Relative Corruption in Home and 
Host Countries  
 Absolute Corruption control Relative Corruption 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Home Countries 
Austria       1.94 0.07 n/a n/a 
Belgium       1.46 0.10 n/a n/a 
Bulgaria      -0.02 0.12 n/a n/a 
Croatia       0.14 0.07 n/a n/a 
Cyprus        0.91 0.09 n/a n/a 
Czech         0.38 0.05 n/a n/a 
Denmark       2.31 0.07 n/a n/a 
France        1.39 0.06 n/a n/a 
Germany       1.86 0.08 n/a n/a 
Greece        0.38 0.16 n/a n/a 
Hungary       0.65 0.09 n/a n/a 
Ireland       1.24 0.52 n/a n/a 
Israel        0.87 0.06 n/a n/a 
Italy         0.43 0.21 n/a n/a 
Lithuania     0.30 0.09 n/a n/a 
Luxemburg     2.03 0.14 n/a n/a 
Netherland    2.12 0.10 n/a n/a 
Portugal      1.16 0.08 n/a n/a 
Romania       -0.21 0.10 n/a n/a 
Serbia        -0.36 0.18 n/a n/a 
Slovenia      0.94 0.07 n/a n/a 
Sweden        2.21 0.08 n/a n/a 
Turkey        -0.08 0.17 n/a n/a 
USA           1.66 0.19 n/a n/a 
 Host Countries 
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.37 0.10 1.71 0.93 
Bulgaria    -0.04 0.12 1.71 0.24 
Croatia     0.14 0.07 0.86 0.57 
Czech Republic       0.38 0.06 1.33 0.39 
Hungary     0.63 0.08 1.05 0.26 
Macedonia (FYR) -0.42 0.17 1.38 0.82 
Moldova     -0.80 0.13 2.20 0.53 
Montenegro  -0.52 0.21 0.84 0.55 
Poland      0.31 0.11 1.55 0.36 
Romania     -0.21 0.10 1.22 0.76 
Serbia      -0.45 0.21 1.50 0.69 
Slovakia    0.35 0.12 1.33 0.50 
Slovenia    0.95 0.06 0.74 0.28 
Ukraine     -0.81 0.19 2.70 0.26 
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Appendix Table A3.2: Correlation Between Host Country Measures of Institutional Quality  
Host Country Indicators Rule of Law Regulatory 
Quality 
Control of 
Corruption 
Rule of Law 
 
1.0000   
Regulatory Quality 
 
0.1847 1.0000  
Control of Corruption 
 
0.9369 0.1778 1.0000 
Correlation Matrix providing the strength of correlation between host country institutional quality indicators. All indicators are obtained from 
Kaufman et al (2009) world governance indicators. A correlation of “1” is indicative of a strong positive correlation and is obtainable 
according to the above table at the diagonals where each indicator is expectedly perfectly positively correlated with itself. Aside from the 
diagonals, any correlation in excess of 0.30 is indicative of high correlation for a panel data set as our data set is. In that regard, Control of 
Corruption and Rule of law are highly positively correlated with a correlation of 0.9369. This suggests that combining indicators by principal 
component analysis as most previous studies have done such as Lensink et al (2008), may be inappropriate on account of such high 
correlations. 
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Appendix Table A3.3: Main sample Variable Descriptive Statistics - Corruption, Foreign Bank 
Entry and Ownership Structure 
Variables Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Major Home Country 
bank Ownership 
concentration 
This is the highest ownership concentration in a 
given host country bank from amongst ownership 
concentrations from home countries with 
investment in the given host country bank. 
70.03 38.44 
Return on Assets This is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets. It measures the income 
generating power of £1 of total assets. It is 
employed in decimal form.   
0.009 0.045 
Non-performing loans 
Ratio 
This is the share of non-performing loans in gross 
total loans. It measures the proportion of gross 
total loans (net loans and loan loss reserves) that 
have actually been deemed to be irrecoverable by 
the bank. It is a measure of risk, and higher values 
suggest more risky banks, while lower values 
suggest less risky banks. 
0.035 0.088 
Intangible Assets 
Ratio 
This is the ratio of intangible assets as a share of 
total assets. It may be viewed as a measure of 
future growth opportunities of a bank. 
0.002 0.007 
Small Bank This is a dummy variable. It takes the value of “1” 
if the banks log of total assets falls within the 
defined first quartile of the log of total assets for 
our sample. It is “0” otherwise 
0.250 0.433 
Medium Bank This is a dummy variable. It takes the value of “1” 
if the banks log of total assets falls within the 
defined second or third quartiles of the log of total 
assets for our sample. It is “0” otherwise. 
0.501 0.500 
Herfindahl Index of 
Market Concentration 
This is a computed index measuring the extent of 
deposit market concentration of sample banks. It 
is the square of the share of each bank of the total 
deposits prevailing in a host country in any given 
year. 
0.0522 0.145 
Host Country 
Corruption Control 
This refers to the corruption control index as 
obtain from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2009). Higher values depict countries with lower 
corruption, while lower values depict countries 
with higher corruption. 
-0.054 0.497 
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Relative Corruption This is corruption in the host country relative to 
that in the home country. It is obtained by 
subtracting host country corruption control index 
from home country corruption control index.  
1.072 0.885 
Host Rule of Law This refers to the rule of law index as obtain from 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). Higher 
values depict countries with better quality rule of 
law while lower values depict countries with poor 
quality rule of law. 
-0.054 0.610 
Relative Rule of Law This is rule of law in the host country relative to 
that in the home country. It is obtained by 
subtracting host country rule of law index from 
home country rule of law index.  
1.055 0.852 
Integration This is membership of both the host and home 
countries of the European Union. It is a dummy 
taking the value of “1” if both the host and home 
country are members of the European Union, and 
“0” otherwise   
0.55 0.497 
Main sample descriptive statistics and variable definitions for variables employed in Tobit regressions. It is based on a sample of 1018 
observations. 
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Appendix Table A3.4: Time Varying Bank Ownership Sample Variable Descriptive Statistics - 
Corruption, Foreign Bank Entry and Ownership Structure  
Variables Total  
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Return on Assets 798 0.007 0.049 
Intangible Assets Ratio 798 0.003 0.007 
Small Bank 798 0.249 0.433 
Medium Sized Bank 798 0.501 0.500 
Non performing loans ratio 798 0.035 0.086 
Foreign Bank Subsidiary 798 0.273 0.446 
Herfindahl Index (computed) of 
Market Concentration 
798 0.070 0.166 
Host country corruption control 798 -0.067 0.491 
Relative corruption 798 1.091 0.871 
Host country Rule of law 798 -0.060 0.609 
Relative Rule of law 798 1.078 0.824 
Integration 798 0.544 0.498 
Sample Descriptive statistics of sub-sample data set obtained from main data set, comprising time-varying bank ownership. Total 
observations in the sample are 798. Bank profitability and intangible assets ratios are quite low in the sample at 0.7% and 0.003 
respectively. Medium sized banks are the most frequent bank size in our sub-sample. With respect to host country institutional quality, 
Host country control of corruption, and host country rule of law are very poor at -0.067 and -0.060 respectively. Integration is variable 
capturing membership of both the host and home countries of the European Union. It is a dummy taking the value of “1” if both the 
host and home country are members of the European Union, and “0” otherwise and we observe that 54.4% of investment in host banks 
in countries that are members of the European union originated from banks located in home countries who are themselves members of 
the European Union  
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Appendix Table A3.5: Main Data and Sub-sample Pooled Logit Regression Estimates 
of Foreign Bank Entry  
 Main Data Sample Data Sub-sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Foreign 
Entry 
Foreign 
Entry 
Foreign 
Entry 
Foreign Entry 
Return on Assets 5.140 4.786 -0.365 -0.560 
 (5.849) (5.668) (1.583) (1.590) 
Intangible Assets 0.0315 -0.171 1.382 1.109 
 (0.248) (0.245) (1.059) (1.059) 
Small Bank 0.709 1.802** -0.914*** -0.755*** 
 (0.705) (0.756) (0.266) (0.269) 
Medium Bank 0.253 0.700 -0.382* -0.276 
 (0.514) (0.563) (0.206) (0.211) 
Non performing loans -0.596 -1.384 -0.143 0.0589 
 (1.757) (1.918) (0.897) (0.900) 
Herfindahl Index of Market 
Concentration 
1.879 3.520 -1.012** -0.938* 
 (2.137) (2.553) (0.486) (0.488) 
Host Country corruption 
control 
0.502  0.719***  
 (0.434)  (0.185)  
Relative corruption 6.326***  0.372***  
 (1.495)  (0.0911)  
Host country Rule of law  1.169***  0.874*** 
  (0.396)  (0.163) 
Relative Rule of law  5.823***  0.476*** 
  (1.295)  (0.106) 
Constant 1.344 0.743 -0.280 -0.527 
 (0.943) (0.983) (0.410) (0.420) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,018 1,018 797 797 
Log likelihood -112.61 -105.16 -504.65 -499.70 
LR chi2(16) 155.66 170.57 90.26*** 100.17*** 
Source: Main data sample (Columns 1-2). Data Sub-sample (Columns 3-4). We run this pooled logit model as an 
alternative to panel estimates given the observed low variability in time varying ownership data from De Haas et al 
(2011). All variables are as defined in Appendix Table A3.3. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 
significance of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. 
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Appendix Table A3.6: Estimates Of Extended Model Of Entry: Logit, Multinomial logit and Joint 
Estimation of Multinomial Logit And Tobit Regression 
 Logit Multinomial Logit Joint Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Foreign 
Entry 
Greenfield 
Entry 
Takeover 
Entry 
Greenfield 
Entry 
Takeover 
Entry 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Return On Assets -3.519 -0.176 -1.149 -0.297 -0.818 -74.51*** 
 (3.872) (3.133) (1.883) (2.982) (1.849) (28.29) 
Intangible Assets 
Ratio 
9.082** -4.080** 5.447*** -4.228** 5.421*** 4.481 
 (4.112) (1.670) (1.598) (1.645) (1.586) (18.42) 
Small Bank -48.15 0.621 -2.347*** 0.368 -2.413*** -4.250 
 (4,251) (0.497) (0.459) (0.482) (0.453) (5.074) 
Medium Bank -24.55 0.0501 -1.002*** 0.0987 -1.001*** -6.392* 
 (3,395) (0.338) (0.283) (0.331) (0.280) (3.732) 
Non-performing 
loans ratio 
12.45* 0.492 -0.426 0.369 -0.365 6.710 
 (6.432) (1.225) (1.255) (1.165) (1.219) (15.85) 
Herfindahl index 7.927 -3.682*** 0.491 -3.480*** 0.447 -25.19*** 
 (6.185) (1.183) (0.721) (1.145) (0.707) (8.672) 
Host country 
corruption  
-6.056 -2.061* -0.359   -9.208** 
 (3.716) (1.161) (0.917)   (3.890) 
Relative Corruption -5.856** 0.587*** 0.106   -1.993 
 (2.605) (0.165) (0.139)   (1.801) 
Integration -1.869* 0.120 -0.306   -5.361* 
 (1.072) (0.289) (0.235)   (2.974) 
Inverse Mills 
(greenfield) 
     0.747*** 
      (0.116) 
Inverse Mills 
(Takeover) 
     0.414* 
      (0.229) 
Constant    -0.104 -17.69 92.47*** 
    (0.717) (1,297) (8.088) 
Sigma      37.18*** 
      (0.963) 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 192 798 798 798 798 798 
Banks 25 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Log likelihood Ratio -30.66 -598.45 -598.45 -607.49 -607.49 -3888.86 
LR chi 2 101.47*** 500.10*** 500.10*** 482.03 482.03 88.61*** 
Source: Data sub-sample (columns 1-3); Main data sample (Column 4). Column (1) are the fixed effect logit estimates, columns (2-3) are 
the multinomial logit estimates, and the tobit estimates are in the last column.  
We run this extended model in an attempt to eliminate competing hypothesis that may bias our earlier results. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix Table A3.3. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent significance of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance. 
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APPENDIX FIGURES B3 
Appendix Figure B3.1: Foreign ownership distribution of Major Home Countries in 
sample for 2000 - 2008 
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Source:  Bankscope database 
The distribution of major home country ownership concentration in host country in sample Central and Eastern 
European countries. A bi-model distribution is observed with about 30% of host country bank ownership by the major 
home country of between 1% and 20%, and 60% of host country bank ownership by the major home country of 
between 80% and 100%.  
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CHAPTER 4 
How Does Bank Capital Affect Bank performance? 
Implications for Bank Ownership in Transition Economies 
4.0.  Introduction  
While financial liberalization and privatization have dominated the financial policy 
debate over the past few decades, the current financial crisis has highlighted the risks of 
unregulated privatization. During the sustained period of high growth over the past 
decade or so, unfettered risk-taking by banks had contributed to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis of 2007 around the globe necessitating huge government bail-out of banks  
see Coricelli et al, 2009; De Haas and Van Horen, 2009). Accordingly, capital 
management of banks has come under increasing scrutiny in recent time, hence 
necessitating a re-evaluation of bank regulations (See, Tarullo (2008) and Santos 2001). 
The latter induces us to examine and understand the link between bank capital and bank 
performance as bank capital is an essential component of bank regulation. In this respect 
we depart from much of the literature to argue that the relationship between bank capital 
and performance not only depends on the size of bank capital per se, but also on other 
factors including ownership and quality of financial institutions in the country.  
Barth et al (2008) argued that a strategic approach to bank regulation was required 
to achieve a successful and effective banking system. The existing approach to bank 
regulation emphasizes aspects of direct official government restriction of bank activities, 
bank entry, provision of credit through government-owned banks, and rigorous 
supervision of banks. While capital regulation may ensure banks are in a good state of 
health, it is also desirable that an effective corporate governance mechanism is put in 
place, so as to ensure close scrutiny of bank activities in both short run and long run so 
that capital regulations are adhered to in practice.  Effective corporate governance in the 
short run will enable the banks achieve future profitability, which in turn ensures some 
degree of sustainability.  
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The relationship between bank capital and performance could be ambiguous. 
While the popular view (e.g., see Diamond and Rajan, 2000) is that they are negatively 
related, Mehran and Thakor (2009) argued that they can be positively correlated. We go 
beyond this literature to argue that the relationship between capital and bank performance 
may also depend on bank ownership, as it has implication for cost of capital and also 
risk-raking. Particularly distinguishing between one hundred percent foreign owned 
subsidiary and jointly owned foreign and domestic bank subsidiaries
42
 we examine this 
hypothesis. We define one-hundred percent foreign owned bank subsidiaries as banks 
domiciled in a host country as solely owned foreign bank subsidiaries; in contrast, joint 
venture bank subsidiaries are banks whose ownership is shared jointly by foreign and 
local private entities (individual or their affiliated companies).  
The underlying argument is that one-hundred percent foreign subsidiaries and 
joint venture bank subsidiaries in host countries may operate differently as they may 
pursue divergent objectives as a result of their differential ownership structure. In 
particular, while there may be a conflict of interest between foreign and domestic partners 
in a joint venture; that may be absent in the case of a sole foreign owned subsidiary. 
However, there are also benefits of joint venture to both foreign and domestic owners. 
Foreigners are able to tap into markets beaming with potential and hedge their risk on 
entry by partnering with domestic partners with significant knowledge of the host 
economy (e.g., see Berger et al (2000) and Alvarez (2003) and especially where the 
foreign partners have little foreign production experience in an unfamiliar host 
environment.
43
 On the other hand, domestic individuals are able to benefit of advanced 
skills and technology foreigners bring with them to the host economy and share with the 
domestic partners, thus significantly increasing the potential of the host country. Despite 
the benefits of joint ventures accruing both to the foreign and domestic owners forming 
the joint venture, it is the sole foreign ownership that enables the foreign owners to enjoy 
the benefits of profitability that come with locating in a developing country as 
highlighted by Claessens et al (2000). However, foreigners with the most benefit to offer 
developing countries may be reluctant to enter into joint venture agreements with 
                                                 
42 Referred to hence forth as joint venture bank subsidiaries 
43 See Blomstrom and Zejan (1991) 
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domestic partners due to their fear to share such technologies with local partners (e.g., see 
Blomstrom and Zejan, 1991) especially when there are weak protection of intellectual 
property rights.  
Our empirical analysis relies on data availability. In the present study, we 
distinguish between foreign greenfield and foreign takeover banks. While foreign 
greenfield refers to one hundred percent foreign owned subsidiary, foreign takeover is a 
case of joint venture through mergers and acquisition, though we do not know the exact 
share of foreign ownership in this case (see further discussion). The essential idea is that 
conflicts of interest between domestic and foreign partners (owners) are more likely to 
arise in the case of foreign take over (joint venture) banks, especially where foreign 
owners have such low minority stakes. This will allow us to examine our central 
hypothesis as to whether the adverse effect of bank capital on bank performance may be 
mitigated for foreign greenfield banks.  
The analysis is based on bank-level Osiris data from a sample of listed banks
44
 
located in a group of Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition countries (see 
further discussion in section 4.2). Access to bank ownership data allows us to classify 
banks into foreign greenfield and foreign takeover bank subsidiaries and then explore the 
effect of bank capital for bank performance for each ownership type.  Note however that 
Osiris ownership data is time–invariant in nature. Hence we supplement this data with 
Bank ownership data that distinguishes between foreign greenfield and foreign taken over 
from De Haas et al (2011).  
Results suggest that, ceteris paribus, the relationship between bank capital and 
performance is contingent upon bank ownership structure. In particular, relative to other 
banks, bank liability is positively related to bank performance for the case of one hundred 
percent foreign bank subsidiaries. We also find that the pooled OLS estimates tend to 
over-estimate the differential return for foreign greenfield banks. Fixed effects least 
squares estimates suggest that the differential return for foreign greenfield banks is about 
12.7% as opposed to about 15.1% in pooled OLS estimates. We attribute this differential 
premium in return on assets to the absence of any conflict of interests among the 
                                                 
44 More specifically, bank subsidiaries. 
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shareholders of the one hundred percent foreign bank owned subsidiary; The latter can 
also be attributed to better practices and corporate governance mechanisms of one 
hundred percent foreign owned bank subsidiaries who generally originate from home 
countries with superior institutions. In other words, higher bank capital is not necessarily 
harmful for bank performance. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications. 
The existing literature on the link between bank capital and bank performance 
does not take account of bank ownership structure. We can thus argue that our result 
offers an explanation for the ambiguous (positive/negative/insignificant) effect of the size 
of bank capital on bank performance, once ownership structure is taken into account.   
The analysis is developed as follows. Section 4.1 provides the background of the 
study as well as hypotheses to be tested. Our sample data are described and sample 
characteristics discussed in section 4.2, while section 4.3 develops the empirical model of 
bank performance. Section 4.4 analyzes the results and the final section concludes. 
 
 
 
4.1. Background and Hypotheses 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), no systematic cross-section relationship 
exists between bank capital structure and bank value. A bank’s value is therefore 
unaffected by the type of capital it is financed by, be it equity or liabilities (debt). 
However existing debate concerning the relationship between capital and bank value 
suggests that the popular view differs from this. The popular view argues bank capital 
and bank value to be negatively related. i.e., higher bank capital is associated with lower 
value. This is especially the case in light of agency theory. More capital may lower bank 
value as a banks possession of more capital lowers its liquidity creation (Diamond and 
Rajan, 2000). Furthermore, more capital may also act as a protective cushion for 
incompetent managers who may choose to undertake wasteful investment projects with 
bank capital.  
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A positive cross-section relationship between bank capital and bank value is 
however argued by Mehran and Thakor (2009). They argue that banks desire to guard 
against unexpected withdrawals by depositors or draw downs by borrowers which may 
bring about bank insolvency, necessitates banks to hold capital as a buffer against 
insolvency, as well as liquid assets – cash and securities. Furthermore, capital increases 
banks incentives to monitor its borrowers thus generating a surplus which could shape the 
competition between banks. In a competitive market, capital increases bank’s incentives 
to monitor its borrowers as greater capital forces banks to internalize the cost of loan 
default on the one hand, while on the other hand, the loan rate gives banks a greater 
incentive to monitor its borrowers in order to receive the higher pay off if the project 
succeeds and the loan is repaid (see Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2011).  
The costs of bank failure are significant, and as Diamond and Rajan (2002) argue, 
bank failure can themselves cause liquidity shortages. Therefore following Diamond and 
Rajan (2002), one could justify a relationship between bank capital and bank value.   
The importance of laws and regulations for bank growth and expansion cannot be 
over-emphasized. Laws and regulations promote a conducive climate for banks activities 
in a competitive market economy. While studies on effects of laws & regulations for 
corporations are vast, those on banks remain relatively few (with the important exception 
of the recent evidence from Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007). We argue that bank 
ownership has important implications for the relationship between bank capital and 
performance though our knowledge in this respect remains rather limited.  
Bank ownership structure in CEE countries over the past two decades or so, have 
undergone significant changes. Since the early 1990s, foreign banks have been active in 
the transition countries, as the countries implemented a variety of significant reforms. 
These reforms encompassed financial market liberalization, elimination of barriers to 
foreign bank entry, privatization of erstwhile state banks, to mention a few. This has 
given rise to existing studies on how foreign bank entry has affected bank performance in 
the region (e.g. Megginson (2005), Bonin et al (2005)). The general consensus is that 
foreign banks have been more efficient than other types of banks (e.g., see Giannetti and 
Ongena (2009), Fries and Taci (2005), Lensink et al (2008), Grigorian and Manole 
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(2002), Isik and Hassan (2002), Jemric and Vujcic (2002), Havrylchyk (2006), and Bonin 
et al (2005)).  
Access to loans by borrowers, especially small and medium enterprises, has been 
created through competition between foreign and domestic banks. Small and medium 
enterprises have therefore been able to scale financial barriers to their survival, as high 
costs of accessing bank loans, are significantly reduced as well as the firms relative 
riskiness
45
. Despite this, the physical co-existence of foreign banks and domestic banks 
may present a risk to the host country economy in which the foreign banks are located. 
An unstable banking environment is created as a result of the co-existence of banks of 
different types as foreign and domestic banks. In particular, Detragiache et al (2008) 
argue that foreign banks tend to cream-skim the economy and discriminate against small 
and medium enterprises which are by nature soft-information borrowers, thus resulting in 
less credit being provided to the private sector and domestic banks having a riskier loan 
portfolio than foreign banks.  Thus, bank ownership is important and is a significant 
factor in determining banks relative riskiness and related to that banks relative 
performance/profitability. The relationship between bank capital and bank performance 
cannot therefore be generalized as it may depend on other factors including ownership, as 
well as, the quality of financial institutions in the country. 
The differences between foreign and domestic owners have been highlighted in 
the literature where foreign and domestic bank efficiency and performance have been 
widely studied
46
. While domestic owned banks may possess superior knowledge of the 
local economy, foreign owners may possess superior skills for risk management, and 
ability to attract foreign capital necessary for bank development. There could however be 
tensions between domestic and foreign owners in joint venture banks in general
47
, 
regarding allocation of local and global profits, intellectual property rights, etc. (see 
Desai et al. 2003) Accordingly, these two types of banks may differ in terms of their 
capital control and therefore performance.  
                                                 
45 As is characteristic of all small and medium enterprises in all countries of the world 
46 Note that in these literatures, foreign banks are defined as banks where the foreign individual or company owns at 
least fifty-one percent of total shareholding. Similarly, domestic banks are defined as banks where the domestic 
individual or company owns at least fifty-one percent of total shareholding. 
47 Regardless of which owner holds majority shareholding. 
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Most existing literature does not distinguish between foreign banks by their 
ownership variation: usually one-hundred percent foreign owned bank subsidiaries and 
joint venture foreign majority owned banks are lumped together as foreign banks, and the 
same is the case for domestic banks. An important innovation of the present study is to 
distinguish one-hundred percent foreign owned bank subsidiaries from joint venture bank 
subsidiaries, which enables us to analyze the differential implications for different 
ownership structure. 
Most existing literature on joint venture arrangements pertain to non-financial 
firms. It is generally argued that joint venture is an expansion strategy for the firms, in 
that the foreign partners use their association with domestic partners to penetrate markets 
in host countries (for example, see Calem, 1988). Mutual benefit of both foreign and 
local private (domestic) partners may however be a motivating factor for such an 
arrangement (see Raff et al (2008), Slangen et al (2008), and Gomes-Cassares (1989)).  
The undesirability of joint ventures may however lie in their nature of being 
unstable (See Gomes-Cassares, 1987; and Steensma et al, 2008). While Meyer and 
Altenborg (2008) view joint ventures as a coming together of foreign and private 
domestic shareholders with incompatible strategies, Miller et al (1996) view joint 
ventures as a fragile association of foreign and private domestic partners. Using 
American evidence, Desai et al. (2003) further argued that, over the period 1982 -1997 
American multinational firms were decreasingly likely to establish joint ventures. This 
had been accompanied by an increasing appetite for multinational control in one-hundred 
percent foreign owned firm subsidiaries operating in host countries. It is argued that this 
increasing incidence of one hundred percent foreign controlled operations in host 
countries highlights growing differences between the costs of running overseas 
operations as joint ventures and the costs of administering foreign activities as one-
hundred percent foreign owned operations.  
Desai et al. (2003) identify three possible sources of the rising coordination 
costs of shared ownership. First, tax-efficient structuring of worldwide operations is 
made more difficult by tensions between joint venture domestic partners concerned with 
local profits and multinational parents concerned with global profits. Second, the ability 
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to transfer intellectual property in many host countries is limited by fear of its 
appropriation by local partners, especially in the absence of strong intellectual property 
rights. Third, the desire to structure worldwide production in a decentralized way with 
greater intra-firm trade creates the room for more conflict with local partners who have 
competing goals. Since multinational firms rely increasingly on cost savings and market 
opportunities created by worldwide tax planning, technology transfer, and production 
decentralization, they face growing incentives to avoid sharing ownership of their foreign 
affiliates. 
Differential ownership structure may in turn, differentially affect the 
relationship between bank capital and performance for the following reasons: (i) 
corporate governance of banks as captured by ownership may affect the cost of capital of 
the firms and households they lend to and therefore bank valuation. (ii) Corporate 
Governance affects costs of financial intermediation, and thereby the cost of capital of the 
firms and households they lend to. (iii) Corporate Governance affects banks’ risk-taking 
and risks of financial crises, both for individual banks and for the overall banking system. 
We argue that overall control by multinational parents in a foreign subsidiary in a host 
country may entail important implications for corporate governance mechanisms, as 
managers of one-hundred percent foreign owned subsidiaries may be subject to more 
rigorous regulations and supervision (relative to joint ventures) which may in turn boost 
their performance.  
We use bank-level Osiris data from a sample of listed banks
48
 located in a group 
of Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition countries, supplemented with Bank 
ownership  data from De Haas et al (2011) to explore this further. We argue that Central 
and Eastern European countries are important cases in point. While the transition process 
has emphasized the need to ensure easy access to firm financing, risks of too much 
finance or capital remains underestimated. The latter highlights the importance of an 
analysis of bank capital and performance for the region 
While there is a large literature on bank performance and efficiency in Eastern 
European transition countries (especially the CEE countries), this literature primarily 
                                                 
48 More specifically, bank subsidiaries. 
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focuses on a comparison of domestic owned and foreign owned banks. While some of 
these studies control for some measures of bank capital, none of these studies explicitly 
explores the implication of ownership structure for the relationship between bank capital 
and performance. The present study bridges this gap in the literature. We deviate from 
existing literature on bank performance focusing on banks relative efficiency in this 
study, as we focus on the relationship between capital and bank performance and explore 
how this relationship may vary with ownership and nature of institutions in the region.   
 
 
 
4.2.  Data  
The bulk of the data for this study have been obtained from the Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Osiris database. The database provides financial 
statements for both financial firms
49
 as well as, non–financial firms50. Banks being a type 
of a financial firm, are the focus of this study. We focus on unconsolidated balance sheet 
and income statement data as use of consolidated bank data could blur the overall picture 
and may thus weaken our analysis. Bank financial statement data are all denominated in 
United States (US) Dollars currency. 
The Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Osiris Database is updated 
annually; for the purpose of this study, we employ bank financial statement data from the 
December 2007 edition. This is because, as at the time of performing this study, the 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Osiris database 2007 edition was the 
only edition available to us. Bank ownership in our sample therefore referred to that for 
the latest year and was time invariant in nature over the period of our study. In order to 
address this shortcoming, we merge Osiris dataset with time varying bank ownership 
information available for sample banks from De Haas et al (2011). De Haas et al (2011) 
                                                 
49 Financial firms refer to firms engaged in the business of financial intermediation. I.e. the receipt of deposits and 
investing of same in profitable ventures to earn returns both for the depositors but also ultimately for the owners of the 
financial firm itself. Financial firms include Banks, insurance companies, pension funds, finance houses, etc. 
50 Non-financial firms refer to those firms not engaged in the business of financial intermediation. 
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data distinguishes between foreign greenfield and takeover; foreign greenfield is 
equivalent to one hundred percent foreign owned bank while foreign takeover is treated 
as joint venture between foreign and domestic partners.   
As the privatization process deepened especially in the post-1995 period, it 
gave rise to a co-existence of private domestic and foreign banks in CEE transition 
countries; this was accompanied by a decline in state bank ownership. We focus on the 
period 2000 to 2007 by when bank reforms were completed in most sample countries.  
Majority of country level data on the quality of institutions are taken from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators. Further we get the creditor rights index from 
Djankov et al (2007).
51
 We merge our country level data to bank level information on 
bank characteristics, performance measures, risk measures and capital structure measures.  
Our data from the Osiris bank database comprises of banks in eleven Central and 
Eastern European countries over the period of 2000 – 2007. Out of a total of 57 bank 
subsidiaries (foreign greenfield, foreign takeover and domestic private banks, there are 18 
foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries, 8 foreign takeover bank subsidiaries, and 41 
domestic private bank subsidiaries. This included 1 bank subsidiary each from Hungary 
and Slovakia, 2 bank subsidiaries from Czech Republic, 3 bank subsidiaries from 
Bulgaria, 5 bank subsidiaries each from Moldova, Republic of Serbia and Ukraine, 7 
bank subsidiaries each from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Poland, 10 bank subsidiaries 
from former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, and 11 bank subsidiaries from Croatia. 
The choice of these countries has been dictated by data availability from Osiris.  
We construct an unbalanced panel of bank data for the 397 observations drawn 
from our 57 bank subsidiaries.  The bank subsidiary ownership distribution of the banks, 
in our data set suggests that foreign banks are substantially represented in our sample, 
and are almost as represented as the domestic private banks as observed in Figure B4.1. 
This may not be a coincidence, given the wave of foreign ownership sweeping through 
the CEE country economies and established arguments of foreign banks being the most 
efficient and occupying most significance in Central and Eastern European countries 
(See, Barth et al (2001) and Naaborg and De Haas, 2004). However, a reluctance of a 
growing number of countries in the world to completely transfer bank ownership to 
                                                 
51 http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
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foreign individuals persists. This may be because the identification of a bank owned by 
local individuals makes it more attractive to patronage by domestic depositors. 
Furthermore, this view is more palatable with a broader strategic objective of country 
governments of ceding ownership of strategic resources to citizens of the country – thus 
promoting citizen empowerment. In support of these views, evidence exists (in many 
developing countries), to suggest that the local populace are reluctant to embrace reforms, 
particularly those ushering the involvement of foreign individuals. The sale of erstwhile 
state banks to foreign individuals however persists due to such bank owners being well 
informed and better placed to deal with weaknesses of ailing state banks (Clarke et al 
2003).  
In many transition countries, large scale bank privatizations has been prompted by 
the general dissatisfaction of continued state ownership and its link with lower financial 
development, lower efficiency and productivity and slower growth in the region 
(Megginson, 2005; Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2002). In support of this, Figure B4.2 provides an overview of the distribution of 
bank subsidiary types in our sample. We observe foreign takeover banks to be the least 
represented in our sample, followed by those of foreign greenfield banks. Domestic 
private banks appear to be the most represented. We have 57 foreign takeover banks, 95 
foreign greenfield banks and 245 private domestic banks. In terms of percentage figures, 
24% of observations refer to foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries, 14% to foreign 
takeover banks, and 62% by private domestic banks. 
 
 
4.2.1.  Banking in transition 
There has been some consensus that state banks are less efficient than privately owned 
banks (Megginson, 2005 and Fries and Taci, 2005). This has been well documented in 
the bank privatization literature. State banks consistent with the performance of all state 
owned enterprises, are run with Government objectives to maximize social welfare (See 
Shirley and Walsh 2000). However, less competition, greater political intervention and 
weaker corporate governance are strong theoretical arguments against state ownership 
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(Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2003)). Poor performance in comparison to private banks has 
unsurprisingly been the result.  
Improved efficiency has been the usual effect of privatization (Megginson and 
Netter (2001), Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2005), and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2004)). This has been mainly attributable to the sale of erstwhile state 
banks to foreign individuals (Megginson (2005), Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2003), Bonin, 
Hassan and Wachtel (2004), Berger et al (2003)). The full benefits of bank privatization 
are however achieved when Government fully relinquishes bank ownership, of which 
Brazil (Beck, Crivelli and Summerhill (2005)), Poland and Czech republic (Bonin et al 
2003b) and Nigeria (Beck, cull, and Jerome (2005)) are classic examples. The spectacular 
growth of foreign banks in the Central and Eastern European transition countries in the 
post reform period is therefore understandable in that context.  
Performance of private banks may vary depending on whether they are de novo 
(newly established after the reform started) or not. De novo private banks perform better 
than privatized banks in general and this may be attributed to the difficulty experienced in 
transforming the pre-privatization fortunes of the privatized banks (Clarke et al, 2003). It 
is this marked distinction between the performances of types of private bank subsidiaries, 
namely private domestic and foreign banks that has been the basis for many arguments in 
the bank privatization literature.  In most cases, foreign banks are observed to perform 
better than private domestic banks. General consensus exists in the case of foreign bank 
cost efficiency (Borovicka, 2007; Yildirim and Philipatos (2007), Weill (2003) and Bonin 
et al (2005)). However foreign bank efficiency/performance in general is not one which is 
universally agreed on. While Claessens et al (1998), Havrylchyk, (2006), Berger et al 
(2000) and Berger et al (2003) highlight better performance of foreign banks in relation 
to domestic banks, Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg (2008), find that foreign ownership of 
banks could reduce bank efficiency.  
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4.2.2. Foreign Greenfield Bank Subsidiaries  
For the rest of our analysis we distinguish foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries from other 
varied bank ownership arrangements such as foreign takeover (or joint ventures) or 
domestic private banks, as their constitutions by solely foreign owners represent a special 
case in point of foreign ownership, and almost bear no mention in previous empirical 
studies examining the role/performance of foreign banks.  
Foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries differ from joint venture bank 
subsidiaries, as they are owned by only one type of private owner –foreign, and as such 
may benefit from the more stringent regulation and supervision of management that 
obtains in their home country. This may give rise to tighter corporate governance 
mechanism of such banks in the host country. This is important given that one-hundred 
percent foreign owned bank subsidiaries will tend to have a stable ownership structure 
over time in contrast to other varied bank ownership arrangements involving foreign 
owners as joint venture bank subsidiaries (Gomes-casseres, 1987). One-hundred percent 
foreign owned bank subsidiaries will also differ from joint venture bank subsidiaries on 
the basis of the incentives for corporate governance which are more attractive.  
 
4.2.2.1. Quality of institutions 
Evidently bank performance depends on the quality of institutions. A critical component 
of the transition process in CEE countries has been the evolution of the legal and 
regulatory environment to accommodate the market-oriented economy to be borne 
(Kemme et al., 2008).  Bank performance thus experienced a marked improvement 
resulting from the accompanying change in the social, economic and political 
environment in which banks were to operate. Despite this, various concerns remain 
including those relating to bank’s risk-taking, bank efficiency, asymmetric information, 
and bank competition.  
Bank competition has led to market concentration and therefore more challenges 
of regulation (Beck et al 2004). Even where bank regulation and control is tighter, banks 
efficiency has been adversely affected. Banks experienced increased costs of financial 
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intermediation on account of increased control of bank entry and bank activities 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al, 2004). Traditional bank regulatory measures such as capital 
adequacy ratio and cash reserve ratios, even when increased have also proved ineffective. 
Barth et al (2008) highlighted the ineffectiveness of strengthened capital regulations and 
official supervisory agencies following Basel guidelines over the last decade. Further 
evidence in support of this observation lies in the origin of the recent financial crisis.  
Well developed institutions and regulations especially those relating to bank 
capital remain central to promoting the long term stability of the banking system. 
However, a solid bank capital structure is crucial for a bank’s stability as well as its 
ability to provide liquidity and credit effectively (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). A stable 
bank contributes to promoting a stable banking system in a country. A stable banking 
system will promote depositor confidence and so prevent bank runs; and also ensure the 
liquidity of banks to ensure that efficient financial intermediation can take place to 
sustain the growth of the economy. Thus it is important for the banks to have a healthy 
capital base. From this perspective, regulation may promote a positive association 
between bank capital and bank performance as suggested by Mehran and Thakor (2009). 
Evidence in support of this is provided by Agoraki et al (2011) who find that higher 
capital requirement reduces bank risk- taking. The effectiveness of higher capital 
requirements is reduced however, with market power of banks and/or increase in off-
balance sheet activities. This though depends on the type of private bank subsidiary, be it 
foreign greenfield or other jointly owned bank. In the case of a foreign greenfield bank 
subsidiary, improved institutions and regulation in the host country economy 
complements the regulations and institutions governing foreign bank activity from the 
foreign banks’ home country. Hence foreign bank performance is strengthened by 
stronger regulation and institutions in their country of origin. Coupled with foreign banks 
reluctance to take on risks in developing countries due to the erstwhile existence of low 
quality institutions (see, Detragiache et al, 2008), foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries 
will have a tendency to outperform all other bank subsidiary types.  
The case of jointly owned banks is very much different. Any resulting impact of 
bank regulation and institutions in the host country, especially with regard to curbing 
risky activity, will be very much felt by the domestic shareholders in joint venture banks, 
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since they are likely to be the forces driving the banks engagement in such risky activity 
(see, Detragiache et al, 2008).  
While the need for effective regulation is not in doubt, strong institutions work in 
tandem to enforce them, especially in the form of strong creditor rights and shareholder 
rights, and rule of law. La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1997) find 
evidence that the legal environment as described by both legal rules and their 
enforcement - matters for the size and extent of a country's capital markets. A good legal 
environment protects the potential financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, and 
raises their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities. The scope of capital 
markets is hence expanded. Well-developed institutions are prevalent in developed 
countries, while much still needs to be done as far as institution quality is concerned in 
developing countries. If corporate governance policies are to be effective, strong 
institutions are required. These will ensure that the desirable stable, healthy banking 
system is achieved.  
Meanwhile, bank performance in developing countries continues to suffer from 
the poor quality institutional design in these countries. While Claessens et al (1998) 
observe in general that foreign banks tend to perform better than domestic banks in 
developing countries, foreign bank performance in host developing countries may benefit 
from better quality institutions. A barrier to foreign bank performance is the poor access 
to information about the country’s economy, language, laws and policies (Hymer, 1976). 
Domestic banks on the other hand, may not be affected, at least to the same extent, if the 
Berger et al (2000) home field advantage hypothesis holds true. This is because, domestic 
banks know their home country well and therefore have superior knowledge of profitable 
sectors to trade in (and so experience lower costs of financial intermediation), compared 
to their foreign counterparts. They may therefore be willing to foray into certain risky 
activity as a result of this superior access to information regarding the country’s 
infrastructure, and in pursuit of highly profitable opportunities. Foreign banks on the 
other hand, due to the high costs of operation (including search costs of information, laws 
and policies) may be unwilling to undertake these activities.  This exposes domestic 
banks deposits and shareholder capital to magnanimous risk.  
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Table 4.1a summarizes the selected institutional characteristics of the sample 
Central and Eastern European countries. Sources of data are varied and are as shown in 
the notes to the table. Clearly there is interesting inter-country variation.  Creditor rights 
are strongest on average in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic and 
Macedonia (FYR) with the highest creditor rights score of 3. Hungary and Poland lag 
behind the pack with the lowest creditor rights of 1.  
There appears a marked association between bank reform as measured by the 
EBRD bank reform index, and development as measured by GDP per capita. Countries 
with more advanced bank reforms have higher levels of GDP per capita compared with 
those countries less advanced in bank reforms. Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia provide evidence in this regard. This further highlights the importance of 
developed banking systems for economic growth and development. While Czech 
Republic is the most developed country with GDP per capita of US$ 11263.76, Moldova 
is the least developed country with GDP per capita of US$ 837.82.  
GDP per capita may proxy for the overall level of development, as bank costs 
may decrease with development due to corresponding improvements in the quality of 
state institutions
52
 (Fries and Taci, 2005). Our data set provides evidence in support in the 
form of high pairwise correlations between GDP per capita and institutional quality in 
sample countries. GDP per capita is positively correlated with Bank credit to the private 
sector as a proportion of GDP (pairwise correlation of 0.4149). GDP per capita is also 
positively correlated with EBRD bank reform index (pairwise correlation of 0.8317).  
With decreased costs of operation of banks located in host countries with better 
quality institutions, foreign banks are likely to be attracted to such countries and as such 
the banking system development is promoted. Evidence in support of this is observed 
from Table 4.1a where Croatia, Hungary, Czech republic, and Slovakia, have the most 
developed banking systems, according to private sector credit by banking system to GDP, 
in our sample. It comes as no coincidence that these countries are those with the most 
developed economies according to average GDP per capita.  
                                                 
52 Evidence in support of this from Table 4.1a is provided in the case of Czech Republic and Croatia with the maximum 
creditor rights of 3.00 on average corresponding to higher levels of economic development. However the other 
countries represented in our sample do not portray this trend.    
  
142 
 
Table 4.1a depicts more developed countries as measured by higher levels of 
GDP per capita, to possess more developed financial sectors as measured by the ratio of 
private sector credit by banking system to GDP, as well as, the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP. Therefore following Fries and Taci (2005), we use Log of GDP 
per capita as a proxy for the quality of country institutions.  
An increasing trend observed in our data sample is that virtually most of home 
countries from which host country bank subsidiary ownership originate are members of 
the Organization for Economic cooperation and Development (OECD) of which 
interestingly, Hungary and Czech Republic, transition countries in themselves, are a 
member of. The OECD are a conglomerate of countries who come together to provide a 
forum in which member country governments can work together to share experiences and 
seek solutions to common problems, thus stimulating economic progress and world 
trade
53
. It therefore comes as no surprise that going by the average GDP per capita, 
Hungary and Czech Republic are one of the most developed host countries in our sample.  
We therefore, obtain average values of institutional indices as in Table 4.1a for all OECD 
member countries for the period 2000 - 2007. This is as in Table 4.1b.  
From Table 4.1b and in comparison with average values obtained for Table 4.1a, 
we observe OECD countries to on average have higher values of all indices. This 
provides support for the argument that home countries tend to be at better levels of 
institutional quality than host countries.  
 
 
4.2.3. Variable Definitions  
Bank capital is generally defined as the excess of bank assets over bank liability where 
liability includes bank deposits which may be lent to investors as loans. For the purpose 
of this study, measures of bank capital explored include deposits, liabilities and 
shareholders’ equity. In particular, we examine the impact of bank assets, bank capital, 
and bank risk measures on a number of bank performance indices for different identified 
                                                 
53 See OECD website at http://www.oecd.org 
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bank subsidiary types, classified by their ownership structure. Among various measures 
of bank performance we consider return on (total) assets, profit margin and return on 
(shareholders’) equity.  
Return on assets is the contribution of each unit (US Dollars) of assets to total 
earnings prior to the deduction of interest and tax payments. The contribution of each unit 
of sales to gross profit is defined as Profit margin. Return on shareholders’ equity is 
defined as the reward that shareholders realize from their investment in shares of the 
bank
54
.  
Return on shareholder equity in particular, is a comprehensive profitability 
measure since banks may have substantial off-balance sheet portfolios. Banks must 
allocate capital against every off-balance sheet activity they engage in. Hence a reflection 
of the banks off-balance sheet activities are net income (earnings) and shareholders’ 
funds (Berger et al, 2009).  
Bank capital is measured by the ratio of total deposits to total assets (deposits 
ratio), ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Liabilities ratio) and ratio of shareholders 
equity to total assets (shareholders equity ratio). These represent the three major sources 
through which banks may obtain capital to fund their activities. The capital measures 
provide the value of bank capital from each source of capital that is used to finance each 
unit (US Dollars) of total assets.  
According to the Bureau Van Dijk Osiris bank database source, bank deposits are 
the hard earned income of bank customers which they choose to invest in various types of 
accounts that the bank may provide to save for withdrawal at a future date, and which 
may also attract interest revenue from the bank as bank re-invests these funds in 
profitable investment projects. Banks total liabilities are the sum of deposits and short 
term funding, other funding, other non-interest bearing liabilities, other reserves, and loan 
loss reserves. Lastly, shareholders equity is defined as the difference between total assets 
and the aforementioned total liabilities. The value of shareholders equity may be used to 
evaluate the performance of Central and Eastern European stock markets and their value 
to banks in terms of providing a source of capital for bank expansion/investment activity.  
                                                 
54 It is the earnings realized by the bank on account of each unit of shareholders capital invested in the bank. 
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We also control for bank risk measures in this study as they explain bank 
performance. We take into account bank’s off-balance sheet items that have been 
growing dramatically over the years. Off balance sheet items are the most viable means 
through which banks may engage in risky activities without being detected (at least in the 
short term). This is because they are concealed from the public eye and not reflected by 
their nature on banks’ balance sheets and financial statements. Thus, it provides an 
avenue for banks engaged in such activity to circumvent regulatory authority which 
restrict banks activities in an effort to regulate the financial industry. This is more likely 
to be the case when banks are large, as larger banks have more liberty to take 
magnanimous risks at such an advanced stage in their growth process.  
An important explanation for the steady growth of bank off-balance sheet 
activities in recent years is that it allows banks to earn fee income without putting an 
asset or liability on its balance sheet (Berger et al, 2009). Accordingly banks can avoid 
reserve requirements or capital adequacy requirements.  We therefore compute the ratio 
of off-balance sheet items to total assets (off-balance sheet items ratio), and employ it as 
one of potential measures of bank risk. Other risk measures are also considered, such as 
loan loss reserves ratio – the ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loans, and non-
performing loans ratio – the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans.  
Loan loss reserve acts as a bank’s insurance against bad loans borrowed, and may 
increase with the size of bad loans given. It reflects the bank’s ability to effectively 
manage its inherent risks of operation.  
Non-performing loans ratio on the other hand, is an alternative measure of bank 
risk possibly more direct. It measures the loans given out by the bank which after the 
bank has exhausted all avenues to recovering the loan from the borrower are determined 
to be irrecoverable. It may however reflect a weakness of the bank in properly screening 
its potential borrowers when they approach the bank for loans. The non-performing loans 
ratio will increase as banks actual loans given out turn bad, and predicated on this will be 
the banks future decisions on risk management strategies. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the average values of measures of capital over two 
identified time periods namely, 2000 – 03, and 2004 – 07. Most bank reforms in the 
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region were completed during the period, 2000-03. Thus, 2004-07 may be referred to as 
the post reform period, while 2000 – 03 is the reform period. From the capital measures, 
there appears to be striking similarities between all the time periods observed, and any 
differences are very little. However, the average capital measure of significant increase is 
that of liabilities ratio over the post-reform period where it is observed to be highest at 
0.82. Average bank performance measures of bank return peaked over the post reform 
period, 2004 – 2007, and significantly too. This once again highlights the superlative 
performance of private bank subsidiaries, be it foreign greenfield, foreign takeover or 
domestic private, in the aftermath of the reform process. This could be explained by the 
resulting competition among banks of various types that co-existed in Central and Eastern 
European country economies following the completion of bank reforms. 
In general, while deposits ratio remains unchanged for all three time periods, 
average liabilities ratio for the post reform period, as well as, the entire sample period, are 
higher than those for the pre-reform period. Equity ratio on the other hand dropped by 1% 
post reform and for the entire sample period than the reform period. Bank performance is 
also higher post reform as well as for the whole sample. Shareholders equity ratio while 
higher during the reform period appears not to have changed much over our sample 
period.  
With reference to the risk measures, off-balance sheet items are similar across 
all identified time periods, suggesting banks continued tendency to engage in off balance 
sheet activity as a means to increase bank profitability, despite its evident risks. While 
loan loss reserves are highest in the post reform period, non-performing loans are the 
lowest on average during the period. This low non-performing loans ratio may suggest 
increased efficiency in private banks management of risks of operations, or alternatively 
the benefits of improved environment for bank operations.  
Jointly owned banks in our data sample comprise of those where bank shareholding 
lies in both the hands of foreign individuals and those of private individuals. This 
classification allows us to explore the difference, if any, in the relationship between bank 
capital and performance among these different identified bank subsidiary ownership 
types. Corporate Governance implications of such varied shareholding arrangement will 
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therefore differ among both these private bank types owing to differences in bank 
ownership, which in turn will affect bank performance. Secondly, risk measures vary and 
will therefore have varying impacts on bank performance. Most existing literature 
overlook this, and so by employing various risk measures, we are able to assess the 
effects of the risk measures on various bank performance measures. Thirdly, various 
reforms undertaken by transition countries including economic, financial and institutional 
reforms, have promoted the foray of foreign banks into the transition countries, as well as 
the growth of private banks in general, in these countries. This may have enabled 
institutions to affect bank performance also in these countries as costs of operations 
decline. To that effect, by using a sample of banks over the period of 2000 - 2007, we are 
able to examine the impact of institutions on bank performance.  
Our analysis focuses on one dimension of bank performance –return on assets, 
relating to the role of bank capital, bank risks and bank ownership.  While some capital 
and risks could boost performance, too much capital and risks may harm it. In other 
word, we envisage a non-linear relationship. This is because, availability of bank capital 
enables the banks to have surplus capital, which could result in excessive risk taking, thus 
lowering bank performance.  Unlike much of the existing literature, we also explore the 
potential role of ownership in this respect. We argue that 100% foreign subsidiary –
foreign greenfield, may be more efficiency enhancing than the joint venture (jointly 
owned) banks  and in the absence of any prior, we use our data to test the validity of this 
hypothesis.  
 
 
 
4.3. Methodology 
Our primary objective in this paper is to assess the effect of ownership on bank capital 
and bank performance, after controlling for all other factors.  
However, given the time-invariant nature of Osiris bank ownership 
information, use of a fixed-effects model may be challenging. One option would be to run 
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separate regressions for identified bank ownership categories; however this is still 
problematic as this would reduce the sample sizes and may also cause selectivity bias in 
our estimates. Fortunately we have access to Bankscope time varying foreign ownership 
information compiled by De Haas et al. (2011). This allows us to merge Osiris data with 
Bankscope ownership data, which in turn gives rise to a sub-sample.
55
 The size of the 
sub-sample was determined by the observations for which time varying ownership data 
was available. There are 397 observations in this sub-sample, which was used for 
estimating the fixed effects model (in equations 4.2). Note however that this ownership 
information is binary in nature distinguishing foreign greenfield banks from foreign 
takeover banks. We therefore proxy one-hundred percent foreign owned subsidiaries by 
foreign greenfield banks - newly established subsidiaries by parent banks. The reference 
category is the foreign take over banks which are essentially joint venture banks and also 
a handful of domestic private banks.  
 
 
4.3.1.  Determination of Bank Capital 
First we determine bank capital in terms of selected bank characteristics and country 
level characteristics. We start with the pooled OLS estimates of capital structure in terms 
of foreign ownership (greenfield or not) and other control variables, including year 
dummies in our specification to control for year specific effects. However given the 
possible omitted variable bias we prefer panel data fixed effects estimates to pooled OLS 
estimates. These are determined as follows:  
   (4.1) 
Where, K is measure of bank capital – liabilities ratio. Size of bank capital, K, depends 
on bank ownership F (whether greenfield/one hundred percent foreign owned, or not), 
and other variables subsumed in X – bank size, intangible assets as a share of total assets 
(Intangibles), Bank Age (Young), profitability (return on assets), Growth of the economy. 
With regard to bank ownership, we control for private domestic bank ownership, while 
                                                 
55 We are grateful to Ralph De Haas and Yevgeniya Korniyenko of EBRD for sharing this information with us.  
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maintaining foreign takeover banks as our reference category.  and  are bank-specific 
and year specific fixed effects respectively.  
 
 
4.3.2. Determination of Bank Performance 
We begin with pooled OLS regression analysis for the sample period using available 
ownership information. Thus, bank performance, Ri of the i-th firm is given by:  
  
Ri = λ0 + λ1Li + λ2Fi + λ3(Fi*Li) + λ4Gi + λ5Xi + μi    (4.2) 
Where, 
L = Capital measure: liability ratio 
F = 1 if the bank is a foreign greenfield bank and zero otherwise. 
G = Risk measure
56
 
Equation (4.2) also includes an interaction term between F and L, with a view to capture 
the differential effect of capital in a foreign greenfield bank subsidiary on bank 
performance. As F, also enters the regression independently, the interaction of F and L 
enables us to capture the total (direct and indirect) effects of foreign greenfield 
ownership, on bank performance, as measured by the sum of the coefficients  
The set of control variables included in X not only includes various firm-
specific variables (e.g., age, bank size (proxied by log of bank assets), but also a dummy 
for reform period 2002-2004 when majority of reforms were completed
57
, and country-
level GDP per capita which is a strong correlate of country institutional characteristics. 
We also include the square of GDP per capita with a view to examine the evidence of 
non-linearity, if any Inclusion of year dummies in our specification enables us to control 
                                                 
56 Of which we experiment with off balance sheet items (as shares of total assets), loan loss reserves, and non-
performing loans due to potential correlation between all three risk measures (See Appendix Table A4.3). 
57 Inclusion of this dummy enables one to examine the immediate impact of successful bank reform completion on 
bank performance. Such an effect could whittle down over time. We drop the variable in final results as it was 
insignificant in all our regressions 
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for year specific effects. All right hand side variables are lagged by one year in an 
attempt to minimize simultaneity bias.  
One potential weakness of equation (4.2) above is that these pooled OLS 
estimates could be biased due to the omitted factors influencing Ri. In order to address 
this bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a panel data fixed effects 
estimate as contained in equation (4.3)  
    (4.3) 
Where  refers to bank specific unobserved factors and refers to year specific 
unobserved factors. All other variables are as included in equation (4.2). As before, use of 
lagged explanatory variables will minimize the extent of potential endogeneity bias in our 
estimates, generated by reverse causality. 
Given the differential corporate governance mechanisms in foreign greenfield 
bank subsidiaries we explore the differential implications of bank ownership structure for 
the relationship between bank capital and performance in our sample. Our fixed effects 
estimates ensure that bias arising from un-observed heterogeneity is minimized. To that 
effect, firm (bank) fixed effects (ν) and year fixed effects (θ) enable any potential bias 
arising from firm (bank)/year level unobserved variation in the data to be minimized. 
Ceteris paribus, our analysis focuses on the sign and significance of α3 which highlights 
the differential effect of foreign greenfield liability on bank performance relative to all 
other banks. 
 
 
 4.3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Our measures of bank performance with which we explore, as earlier discussed include 
return on total assets, profit margin and return on shareholders’ equity. Our risk 
measures, on the other hand are, ratio of off balance sheet items to total assets, although 
we experiment with two other measures: ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loans, 
and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans
58
. Measures of capital structure 
                                                 
58 The sum of total loans and loan loss reserves. 
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with which we explore include, deposits ratio, liabilities ratio, and shareholders’ equity 
ratio. Definitions of regression variables employed in our model and the means and 
standard deviations of these variables are provided in Appendix Table A4.1. Pair wise 
correlations between explanatory variables employed in our regression models are as 
shown in Appendix Tables A4.2 and A4.3, and suggest that multicollinearity between the 
included regressors is not of a serious nature.  
More interestingly, as we supplement our data set with data from De Haas et al 
(2011), where we observe foreign greenfield banks and foreign takeover banks, Table 
4.3a compares the means of bank capital and performance measures between foreign 
greenfield and foreign takeover bank subsidiaries in our data sub-sample. In this regard 
bank capital examined included deposits ratio (ratio of deposits to total assets), and 
shareholders equity ratio (ratio of shareholders equity to total assets), in addition to 
liabilities ratio. 
Compared to foreign takeover bank subsidiaries, foreign greenfield bank 
subsidiaries tend to have higher deposits and liability ratio, but lower equity ratio. It 
follows that foreign greenfield banks tend to be the most capitalized banks in terms of 
most capital ratios. Furthermore, greenfield banks have higher return on assets than 
foreign takeover banks, but no significant difference is observed for other potential 
profitability ratios - profit margin and return on equity measures. In Table 4.3b we 
observe a similar trend as means of foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries capital and 
performance measures are compared to those of all other banks in the sample. Foreign 
greenfield bank subsidiaries perform overwhelmingly better than all other bank 
subsidiary types. It would be interesting to see whether this bivariate comparison holds 
when we control for other factors in a multivariate regression framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
151 
 
4.4. Results 
We start our analysis by considering pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model for 2000 
-2007. We also show the corresponding capital estimate as in equation (4.1) as 
summarized in Table 4.4.  
Given the aforementioned concerns with single cross-section regressions as the 
use of continuous bank ownership data for the latest year may have resulted in, and the 
anticipated challenges in estimating fixed effects with time-invariant bank ownership, we 
introduce the time varying bank ownership data from De Haas et al (2011) and merge it 
with our Osiris data. De Haas et al data however only contains ownership of banks based 
on whether they are foreign greenfield, takeover, or domestic private bank. Our choice of 
bank performance measure, return on assets, is informed by the significance of the mean 
return on assets of foreign greenfield banks relative to those of other banks as discussed 
previously in section 4.3. This provides further substance to our argument that one 
hundred percent foreign owned/Foreign greenfield banks, tend to be the best performing 
banks compared to other types of banks. Table 4.5 shows the fixed effects least squares 
estimates. 
 
 
4.4.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Regression estimates  
Table 4.4 shows the pooled OLS estimates and makes use of Bankscope time varying 
ownership information.  
Table 4.4 suggests that foreign greenfield bank subsidiary dummy is negative and 
significant for return on assets, and results in a decrease in return on assets by 14.8%. It is 
however insignificant for bank liabilities. Furthermore, although higher liability lowers 
return on assets, higher liabilities in foreign greenfield banks increases return on assets by 
15%.  
In the aforementioned pooled OLS regression estimates, intangible assets are 
negative and significant for return on assets. Evidence of non-linearity of growth of GDP 
  
152 
 
per capita is also observed given the significance of log of GDP per capita and its square 
which are negative and positive respectively.  
We compare these pooled regression estimates with those of fixed effects 
ordinary least squares in the subsequent section (4.4.2) 
 
 
4.4.2. Fixed Effects Ordinary least squares Regression results 2000-2007 
We present the bank performance fixed effects OLS estimates for sample banks as 
tabulated in Table 4.5. Foreign greenfield bank subsidiary dummy is negative and 
significant in respect of both bank liabilities and return on assets. This suggests that 
greenfield banks have significantly lower liabilities, while they result in a decline in 
return on assets by 1.1%. Foreign greenfield banks tend to have higher return on assets 
even when liability increases, and the differential return is 12.7%. The differential return 
of private domestic banks on the other hand remains insignificant. In general higher 
liabilities ratio lowers return on assets.    
We observe the importance both for bank liabilities of intangible assets bank size, 
and bank age (young bank dummy), while growth of GDP results in a decline in bank 
liabilities. The significance of log of GDP per capita suggests that as CEE countries 
quality of institutions improves, bank liabilities will decline, resulting in less bank 
capital.  
Important for return on assets are banks off balance sheet items and bank age 
(young bank dummy), which are both positive and significant. 
 
 
4.4.3.  Comparison of Pooled and Fixed Effects Ordinary least squares Regression 
results 
Compared with pooled ordinary least squares regression estimates, fixed effects provide 
overwhelmingly better regression results. In particular, the differential return of foreign 
Greenfield banks of 12.7% in fixed effects ordinary least squares, is slightly lower than 
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15.1% obtained from pooled ordinary least squares. In other words, pooled OLS was 
overestimating the differential return on assets for foreign Greenfield banks.  
 
 
 
4.5.  Concluding Comments 
Despite the growing importance of understanding the implications of bank capital for 
bank performance, existing literature remains rather limited, especially for emerging 
economies. The present paper aims to bridge this gap of the literature. Furthermore, 
concerns regarding bank excessive lending in light of the recent financial crisis suggest 
the need for stronger corporate governance of banks by its stakeholders –depositors, 
creditors, shareholders, and the Government. To that effect, much of the discussion in 
Europe has focussed on bank capital and capital regulation. However the success of any 
policy to address the challenges of bank regulation will require a strong corporate 
governance of the banks in ensuring that bank capital is employed optimally to earn 
attractive rewards both to depositors and shareholders. The strength of this corporate 
governance will in turn depend highly on bank ownership, i.e., whether the bank is a 
foreign greenfield bank subsidiary or not. Foreign greenfield banks being more profitable 
than other banks will benefit bank performance in the economy owing to their bank 
capital. Host CEE countries will therefore stand to benefit from the superior corporate 
governance of these banks, and can serve to ensure the promotion of these bank types by 
strengthening institutional quality. Using bank-level data for the period 2000-2007 for a 
group of Central and Eastern European countries, we assess the role of banks’ assets, 
liabilities and risks on bank return on assets for foreign greenfield banks, while arguing 
foreign greenfield banks to be equivalent to one hundred percent foreign owned banks. 
Our results highlight the relationship between bank capital, bank risks, and performance, 
and this relationship may depend on ownership and institutions in these countries. We 
observe evidence that foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries tend to perform better than 
other banks. We argue that the latter crucially depends on of the fact that all owners in 
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foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries are foreign who share similar interests. Our results 
are robust to alternative specifications. 
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CHAPTER 4 TABLES 
Table 4.1a: Means Of Selected Institutional Characteristics In Host Countries Of Sample Banks 
Countries Creditor 
Rights 
Index 
EBRD 
Bank 
Reform 
Index 
Private 
Sector Credit 
by Banking 
system to 
GDP 
Stock 
Market 
capital 
to GDP 
Banking 
sector 
Efficiency 
Index 
Bank Size 
index 
Equity 
Market 
Efficiency 
Index 
Equity 
Market 
Size index 
GDP per 
Capita  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.00 2.52 0.00 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2773.51 
Bulgaria 2.00 3.36 0.29 0.14 5.51 4.84 4.01 0 3729.34 
Croatia 3.00 3.78 0.44 0.33 4.89 5.76 0 0 8637.32 
Czech republic 3.00 3.82 0.37 0.26 4.72 5.35 3.55 5.37 11263.76 
Hungary 1.00 4.00 0.41 0.25 5.37 5.21 4.23 5.57 8853.12 
Macedonia (FYR) 3.00 2.70 0.18 0.09 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2828.33 
Moldova 2.00 2.53 0.19 0.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a 837.82 
Poland 1.00 3.45 0.28 0.24 5.67 5.08 5.03 4.93 8036.20 
Republic of Serbia 2.00 2.33 0.23 0.17 3.36 n/a n/a n/a 4272.57 
Slovakia 2.00 3.46 0.38 0.08 4.76 5.52 0 0.92 8920.80 
Ukraine 2.00 2.47 0.00 0.18 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1959.41 
The average country level measures of the quality of institutions in sample Central and Eastern European countries.  Creditor Rights index is as obtained from Djankov et al (2007). 
The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights).  EBRD Bank reform index is as obtained from EBRD Structural Change indicators database 2009.It 
ranges from minimum of zero, to a maximum of four. Private sector Credit to GDP and Stock market credit to GDP measure banking and stock market development respectively. 
They are as obtained from Beck et al (2009). Creditors’ rights, EBRD Bank reform index, private sector credit by banking system to GDP, stock market capitalization to GDP are 
all averaged over the period 2000 – 2007.  Bank sector Efficiency Index, Banking Sector Size Index, Equity efficiency index and Equity size Index are obtained from World Bank 
Financial sector Development Indicators, and were averaged over 5 years for each of the countries where available from 2001 -2005.  GDP per capita is denominated in US 
Dollars, are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators and is also averaged over the period 2000 - 2007. Higher values of all indicators indicate better quality 
of institutions in these countries. Higher values of GDP per capita are indicative of more developed countries. 
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Table 4.1b: Means Of Selected Institutional Characteristics in OECD Countries Region 
Countries 
Creditor 
Rights 
Index 
Private 
Sector Credit 
by Banking 
system to 
GDP 
Stock 
Market 
capital 
to GDP 
Banking 
sector 
Efficiency 
Index 
Bank Size 
index 
Equity 
Market 
Efficiency 
Index 
Equity 
Market 
Size index 
GDP per 
Capita 
OECD Countries 1.97 0.89 0.76 n/a n/a n/a n/a 26683.50 
The average country level measures of the quality of institutions in the Organization for Economic cooperation and Development (OECD) region. OECD countries feature 
prominently as home countries of host country banks, and infact quite a number of CEE countries with investment in banks in fellow host CEE countries are members of OECD, 
such as Hungary, Poland, Czech republic, Slovakia  and Slovenia to mention but a few. Thus, these CEE countries will certainly be expected to be highly developed than fellow 
CEE countries that are not members of OECD and as such reforms in the countries will be more advanced than in other CEE countries. Furthermore, some OECD countries that 
are not CEE countries have significant investment in most of the CEE countries in our sample data set such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, France and Greece and Austria. All 
indicators are as defined in Table 4.1a above, and were obtained from the same sources. We exclude the averages of EBRD bank reform index on account of the index being not 
applicable to OECD countries. Bank sector Efficiency, Banking Sector Size, Equity efficiency, and Equity size Indices are unobtainable for the OECD countries and as such we 
insert “n/a” into the respective columns meaning “not available”. In comparison of Table 4.1b with 4.1a above, the OECD region average of all indicators are higher than all 
indicators of individual CEE countries above, except for creditor rights which is higher in a number of CEE countries than the OECD region. All indicators are averaged over the 
period 2000 -2007 
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Table 4.2: Average Capital Structure, Return and Risk measures for Sample Banks 
Time Period 2000-2003 2004-07 2000-2007 
Number of Observations 181 216 397 
Capital measures     
Deposits ratio 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Liabilities ratio 0.80 0.82 0.81 
Equity Ratio 0.19 0.18 0.18 
Return measures (in 
Percentage) 
   
Return on Total Assets 0.92% 1.33% 1.14% 
Profit Margin 11.21% 22.84% 17.54% 
Return on Equity 9.43% 10.44% 9.98% 
Risk measures     
Off-balance sheet items ratio 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Loan Loss Reserves ratio 0.043 0.052 0.048 
Non- performing Loans ratio 0.06 0.02 0.04 
Source: Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) Osiris Database (2007)  
Sample average capital structure, return measures and risk measures for sample banks over four time periods – Reform 
period (2000 – 2003), Post-reform period (2004 – 2007), and the full data sample period (2000 – 2007). The reform 
period is the period when most reforms in Central and Eastern European countries were implemented. The post-reform 
period on the other hand is the period when major reforms in most Central and Eastern European countries had been 
completed. As the number of observations in our sample varies from one year to another on account of missing 
observations –subsequently discarded, we observe a variation in the number of observations employed in making our 
comparisons across the identified time periods of reform.  
Capital structure measures the state of health of the bank. Higher values indicate more healthy banks, while lower 
values indicate cause for concern on account of the health of the bank. Thus higher capital structure measures are 
preferable to lower measures Capital structure measures are: Deposit ratio – Ratio of total bank deposits to total assets, 
Liabilities Ratio – The ratio of total liabilities (sum of deposits, other funding, non-interest bearing liabilities, loan loss 
reserves and other reserves) to total assets, and, Shareholder equity ratio - the ratio of shareholder equity to total assets.  
Return measures are the measures of the bank’s profitability/performance. We have three bank profitability measures in 
this regard: Return on total assets, Profit Margin, and return on equity. Higher measures indicate better performing 
banks, while the inverse is equally true. All return measures are in percentages.  
Risk measures reflect the impact on banks activities, of the business environment in which Central and Eastern 
European country banks operate. Banks may find it difficult to operate in highly risky business environments compared 
to less risky ones. Risk measures are: loan loss reserve ratio – The ratio of loan loss reserves to Gross loans, Non-
performing loans ratio – the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans, and, off-balance sheet items ratio – the 
ratio of the value of off-balance sheet items to total assets. Higher risk measures indicate more risky banks, while lower 
values indicate less risky banks. Risk measures are computed in decimals. 
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Table 4.3a: Independent Sample Means Test Of Foreign Greenfield Banks And Foreign 
Takeover Banks For 2000-2007 
Variables 
Number of 
observations 
Greenfield Takeover T-stat 
Deposits Ratio 152 0.8080 0.5974 5.966*** 
Liabilities ratio 152 0.8927 0.8114 3.596*** 
Equities Ratio 152 0.1073 0.1886 -3.596*** 
Return on assets 152 0.0053 0.0153 -2.332** 
Profit Margin 152 0.1656 0.1891 -0.440 
Return on Equity 152 0.0866 0.1744 -1.043 
Independent sample mean tests for foreign bank sample. We examine if the means of selected capital and performance 
measures for Foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries are significantly different from those for Foreign takeover bank 
subsidiaries. We make our analysis on the basis of the assumption of unequal variances between both foreign bank 
subsidiary samples. A positive and significant t-stat indicates that foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries capital and 
performance measures are significantly higher than those for foreign takeover bank subsidiaries. The inverse is the case in 
the event of a negative and significant T-stat. An insignificant t-stat suggests that Foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries and 
Foreign takeover bank subsidiary means are not significantly different. 
Table 4.3b: Independent Sample Means Test Of Foreign Greenfield Banks And Other 
Private Banks For 2000-2007 
Variables Number of 
observations 
Greenfield Other Banks T-stat 
Deposits Ratio 397 0.8080 0.6915 7.360*** 
Liabilities ratio 397 0.8927 0.7953 7.843*** 
Equities Ratio 397 0.1073 0.2047 -7.843*** 
Return on assets 397 0.0053 0.0134 -2.694** 
Profit Margin 397 0.1656 0.1785 -0.320 
Return on Equity 397 0.0866 0.1040 -0.754 
Independent sample mean tests for data sub-sample from De Haas et al (2011). We examine if the means of selected capital 
and performance measures for Foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries are significantly different from those for all other bank 
subsidiaries. We make our analysis on the basis of the assumption of unequal variances between both bank subsidiary 
samples. A positive and significant t-stat indicates that foreign greenfield bank subsidiary capital and performance measures 
are significantly higher than those for all other bank subsidiaries. The inverse is the case in the event of a negative and 
significant T-stat. An insignificant t-stat suggests that Foreign greenfield bank subsidiaries and other bank subsidiary means 
are not significantly different. 
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Table 4.4: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates of Capital Structure and 
Bank performance (With Foreign Greenfield bank Dummy for 2000 -2007) 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Liabilities Return on Assets 
Greenfield Bank Subsidiary -0.0623 -0.148*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0376) 
Domestic Bank Subsidiary -0.0682 -0.121** 
 (0.0444) (0.0506) 
Liabilities  -0.107** 
  (0.0423) 
Liabilities X Greenfield Bank Subsidiary  0.151*** 
  (0.0425) 
Liabilities X Domestic Bank Subsidiary  0.132** 
  (0.0586) 
Return on Assets 0.124  
 (0.281)  
Intangible assets -0.444 -0.441* 
 (0.994) (0.225) 
Off Balance sheet items -0.0172 -0.000299 
 (0.0108) (0.00126) 
Bank Size 0.0940** 0.00658* 
 (0.0325) (0.00321) 
Young -0.243** -0.0265 
 (0.107) (0.0166) 
Log of GDP per capita 0.00309 -0.190** 
 (0.0503) (0.0647) 
Square of Log of GDP per capita  0.0259** 
  (0.00972) 
Constant 0.134 0.407*** 
 (0.320) (0.113) 
   
Observations 340 340 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.446 0.167 
Pooled ordinary least squares regression estimates of capital structure and bank performance using time varying Bank subsidiary 
ownership data from De Haas et al (2011). Bank performance is measured using Return on Assets. Capital structure on the other 
hand is measured by liabilities ratio. All of the explanatory variables are as defined in Appendix Table A4.1. The Interaction of 
liabilities with Foreign greenfield bank subsidiary dummy enables us to examine the differential effect of foreign greenfield bank 
subsidiaries in respect of liabilities relative to other bank subsidiary ownership types. Log of GDP per capita measures the growth 
of GDP per capita and is used as a proxy for the quality of institutions in Central and Eastern European countries. Higher values of 
Log of GDP per capita indicate countries with better institutional quality. The square of the Log of GDP per capita is included in 
the regression to examine if growth of GDP per capita has a non-linear relationship with bank performance. A significant 
coefficient for both Log of GDP per capita and its square, as well as a variance in signs between both coefficients is indicative of a 
non-linear relationship between Log of GDP per capita and Bank performance. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%.    
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Table 4.5: Fixed Effects Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Of Bank Capital And 
Performance, 2000-2007 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Liabilities Return on Assets 
Foreign Greenfield Bank -0.0362*** -0.0112** 
 (0.111) (0.00370) 
Non foreign Bank -0.00495 0.00484 
 (0.00595) (0.0521) 
Liabilities ratio  -0.0544* 
  (0.0287) 
Liabilities Ratio X Foreign Greenfield Bank  0.127*** 
  (0.0285) 
Liabilities X non-foreign bank  0.116 
  (0.0915) 
Return on Assets -0.104  
 (0.0697)  
Intangible Assets 1.948* -0.587 
 (0.920) (0.364) 
Off Balance sheet items 0.00127 0.00130* 
 (0.00140) (0.000704) 
Bank Size 0.114*** 0.000949 
 (0.0400) (0.0107) 
Young Bank 0.0589*** 0.0118** 
 (0.0101) (0.00497) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.0981*** 0.0427 
 (0.0620) (0.0657) 
Square of  log of GDP per capita  -0.00636 
  (0.00939) 
Constant 0.216 -0.105 
 (0.170) (0.133) 
   
Observations 340 340 
Number of Banks 56 56 
R-squared 0.186 0.048 
Fixed effects ordinary least squares regression estimates of capital structure and bank performance using time varying Bank subsidiary 
ownership data from De Haas et al (2011) for sample period 2000 - 2007. Bank performance is measured using Return on Assets. Capital 
structure on the other hand is measured by liabilities ratio. All of the explanatory variables are as defined in Appendix Table A4.1. The 
Interaction of liabilities with Foreign greenfield bank subsidiary dummy enables us to examine the differential effect of foreign greenfield 
bank subsidiaries in respect of liabilities relative to other bank subsidiary ownership types. Log of GDP per capita measures the growth of 
GDP per capita and is used as a proxy for the quality of institutions in Central and Eastern European countries. Higher values of Log of GDP 
per capita indicate countries with better institutional quality. The square of the Log of GDP per capita is included in the regression to 
examine if growth of GDP per capita has a non-linear relationship with bank performance. A significant coefficient for both Log of GDP per 
capita and its square, as well as a variance in signs between both coefficients is indicative of a non-linear relationship between Log of GDP 
per capita and Bank performance. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets *** = significant at 
1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Table A4.1: Variable Definitions With Their Means And Standard Deviations – Bank Capital And Performance 
Variable Name Variable Definition Means 
Standard 
Deviation 
Return Measures (in Decimals)    
Return on total assets (In decimals) 
This is the contribution of each unit of total assets to net profit of the bank. It 
is defined as Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  It is 
usually measured in percentages, but for the purpose of obtaining concise 
regression estimates, we report it in decimal figures. A higher value indicates a 
more profitable bank. 
 
0.011 0.032 
Risk measures (In decimals)    
Off-balance sheet items to total assets 
This is the ratio of off balance sheet items to total assets. It may provide an 
indicator of riskiness of a bank, since more risky banks will tend to engage in 
more off balance sheet activity. Thus, higher values indicate more risky banks. 
0.121 0.644 
Capital Structure Variables    
Liabilities ratio 
This is the Ratio of the bank’s total liabilities (deposits plus other funding, 
non-interest bearing liabilities, and other reserves) to total assets. The higher 
this is, the better the bank’s capital base. 
 
0.819 0.151 
Bank Ownership    
Foreign Greenfield Bank 
This is a dummy taking the value of “1” if a bank is a foreign greenfield bank 
and “0” otherwise. 
 
0.239 0.427 
Domestic Private Bank 
This is a dummy taking the value of “1” if a bank is a domestic private bank 
and “0” otherwise. 
0.617 0.487 
Bank Characteristics     
Bank Size  
This is measured by the log transformation of the value of the bank’s total 
assets. Higher values indicate larger banks. 
 
8.435 0.801 
Young Bank 
This is a dummy taking the value of “1” if a bank was established after 1995 
and “0” otherwise 
0.060 0.239 
Intangibles This is the ratio of Intangible Assets to total assets. It may measure firms’ 0.002 0.006 
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growth opportunities. 
Liabilities Ratio X Foreign bank 
This is the cross product of Liabilities Ratio and Foreign greenfield Bank 
dummy. It measures the differential impact of liabilities of foreign greenfield 
banks.   
0.214 0.383 
Liabilities Ratio X Domestic Private 
Bank 
This is the cross product of Liabilities Ratio and domestic private bank 
dummy. It measures the differential impact of liabilities of domestic private 
banks    
0.489 0.405 
Country Level Characteristics    
Log of GDP per capita 
This is the log transformation of the value of Gross Domestic Product of a 
country attributable to each individual in the country. It is measured in US 
Dollars. Larger values indicate more developed countries and by inference 
higher quality institutional infrastructure. 
 
3.56 0.372 
Square of Log of GDP per capita 
This is the square of the log of GDP per capita. It provides evidence as to the 
existence of a non-linear relationship between log GDP per capita and Bank 
performance. 
   
12.84 2.59 
Sample Descriptive statistics for all variables employed in our regression model specification. These statistics are inclusive of all types of bank subsidiaries. Variable are defined and their 
computation explained where applicable. All variable descriptive statistics are reported in Decimals. 
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Appendix Table A4.2: Sample Correlation Matrix Of Pairwise Correlations Between Variables Employed In Regressions – Bank 
Capital and Performance 
Explanatory Variables 
Foreign 
Greenfield 
Dummy 
Domestic 
private 
Dummy 
Liabilities 
Ratio 
Intangible 
assets 
ratio 
Off-
Balance 
sheet 
items 
Bank 
size 
Young Log of 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
Square of 
log of 
GDPPC 
Foreign Greenfield Dummy 1  
 
 
  
 
  
Domestic Private Dummy -0.7121 1 
 
 
  
 
  
Liabilities Ratio 0.2765 -0.2285 1  
  
 
  
Intangible Assets 0.3195 -0.2650 0.0667 1 
  
 
  
Off Balance Sheet Items 0.1700 -0.2065 0.0582 0.1772 1 
 
 
  
Bank size 0.5571 -0.4428 0.5679 0.2313 0.2064 1  
  
Young Bank -0.1423 -0.1481 -0.4097 -0.0913 -0.0477 -0.2689 1 
  
Log of GDP Per Capita 0.3324 -0.3077 0.2399 0.2062 0.1340 0.5262 -0.1315 1 
 
Square of log of GDP Per 
Capita 
0.3395 -0.3057 0.2445 0.2042 0.1330 0.5338 -0.1406 0.9979 1 
Sample (of 397 observations) pairwise correlations between all variables employed in regression estimates. All variables are as defined in table 4 above.  With the exception of the variables of Bank size, and its 
pairing with foreign greenfield dummy Domestic private dummy, and liabilities, for which there is high correlation, but for which the correlation is consistent with existing theory, there exists no excessive pair 
wise correlation between any other pairs of explanatory variables. 
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Appendix Table A4.3: Sample Correlation Matrix of Pair Wise Correlations between Risk 
Measure Variables Employed In Regressions – Bank Capital and Performance 
 Risk Measures 
Risk Measures Loan loss Reserves 
Ratio 
Off-Balance sheet 
items Ratio 
Non-performing loans 
Ratio 
Loan loss Reserves 
Ratio 
1   
Off-Balance sheet 
items Ratio 
0.1261 1  
Non-performing loans 
Ratio 
-0.0443 -0.0094 1 
Sample pairwise correlations between risk measures experimented with in regressions. The three risk measures are Loan loss reserve ratio 
–ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loans, off balance sheet items ratio –the ratio of Off balance sheet items to total assets, and Non-
performing loans ratio – the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. All pairwise correlations are low. However given the rising 
popularity of off-balance sheet activity in banks portfolios of assets, we choose to employ off-balance sheet items ratio as our measure of 
bank risk. 
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APPENDIX FIGURES B4 
Appendix Figure B4.1: Distribution of Foreign bank ownership in sample CEE Countries 
for 2000 - 2007 
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Source: De Haas et al (2011) 
The distribution of private bank ownership across sample Central and Eastern European countries. Foreign bank subsidiary 
observations in our sample are about half of those of Domestic private bank subsidiaries. This suggests the significant role that 
foreign bank subsidiaries are playing in CEE countries and their growing appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1 
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Appendix Figure B4.2: Sample Distribution of Foreign Greenfield, Foreign 
Takeover and domestic private banks in sample CEE Countries for 2000 - 2007 
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Source: De Haas et al (2011) 
The distribution of foreign greenfield, foreign takeover, and domestic private banks across sample Central and Eastern 
European countries. A bi-model distribution is observed with 60% of observations being those of domestic private 
banks, and about 24% being those of foreign greenfield banks 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
5.0.  Introduction 
It is now well-established that growth and development cannot take place in an institutional 
vacuum. Transition from erstwhile communist states into a mature market economy requires an 
institutional framework that allows transactions to take place in an orderly manner and in 
which agents know that the decisions they take and the contracts they make will be protected 
by law, and enforced. Savers, investors, consumers, entrepreneurs, workers and risk-takers of 
all kinds need a framework of rules if rational, optimizing decisions are to be made. They also 
need some guarantee of economic stability and certainty, which can be provided only by good 
governance and sound economic policy-making. In this context, the thesis highlights the role of 
business association membership on firm’s external financing opportunities, role of absolute 
and relative corruption on growth of a competitive banking system where foreign banks are 
allowed to operate freely and also that of ownership (distinguishing between fully owned 
subsidiaries from joint venture) on the relationship between bank capital and performance.  
In this concluding chapter, we provide summary of our findings, contributions of our 
research as well as the challenges faced during the course of the thesis. Accordingly, this 
chapter comprises of three sections. Section 5.1, provides the summary of our findings, section 
5.2 critically analyzes the contributions of our findings, while the final section 5.3 discusses the 
shortcomings of the study and scope for future research. 
 
 
 
5.1.  Summary of findings 
The present thesis examines the implications of ownership and institutions for corporate 
financing in Central and Eastern Europe. There are three main empirical chapters (chapters 2, 3 
and 4) in this thesis.  
Chapter two examines the role of business networks for firm external financing. Our 
central hypothesis here is that firms’ affiliation to business association are likely to be 
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beneficial in securing external finance (especially bank finance) in countries with weak legal 
and judicial institutions; this is because it helps banks and financial institutions to minimize the 
underlying agency costs of lending. Using recent World bank-EBRD BEEPS data, we find 
some support to this central hypothesis in our sample. Firms affiliated to business networks are 
more likely to secure external bank finance, especially from newly established foreign and 
domestic private commercial banks. In the process small and medium sized enterprises are 
discriminated against and are often less likely to secure external bank finance. This finding 
however highlights that too much reliance on business networking for credit allocation may 
encourage inefficiency as networked firms are not necessarily more efficient. Given the data 
constraint, we were unable to examine the implications of business association membership for 
firm efficiency, which we hope to address in future research. 
Importance of foreign banks for economic development of CEE countries has been 
emphasized in the literature though there is wide dispersion in foreign investment in the region. 
In this context, the chapter three focuses on the implications of corruption for foreign bank 
entry and ownership structure in central and eastern European countries. Clearly corruption is 
an important aspect of weak institutions in many emerging economies. The chapter argues that 
the presence and persistence of corruption adversely affects costs of foreign banks (setting-up 
as well as running day-to-day business) in host emerging economies. The paper not only 
considers the role of host corruption per se, but also the distance in the corruption between 
home and host countries, which we label as relative corruption. It is argued here that relative 
corruption measures the degree of (un)familiarity in running a business in the foreign country. 
We primarily use Bankscope bank-level data to examine the implications of absolute and 
relative host corruption for foreign bank entry in our sample. While greater absolute and 
relative corruption may lower foreign bank entry, greater relative corruption is found to 
encourage foreign greenfield entry in our sample; relative corruption is not however significant 
for foreign takeover. The latter highlights the importance of encouraging foreign investors 
from countries with similar institutions. 
Finally, we consider the implications of ownership for bank capital and performance in 
chapter four (the final empirical chapter). While much of the discussion in Europe after the 
recent banking crisis has focused on bank capital and capital regulation, we argue that the 
relationship between bank capital and bank performance crucially depends on bank ownership 
structure. Following on from the second chapter, our analysis focuses on a distinction between 
foreign greenfield and other joint venture (JV) banks in our sample. We predict a differential 
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effect of high bank capital in greenfield and JV banks because unlike greenfield banks, there 
remains a conflict of interests between foreign and domestic partners in JV banks. Using both 
Osiris and related data from De Haas et al (2011), we find a significant positive effect of 
foreign Greenfield (as opposed to JV) bank capital on bank performance, after controlling for 
all other factors. We argue that the better performance of foreign Greenfield banks in CEE 
countries in this respect can be attributed to their better governance compared to varied 
ownership arrangement in other joint venture banks. This is an important contribution to the 
existing literature as the distinction between foreign greenfield and JV banks is often not made.  
Thus the present study highlights the role of institutions and ownership on corporate 
financing opportunities in the transitions of CEE countries from erstwhile planned economies. 
We hope findings of this thesis would inform policies and will also influence future research.  
  
 
 
5.2. Contributions  
Having successfully conducted a study of this magnitude, it is important to highlight the 
contributions of the research. This enables the creation of value to research.  
The chapter on the role of business association membership contributes to a limited but 
growing literature on corporate financing in emerging economies. There is generally a 
consensus in the literature that business networks are a feature of the organizational landscape 
of many countries though their nature and effects may vary across the world. Kali (1999) 
argued that these networks absorb honest individuals and raise the density of dishonest 
individuals engaged in anonymous market exchange, which in turn may harm public interest. 
Consequently, the payoff from market exchange may diminish. Along similar lines Khawaja 
and Mian (2005) examining the link between political connection of firms and bank lending in 
Pakistan from 1996-2002, found that political firms borrow 45% more and also have 50% 
higher default rates and this preferential treatment of political firms largely occur in states 
banks in the country. In contrast, cross-country studies on social capital and economic growth 
(e.g., see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley 2000) have generally highlighted the positive 
impact of active membership in social organization to economic growth, thus motivating our 
analysis for the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe. While there is a growing 
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literature on corporate financing in CEE region (for example, see Fries and Taci (2002); 
Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Sulla (2002); De Haas et al. (2007)) and also some literature 
highlighting the effect of lack of social capital in transition region (e.g., see Raiser (1999), 
Paldam and Svedsen (2000, 2001)) on economic development and growth in the region, we are 
not aware of any study that analyzes the role of business networks on firm external financing 
opportunities in the transition region. We thus integrate two strands of the literature, one on 
corporate finance and, the second one on social capital and economic development, to examine 
the effect of business networks on corporate financing opportunities in the CEE region. It is an 
important exercise because it would allow us to identify a possible micro-economic mechanism 
through which social networking could influence corporate financial opportunities in the 
region. Further results from our analysis highlights the aspect of inefficiency business 
networking may cause, distinguishing it from the advantages of social networking. Given that 
these countries are undergoing radical institutional restructuring, it is important that the 
informal institutions (e.g., some business networks) remain compatible with the formal 
institutions so as to minimize the possible costs of corruption and tax evasion and boost 
economic growth in the region. We thus hope that this research will inform policy makers to 
take steps to ease SME’s access to external corporate financing opportunities from newly 
privatised banks (domestic or foreign). 
The rationale for foreign bank entry in transition countries is not fully understood. Most 
studies on foreign bank entry have tended to focus on developed economies, mostly the US 
(e.g., see Goldberg and Saunders (1980), Goldberg and Saunders (1981), Fisher and Molyneux 
(1996), and Hultman and Mcgee (1988)). These countries welcomed foreign banks into their 
economies in the process of embracing capitalist principles in their economies.  Rationales for 
foreign bank entry in CEE transition countries include provision of financial services to 
existing clientele (Lensink and Hermes, 2002), attractiveness of host markets, e.g., size, lower 
taxes, higher GDP (e.g., see Claessens et al. 2000), favourable host country regulation (Clarke 
et al. 2001, Cerruti et al. 2007) and also the role of bank reforms and political freedom 
(Lensink and Haan, 2002). While different dimensions of institutions may be pertinent, recent 
FDI literature for non-financial firms has particularly focussed on the significance of 
corruption (e.g, see Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). In this context, we focus on the role of 
corruption on foreign bank entry and ownership structure in CEE region characterised by weak 
institutions, which remains rather unexplored. 
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Corruption is argued to adversely affect foreign direct investment as it acts as a tax on 
international investments (Wei, 2000). Hines (1995) cites the USA as a country from which 
foreign direct investment goes to less corrupt countries. Conversely, Egger and Winner (2005) 
provide evidence suggesting that corruption might encourage foreign direct investment. From 
that perspective, foreign bank entry might be encouraged despite the prevalence of corruption. 
Distinguishing between absolute and relative corruption, Driffield et al. (2010) find that in 
addition to absolute corruption, relative corruption may further lower foreign ownership in 
non-financial firms in the transition region though the result is reversed for knowledge 
intensive firms who are unwilling to share their knowledge with local partners in the region 
characterized by weak institutions. The literature is however rather silent about the role of 
corruption on foreign bank entry and ownership in the emerging world and the present paper 
attempts to bridge this gap in the literature.  We apply the literature on corruption and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to the case of foreign banks with a view to explore if the results 
obtained for non-financial firms remain unchanged for the banking sector. The finding that 
relative corruption is important for foreign bank entry is a significant one for policy makers as 
it may emphasize the need for encouraging foreign banks from countries with similar 
institutions.  
The recent financial crisis highlights concerns regarding bank excessive lending and 
hence suggests the need for stronger corporate governance of banks by its stakeholders –
depositors, shareholders, and the government. During this period, much of the discussion in 
Europe has focused on the size of bank capital and capital regulation. In this context we argue 
that the effect of bank capital on bank performance crucially depends on bank ownership 
structure. While the existing literature highlights the relative efficiency of foreign banks as a 
whole, our analysis highlights the fact that there is heterogeneity in the ownership structure of 
foreign banks. In particular, we distinguish fully owned foreign owned bank subsidiary from 
joint venture foreign banks with a view to understand their differential implications for the 
effects of bank capital. The underlying argument is that unlike Greenfield banks there is likely 
to be a non-alignment of interests between foreign and domestic owners of joint venture banks, 
which in turn may influence the relationship between bank capital and bank performance in 
joint venture banks differently from that for fully owned foreign subsidiaries. Results support 
our central hypothesis that greater bank capital is not necessarily harmful for bank 
performance. In particular, there is suggestion that greater bank capital may improve bank 
performance of fully owned foreign bank subsidiaries only. This finding helps explaining the 
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mixed findings in the literature: While Claessens et al (1998), Havrylchyk, (2006), Berger et al 
(2000) and Berger et al (2003) highlight better performance of foreign banks in relation to 
domestic banks, Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg (2008), find that foreign ownership of banks 
could reduce bank efficiency. It can be argued that these mixed results in the literature can be 
better explained by differential bank ownership structure even for foreign banks, which 
remains rather unexplored. In other words, findings from this chapter highlight the importance 
of differential ownership structure of foreign banks.  
 
 
  
5.3. Shortcomings and scope for future research 
Like most empirical studies, the first and foremost challenge for us was access to suitable data 
to test our hypotheses. While BEEPS data had information about firm’s affiliation to business 
association, we did not have in depth information of the nature of the business association, e.g., 
size of the association, duration of the affiliation or membership fee for the affiliation. While 
most of this information pertained to 2002 and 2005 rounds of the survey, 2009 round of the 
survey did not possess information about firm’s affiliation to business association and hence 
we could not include 2009 data in our analysis. Also, the panel element of BEEPS data is 
limited and as such the size of the panel sample from 2002 and 2005 rounds of the data was 
limited. We however have tried our best to rise to the challenges and adopted suitable 
methodology to minimize any estimation bias. Finally, BEEPES data does not provide any 
information of profitability of firms and as such we were unable to test whether networked 
firms are more profitable or not. This remains an agenda for future research. 
Our second challenge pertains to information on bank ownership that we employed for 
second and third chapters. Information on bank ownership from Osiris and Bankscope that was 
available to us only pertained to the final year of the survey. Although ownership is largely 
time-invariant, there are some important changes in ownership for about 20% of our banks. 
Fortunately we were able to access data containing time varying bank ownership information 
from De Haas et al (2011). However the latter was largely binary in nature distinguishing 
foreign Greenfield from foreign takeover and so we did not have continuous ownership 
information. In addition, we had rather limited information on parent bank characteristics. 
Again, we have adopted panel data methodology that minimizes estimation bias due to omitted 
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factors and our results are robust to alternative samples and methodology. We however hope 
that future research will address the gaps in the current thesis.    
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